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Abstract
This thesis compiles three papers on livelihood and development in Indonesia. The
first quantifies the causal impact of having an alternative livelihood on household
food security for people living on small Indonesian islands. The geographical con-
text is chosen to acknowledge the severity of the food insecurity problem that they
face. The empirical identification employs a laboratory experiment in the field to
resolve the difficulties in conducting a full randomised control trial in small and
remote islands. Results show that an additional income framed as from an al-
ternative livelihood reduces expected household food insecurity. For every US$7.5
increase in permanent household weekly income, the food insecurity index is low-
ered by 2.3 points on a 0–15 scale. The magnitude of causal impact implies that a
more substantial amount of intervention is needed than the existing cash transfer
to entirely eradicate the feeling of food insecurity in the small Indonesian islands.
The second paper examines economic assimilation profiles of Indonesian ru-
ral–urban migrants, which can be viewed as assessing the outcome of a livelihood
diversification strategy. The empirical assessment utilises the feature of individual
longitudinal data of the Rural–Urban Migration in China and Indonesia (RUMiCI)
dataset in a novel approach for the context of the case study. The Indonesian con-
text is chosen to add empirical finding to countries such as China and Vietnam,
that have more restrictive policies than Indonesia. The focus of analysis is earn-
ings as well as mental health, which is also considered novel for the context of the
case study. Results demonstrate that internal Indonesian migrants do not experi-
ence earnings penalties subsequent to their arrival in urban areas. Indeed, their
earnings persistently overtake those of urban natives over time. This assimilation
profile suggests that internal migrants in a liberal internal migration institutional
setting tend to be positively selected such that they outperform the urban native
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in the labour market. However, a series of further estimates also identifies that
the migrants experience a worsening mental health condition subsequently. The
inferior mental health outcome seems to be explained by decreasing social support
over time rather than the number of hours spent at work. On combining the earn-
ing assimilation profile and mental health assimilation profile, it can be inferred
that although these migrants are positively selected in the labour market, they are
quite prone to depressive symptoms.
Given the importance of social capital in livelihood development, the third pa-
per investigates the potential role of education as a means for social capital for-
mation. The paper argues that civic education might matter in shaping individual
social capital skills following an appropriate period of exposure of individuals to
such education in their lifecycle of social skills development, that is, adolescence.
Specifically, the identification strategy exploits a natural experiment of state ide-
ology courses in Indonesia (known as P4), which was discontinued unexpectedly
owing to the Reformasi in 1998. However, the regression discontinuity design iden-
tifies no significant statistical difference in terms of social skills and a set of social
capital measures between similar cohorts exposed and not exposed to the P4 pro-
gramme. The programme only had a minor effect on cognitive score related to the
courses. The results are consistent on using various robustness checks. The analy-
sis concludes that the role of state ideology with indoctrination of the type observed
in Soeharto’s Indonesia to develop social capital element at the individual level is
limited.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Livelihood and development
A means of securing both living and livelihood is the underlying common topic of
three significant chapters in the present thesis. Each chapter, however, has its
theme and independent from the other. They offer a new context or a different
technique or a combination of both aspects added to literature on economic devel-
opment. The themes of the chapters consist of income shock and food security on
the small islands (Chapter 2); economic assimilation of rural-urban migrants in
non-restrictive policy setting (Chapter 3); and individual social capital formation
through education in an authoritarian regime (Chapter 4).
Those three empirical chapters used Indonesia as a study case because the
country provides a unique setting for the empirical investigations of each chapter.
Its socially diverse population and geographical shape, as the largest archipelagic
country in the world, are the distinct background to study food insecurity issue,
consequences of internal migration and social capital formation debate. The ‘is-
landness’ setting is very relevant for studying food security issue for people living
in the small islands (Chapter 2). The archipelago setting is essential in under-
standing the consequence of having an open internal migration with high domes-
tic migration costs (Chapter 3). The diverse social environment is relevant for
analysing the social capital formation-issue in Chapter 4.
Chapter 2 is concerned with the relationship between income shock and the
feeling of food insecurity as there has been a long tradition of examining the link-
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age between income and health (Deaton, 2003; Preston, 1975). This chapter fits
into the literature stream and focuses on the microeconomic analysis. Its distinct
contribution is that it focuses on establishing a causal relation between a positive
income shock and the individual perception of food insecurity improvement. More-
over, the empirical exercise uses a field experiment which differs to the method
used in the existing studies as it applies the population context. It is applied to
a unique framework of people living on small islands and facing vulnerable liveli-
hood prone to social conflict. The findings are expected to add new perspectives to
the empirical analysis of causal inference on the effect of income on food security
outcome.
Chapter 3 deals with the effect of time on earnings and mental health of the
rural-urban migrants. The study revisits the economic assimilation of migrants’
literature pioneered by Chiswick (1978) and Borjas (1985). The new proposed con-
text is the internal migration analysis occurring in a non-restrictive policy regime
and facing a high fixed cost of migration due to the nature of the archipelagic na-
ture of the country. The estimate utilises an individual panel data with fixed effect
technique. The empirical analysis is applied to newly available longitudinal data
on internal migrants seeking a better livelihood through rural-urban migration,
leading to movements from rural areas to one of the four major Indonesian cities.
The present chapter also highlights the relationship between economic assimila-
tion and general well-being, measured through the mental health status of the
population. The findings are expected to add variety of evidence to the economic
absorption of internal migrants’ literature.
Chapter 4 examines the consequence of the exposition to special education un-
der the Soeharto government in Indonesia. The chapter revisits the literature on
non-market effect or social return of education (Haveman and Wolfe, 1984) and
the technology of skills formation (Cunha and Heckman, 2007). The study mainly
focuses on a particular type of education, namely state ideology indoctrination
courses. It utilises the natural experiment of the discontinuation of massive pro-
grams. The findings are expected to shed light on the debate aiming to design an
appropriate intervention plan to build social capital at the individual-level through
education.
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1.2 Focus on Indonesia
The full-fledged empirical analyses in the present thesis solely focus on Indonesia.
Indonesia was chosen as a case study for several reasons. The common underly-
ing motivation in picking Indonesia as a case study is its unique setting for each
empirical analysis. For instance, in Chapter 2, Indonesia is an appropriate setting
as a sizeable archipelagic nation with food insecurity diversity. Besides, the policy-
setting about food security also deserves attention since the “food sovereignty” view
tends to undermine economic food access for the poor (Simatupang and Peter Tim-
mer, 2008).
In Chapter 3, Indonesia, with less restrictive policy towards internal migration,
offers a variety of evidence for a comparative analysis with countries having a more
stringent policy, such as China and Vietnam. Given the similarities between those
countries in terms of urbanisation rate and population size, Indonesian migrants
could have different economic outcomes compared with migrants in China as a
consequence of different institutional setting.
In Chapter 4, Indonesia’s experience of having a dictatorship regime imple-
menting education-specific training is very relevant to the discourse on social cap-
ital formation. Notably, the setting allows us to study social capital formation at
the individual level as the nature of the event suggests. This chapter focuses on
the individual level, which differs from that of the significant existing empirical
works using the community level as the unit of social capital formation.
1.3 Key analytical questions, method, and results
1.3.1 Chapter 2
This chapter attempts to answer two technical questions: how to establish a causal
link between a positive income shock and household food security; and how much a
one-Rupiah increment contribute to improving food security status. The empirical
approach adopted is a laboratory experiment in the field. The experiment allows
for designing an appropriate treatment framed as an event of having additional
income from an alternative livelihood. The use of a sample consisting of actual
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inhabitants of small islands permits precise impact evaluation, given that the best
effects in the context of location are known. The results showed a moderate impact
on the context of small island communities living in the Kei Islands. Every US$7.5
increase in weekly household income lowers the food insecurity index by 2.3 points
on a 0–15 scale. The finding suggests that a positive income shock is a real need to
reduce the feeling of food insecurity for the subpopulation considered in this study.
1.3.2 Chapter 3
This chapter questions whether the rural residents moving to a city succeed in
improving their livelihood or not. There are few specific analytical questions that
need to be asked: Do the earnings of Indonesian rural-urban migrants assimilate
those of urban natives? How fast does the convergence, if any, occur? Do they
conform to the immigrant assimilation hypothesis (IAH)? What is the correlation
between economic assimilation and mental health conditions? Does any specific
factor exist to explain the yearly mental health condition since migration?
A standard estimating equation for testing the IAH is used to answer those
questions. Unlike the impact evaluation of migration comparing migrants with
their counterparts in the migrant-sending region, economic assimilation by pur-
pose compares migrants with the population in the migrant-hosting region. Thus,
the specification mainly addresses the potential bias originating from the cohort
effect and individual heterogeneity. The cohort effect bias emerges because the
type of migrants in the cohort differs in each migration wave. The term individ-
ual heterogeneity refers to differences at the individual level. The estimates utilise
panel data at the individual level provided by Rural-Urban Migration in China and
Indonesia (RUMiCI) surveys with fixed-effect technique.
Result shows that the internal Indonesian migrants in four cities have persis-
tent higher incomes relative to non-migrants subsequent to their arrival in the
cities. This finding contradicts the standard profile predicted by the IAH in which
immigrants start with an earning penalty and then gradually catch up with the
earnings of urban natives. However, the economic assimilation profile is accom-
panied by a persistent worsening of mental health condition. It implies that the
migrants in the setting of a less-restricted internal migration policy tend to be pos-
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itively selected from the rural areas in the urban labor market. Although these
migrants are positively selected, as regards the other trait, they are prone to de-
pressive symptoms. In the Indonesian case, the estimates suggest that the pres-
sure on their mental health condition arises from reduced social support rather
than extended working hours relative to the natives. The overall economic assim-
ilation profile analysis results add varieties of evidence for comparative analysis
to other places in which the rural-urban migrants face more restrictions, such as
China or Vietnam.
1.3.3 Chapter 4
This chapter asks whether or not education forms individual social capital. The
empirical analysis exploits the natural experiment of the discontinuation of the
state ideology indoctrination courses in Indonesia (1998) owing to the Reformasi.
In doing so, it considers the following: Were the cohorts exposed to state ideology
courses during the Soeharto era statistically different from the un-exposed cohorts
with regards to social skills and social capital measures? The identification strat-
egy employs a regression discontinuity design (RDD). The RDD setting exploits the
sudden discontinuation of the P4 program in 1998 and uses the last cohort to be
exposed to the program in 1998 as the cut-off.
The analysis revealed no intermediate effect related to the differences in the la-
tent social skills of the groups. However, there was a minor effect on the cognitive
measure associated with the courses. Consistent with this result, no higher-order
effect was found with regards to the differences in social capital measures of the
cohorts. The results are robust to various robustness and falsification tests. The
heterogeneity impact analysis showed that there could be a backlash effect erod-
ing the program effect. The mentioned effect was attributed to the aspiration to
abandon all life aspect related to the New Order Era after the Reformasi. Besides,
support from the environmental condition could make the effect of the program last
longer. For example, living in a rural area with a homogeneous environment seems
to be an ease for the individual in maintaining program effect on trust. Overall,
the findings suggested that specific education with the type of indoctrination as ex-
perienced in Indonesia (Soeharto era) has a limited role in developing social capital
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at the individual level.
1.4 Contributions
Chapter 2 is innovative in that it focuses on small island communities within a
country rather than small-island communities at the country level as insignificant
studies on the small island developing states (SIDS), such Briguglio (1995), Dou-
glas (2006), Easterly and Kraay (2000), Guillotreau et al. (2012), McGillivray et al.
(2008), Read (2004), and Read (2010). Such a focus shift is crucial in understanding
the intra-subnational complexity problem of capabilities and entitlements. Macro-
level studies of SIDS have yielded two possible policy recommendations, namely
strengthening the engagement of micro and small states in international trade and
providing foreign aid to foster sustainable livelihood in those states. Those recom-
mendations might not be applicable to small island communities within a nation.
The field experiment also emphasises the importance of alternative livelihoods or
other interventions, such as cash transfer, to ensure food security in the small is-
land context. Moreover, the experiment provides the magnitude or dosage of the
causal link of additional income from this intervention on reducing the household
expectation in experiencing hunger. The practical use of the results is, for example,
to provide a revised amount of uniformly provided cash transfer in Indonesia if the
government takes into account malnutrition and food insecurity reduction as the
goal for such intervention. Currently, the government is considering shifting food
aid from rice to money (cash).
In Chapter 3, the study revisits the empirical work on internal migration eco-
nomic and mental health assimilation. To the best of our knowledge, there is no
study to estimate the economic assimilation or rural-urban migrant in Indonesia
using longitudinal data. Therefore, the present study compares the analysis to
other Asian countries such as China. The economic assimilation analysis differs
from Zhu (2016) with the Chinese case in the sense that this study explicitly tests
the time effect on the wage gap between rural-urban migrants. Besides, the en-
vironment for migrant also contrasts those of restrictive system in China. As for
the mental health analysis, the examination advances the study of Lu (2010a) for
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Indonesia. The analysis differs from Lu (2010a) in as it uses urban non-migrant as
the control group making the economic assimilation analysis instead of the impact
of migration as in Lu (2010a).
In Chapter 4, a different and fresh perspective on the Reformasi effect in In-
donesia is offered in terms of decentralisation, family planning, and the post-
economic crisis (see for example Molyneaux and Gertler (2000); Parinduri (2017);
Duflo (2001); Waters et al. (2003)). In particular, this research investigates a nat-
ural experiment related to the Indonesian reform in 1998: the discontinuation of
the state ideology courses in Indonesia, namely the P4 program. The interruption
offers an RDD setting to exploit the long-term effect of the program. This chapter
argues on the importance of the application to the social capital formation and the
uniqueness of the exposure period of adolescence, which is crucial for non-cognitive
formation in an individual’s lifecycle. The chapter provides an impact evaluation
of social capital formation at the individual level through specific education. The
results could serve as the basis for cost-benefit perspective in comparing the effec-
tiveness in developing social capital relative to community development approach
or any other means, such as general education.
1.5 Thesis structure
This thesis has five self-contained chapters. Chapters 2–4 are the significant chap-
ters and present the core of the research. Chapter 2 establishes the causal impact
of having additional income on perceptions of food security at the household level of
inhabitants of specific small islands, the Kei Islands of Maluku, Indonesia. Chap-
ter 3 examines the economic assimilation and its consequence on the mental health
of the rural-urban migrants in four major Indonesian cities. Chapter 4 investigates
the role of civic education in creating the element of social capital at the individual
level by exploiting the 1998 discontinuation of the P4 (state ideology courses) in
Indonesia given the critical nature of the social capital for livelihood development.
Chapter 5 concludes by highlighting the contribution, discussing the implications
of the findings of this thesis in policymaking, and presenting possible further re-
search directions.
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Chapter 2
Alternative livelihood for food
security
Abstract
Communities living in small and remote islands often have to deal with food inse-
curity. This chapter aims to assess the magnitude of impact of additional income
earned from an alternative livelihood on the status of household food security in
the short run. A random evaluation method is used to achieve this goal in the con-
text of fishing communities in Kei Islands, Indonesia. The sample population lives
in a lagging and geographically isolated region, facing limited livelihood options
and food insecurity. The field experiment uses a random real stake that represents
an alternative livelihood that could generate an additional income as the treat-
ment and relates it to the changes in household perceptions of food security as the
outcome measure. The results imply that higher weekly income enhances expected
food security. An increase of Rp100,000 (US$7.5) in permanent household weekly
income lowers the food insecurity scale by a factor of 2.3 out of 15. The magnitude
effect implies that a much larger amount of cash transfer is needed relative to the
existing national-level cash transfer programme.
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2.1 Introduction
Global progress has been made to reduce hunger and malnutrition, yet around
800 million people remain food insecure in 2016 (FAO et al., 2015). An emerging
framework to deal with the challenge is to acknowledge the food insecurity prob-
lem on a territorial basis and formulate appropriate policy responses (Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development et al., 2016). Geographical concentra-
tions for chronic food insecurity are primarily rural areas of developing countries.
In particular, disadvantaged subnational regions are those such as a remote area
or small islands with weak ties to the major market, which rely on subsistence
activities (FAO, 2014).
Therefore, a low-income group living on a small remote island is among food
insecure subpopulations. The modern food security concept requires the fulfilment
of both food availability and food access for all people at all times (FAO et al., 2015),
which is a requirement that is hardly realised for such a subpopulation. Food ac-
cess is limited by the geographical remoteness of the islands. Often, the island
population’s economic access to food is hindered by poverty and subsistence liveli-
hood from a marine resource or small-scale agriculture (Yamazaki et al., 2015).
The sustainable livelihood (SL) framework suggests three strategies for a house-
hold: (i) agricultural extensification or intensification, (ii) livelihood diversification,
and (iii) migration (Scoones, 1998). The study in this chapter focuses on exercising
the implication of livelihood diversification on food security for people living in a
small and remote island. By such an examination, the resulting empirical findings
are expected to serve as additional information for evidence-based policymaking.
The empirical analysis uses a case study of Eastern Indonesia. The samples
are artisanal fishing communities living on the Kei Islands, which are small. In-
donesia is an appropriate context since it is the largest archipelago and a develop-
ing country that has been facing persistent within-country food security disparity
(Food Security Council et al., 2015). Moreover, the food policy at the national level
is ambiguous in orientation, and hence, views as regard self-sufficiency and protec-
tion of the agricultural sector predominate. The policy results in high food prices
and food insecurity of the poor, despite the country’s claim of having a pro-poor
food policy (McCulloch and Peter Timmer, 2008; McCulloch, 2008; Fane and Warr,
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2008; McCarthy and Obidzinski, 2017). Eastern Indonesia is chosen since the re-
gion is known as the pocket of poverty and has lower economic growth relative to
the national standard (Hill et al., 2008; Miranti and Resosudarmo, 2005).
For a household, food security is both the means and ends for livelihood. For
an SL, food security needs to be achieved, which results in family members being
in a productive state. Conversely, food security requires adequate economic access
to food from a sustainable income. Given the nature of the bi-relationship between
livelihood and food security, careful empirical work is needed to establish a causal
effect of livelihood development on food security.
Accordingly, my study in this chapter employed a laboratory experiment in the
field and applied a randomised evaluation to a sample of 534 households to estab-
lish the causal impact of additional income gained from an alternative livelihood
on the status of household food security. As an outcome measure, the experiment
uses recent, widely adopted tools to measure food insecurity at the household level,
which rely on the hunger and food insecurity experience developed by the United
States Department of Agriculture (Hamilton et al., 1997), namely the Household
Food Security Survey Module (HFSSM). The use of the tools allows to not only gain
a valid measure since it, in general, complies with traditional nutrition intake and
anthropometry measures (Coates et al., 2003; Frongillo Jr, 1999; Jones et al., 2013;
Studdert et al., 2001; Upton et al., 2016) but also is an efficient way of measuring
food insecurity at the household level because it is recall based on experience. For
the treatment, participants in the experiment were asked to play an alternative
livelihood game in which a real stake was offered (Cameron and Shah, 2015) and
framed as additional income generated by alternative livelihood opportunities.
The use of a laboratory experiment in the field combined with the adoption of
HFSSM is a novelty of this chapter to resolve the difficulties in conducting a full
randomised control trial in small islands and remote areas. The novel focus of this
study is a population of artisanal fishing households that increasingly face a threat
of declining incomes and loss of livelihood as a result of the depletion of fishery
resources (Ainsworth et al., 2008), illegal fishing (Fox et al., 2009), and marine
resource conflict among community members (Yamazaki et al., 2015). To best of
my knowledge, this is the first study that uses a laboratory experiment in the field
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randomised in such a context of the population to evaluate the impact on household
food security of providing additional income through alternative livelihoods.
The finding suggests that providing additional income to households in the
small-island fishing community improves the expected food security of the house-
holds and its impact is higher than that found in other studies. The result suggests
that an increase in weekly household income of US$7.5, or about 21% cent of the
average household weekly expenditure is, on average, associated with a 2.3-point
decrease in the 15-item scale measuring food insecurity. This magnitude is mod-
erately higher than in the result of (Loopstra and Tarasuk, 2013), who found that
a $2,000 a yearly income gain, or 17% of annual household income, is associated
with only a 0.29 point decrease in the same scale of measurement.
Moreover, the estimated results predict that the total amount of additional
income required to fully alleviate the household experience of food insecurity in
Maluku and East Nusa Tenggara provinces is Rp12 billion and Rp15 billion ($9.6
and 12 million) respectively. The finding provides key information about the dose of
social assistance programmes that aim to improve the food security of small-island
communities by providing access to alternative livelihoods and relaxing financial
constraints of households for food consumption.
The rest of the chapters are organised as follows. Section 2.2 describes the
context of the population of the study. Section 2.3 explains the field experimental
laboratory design and estimation strategy. Section 2.4 presents the results and
discussion. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Context: small-island communities
Indonesia is an archipelago country with more than 17,000 islands, and most of
them are small and remote, particularly those in Eastern Indonesia (Indonesia
Statistics Agency, 2013). Small-island communities in Eastern Indonesia face two
major impediments to improving the status of household food security regarding
both the availability and accessibility of food. First, food availability is hindered
by underdeveloped infrastructure and limited connectivity to major cities in the
country. Returns on investment in transportation infrastructures in small islands
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are known to be riskier than for other regions owing to the sensitivity to variable
weather conditions and natural disasters, resulting in limited public and private
involvement in improving food availability in the region (FAO et al., 2015). Public
underinvestment in infrastructure for nation, including the eastern part, has been
massive owing to the energy subsidy that crowds out public spending, whereas
private investment has been hindered by a lack of coordination between line min-
istries, ministries of the central and local governments for the issuance of regula-
tions to boost physical infrastructure (Sandee, 2016).
FIGURE 2.1 – CORRELATION BETWEEN NUMBER OF ISLANDS AND FOOD SECURITY AT
PROVINCIAL LEVEL IN INDONESIA
Source: Author calculation based on Indonesian BPS (Bureau of Statistics) data and Food
Security Council et al. (2015, page 152).
Legend: A = Aceh, Bali = Bali, Ba = Banten, Be = Bengkulu, Y = Yogyakarta, Ja = Jakarta,
G = Gorontalo, Ji = Jambi, WJ = West Java, CJ = Central Java, EJ = East Java, WK = West
Kalimantan, SK = South Kalimantan, CK = Central Kalimantan, EK = East Kalimantan, NK
= North Kalimantan, BBI = Bangka Belitung Island, RI = Riau Island, L = Lampung, M =
Maluku, NM = North Maluku, WNT = West Nusa Tenggara, ENT = East Nusa Tenggara, P =
Papua, WP = West Papua, R = Riau, WS = West Sulawesi, SS = South Sulawesi, CS = Central
Sulawesi, SES = Southeastern Sulawesi, NS = North Sulawesi, WSum = West Sumatra, SSum
= South Sumatra, NSum = North Sumatra.
Note: Higher values in Y axes represents better food security.
About the accessibility of food at the household level, Eastern Indonesia, where
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many small islanders live, is known as the pocket of poverty and driver of na-
tionwide inequality (Akita and Alisjahbana, 2002). That is, economic access to re-
quired nutrition and healthy life for people living on the island has been hindered
by poverty and limited livelihood options (Resosudarmo and Jotzo, 2009).
The persistence of high food insecurity for communities living on a small and
remote island at a subnational level, with lagging social outcomes, is the interplay
of high poverty incidence, limited food entitlement, and food insecurity (ESCAP,
2009). This study focuses on Maluku Province that has a remarkable trifecta of
challenges for food security: (i) It is ranked among the provinces with lowest gross
domestic capita per capita in Indonesia (Hill and Vidyattama, 2016); (ii) It faces
severe food security vulnerability (Food Security Council et al., 2015); and (ii) It
has many small islands, which implies limited physical connectivity.
At the national level, Indonesia is an example that having a large number of is-
lands is a challenge for food security. A negative correlation exists between the food
insecurity index and the number of islands at the province level (Figure 2.1). It ex-
hibits a clear indication that economic access (income) and physical access to food
are weaker in some remote islands. As a showcase, in Eastern Indonesia, the small
islands of Maluku, North Maluku, East Nusa Tenggara, West Nusa Tenggara, and
West Papua are in contrast to the small islands of Bangka Belitung Island and
Riau Island in Western Indonesia, which have more opportunity to exploit the ad-
vantage of being located near Malacca Strait such as a greater involvement in
international trade. The correlation line (dashed) becomes steeper when I exclude
Bangka Belitung Island and Riau Island, which suggests that income (economic)
access matters for food security.
For the low-income groups in these provinces, food may be physically present
in the region, although not as much as in Western Indonesia, but it is not accessi-
ble for all subpopulations because of the limited financial capacity of some groups.
Thus, the resource allocation of food at the household level will likely exhibit depri-
vation for some or inequality among the subpopulation members. Therefore, food
security problem in the region is about food entitlement at the individual level.
This article specifically contributes to finding a solution to this problem by
quantifying the causal impact of relaxing household economic access problems re-
2.2. CONTEXT: SMALL-ISLAND COMMUNITIES 15
FIGURE 2.2 – LOCATION OF THE KEI ISLANDS
Source: CartoGIS Services, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National
University
garding food security. Protecting the most vulnerable member of the household or
society, including in terms of food security, is the most important determinant of
household well-being (Dasgupta, 1995). The treatment in this study is best suited
to two potential sources of income enhancements for vulnerable members of the
community: (i) market base (additional income) and (ii) social safety net (cash
transfer). The difference between the two is the time frame of the intervention.
The former is more sustainable than the latter but needs a long-run time frame to
be achieved. The latter is a more suitable than the former for a temporary and ur-
gent situation, such as food price hike. In addition to the time frame, policymakers
need to know the effects and extent of such effects on household food security re-
sulting from relaxing the financial access to food based on a cost–benefit measure.
Therefore, the relevance of this analysis is in determining the size or magnitude
impact of monetary shock to household food security in this particular population
context.
16 CHAPTER 2. ALTERNATIVE LIVELIHOOD FOR FOOD SECURITY
TABLE 2.1 – RESPONDENT DISTRIBUTION ACROSS VILLAGES AND DISTRICTS
District Village Number of samples
Maluku Tenggara District Dian Pulau 31
Dunwahan 94
Sathean 80
Sitniohoi 39
Lairngangas 17
Selayar 78
Total 339
Tual City Dullah Laut 93
Pulau Ut 48
Lebetawi 54
Total 195
2.3 Field experiment
This study was performed in nine fishing villages from two districts in Kei Islands
in the Maluku Province of Eastern Indonesia (Figure 2.3). The Kei Islands are cho-
sen as the research site because they represent small and remote island communi-
ties in Eastern Indonesia. The remoteness of the Kei Islands is evident from the
fact that they are about 551 km away from Ambon, the capital of Maluku Province,
which consists of thousands of small islands (Figure 2.2). Ambon itself is about
2,404 km away from Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia. Food availability in the
Kei Islands is hindered by underdeveloped infrastructure and limited sea trans-
portation from Ambon and other major cities. Further, there has been increasing
concern as to the capability of supplying food within the islands because of the
degradation of marine resources and local conflict, forcing the island community to
face food access problems (Yamazaki et al., 2015).
2.3.1 Sampling procedure
Household-level sampling uses both purposive and random sampling methods. First,
we selected two target districts, namely Tual City and Southeast Maluku District.
Each of them represents fishing communities in urban and rural areas in small-
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FIGURE 2.3 – LOCATION OF THE SURVEY IN NINE VILLAGES
Source: CartoGIS Services, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National
University
island, respectively. Then, samples of fishing villages were then randomly selected
in proportion to the total number of fishing villages in each district. According to
Podes (Potential Village) 2014 of Statistics Indonesia, the ratio of the fishing village
in Maluku Tenggara District to Tual City is about two. Hence, there were three
fishing villages from Tual City, and six fishing villages from Southeast Maluku
District were selected. Finally, a door-to-door households census was conducted
in each village. The census aims to capture all of the fishing households in each
village since administrative data to identify fishing families is difficult to find. In
total, data from 534 households were collected (Table 2.1).
2.3.2 The treatment: alternative livelihood
The objective of this chapter is to use randomised evaluation to assess an expected
change in household food insecurity status as a result of having access to additional
income that is generated by alternative livelihood activities. However, for ethical
reasons, the experiment could not include a simple randomisation procedure to
form treatment and control groups in the research area, through which the control
group would receive no benefits and the treatment group would receive treatment
with a certain probability. Such an approach was likely to create distress among
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the local community because of the current social tension.
The tension is associated with a poorly targeted subsidy from the local govern-
ment that has intensified jealousy among community members regarding receiving
external aid and gifts. To avoid such distress, the experiment required respon-
dents to play an alternative livelihood game in which they have a real stake in
the choice of livelihood options that yield a varying intensity of treatment among
respondents (Angrist and Imbens, 1995). The treatment is framed as an additional
income earned from an alternative livelihood opportunity. In the context of the
fishing communities at the research site, other livelihood options included engag-
ing in small-scale aquaculture or small-scale agriculture or becoming a motorcycle
or motorboat taxi driver or a carpenter.
The implementation of the alternative livelihood game involves two steps. First,
an initial wealth of either Rp5,000 ($0.4) or Rp20,000 ($1.6) is randomly offered to
respondents. The initial wealth represents part of the treatment, which is ran-
domly determined. Second, six alternative livelihood options are offered to each
respondent (Table 2.2). Each livelihood option has two possible outcomes, which
are determined by randomly picking up two marbles from a concealed hand. I use
the exact steps as in Cameron and Shah (2015). At this step a real money is given
to respondents and is framed as additional income from an alternative livelihood.
The enumerator read the following phrases at this step in the survey “Now, we
want to relate your livelihood change to the questions about the food that will be
eaten in your household in the next 1 week, from now, and whether you will be
able to afford the food you need in this period. Imagine that the amount of fund-
ing from the livelihood change experiment will be your additional monthly income,
beside your usual income. ” Further details of the procedures and the framing for
implementing the treatment is provided in Part I of subsection 5 Questionnaire.1
Given the structure of the game, the choice of livelihood options also allows us
to elicit risk preferences which is considered as an important control variable in my
estimating equation and to calculate the inferred coefficient of relative risk aver-
sion/CARRA (Table 2.2) following the procedure of Eckel and Grossman (2008).
1During the implementation of the investment game, we did not find any rejection to play the
game, neither respondents insisted to take the initial wealth directly.
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TABLE 2.2 – LIVELIHOOD OPTIONS AND INFERRED CARRA (COEFFICIENT OF RELATIVE
RISK AVERSION)
Livelihood
option
Low initial wealth $0.4(Rp5,000) High initial wealth $1.6(Rp20,000)
Red mar-
ble
Green
marble
Inferred
CARRA
Red mar-
ble
Green
marble
Inferred
CARRA
A Rp5,000 Rp5,000 6.32–∞ Rp20,000 Rp20,000 1.01–∞
B Rp4,500 Rp6,500 2.07–6.32 Rp16,000 Rp25,000 0.32–1.01
C Rp4,000 Rp8,000 1.07–2.07 Rp12,000 Rp30,000 0.23–0.32
D Rp3,000 Rp10,000 0.74–1.07 Rp8,000 Rp35,000 0.17–0.23
E Rp2,000 Rp12,000 0 –0.74 Rp4,000 Rp40,000 0–0.17
F 0 Rp14,000 -∞–0 0 Rp50,000 -∞–0
With two initial offers, there are 22 possible outcomes ranging from Rp5,000 to
Rp70,000 ($0.4 to $5.6), which represent the treatment intensities among respon-
dents. The average treatment intensity is equivalent to about 62% of the official
unconditional cash transfer (BLT or Bantuan Langsung Tunai), which is Rp5,000
($0.4) per capita per week or about 16% of the poverty line in the region.
The communication between respondent participating in the game could create
the unintended effect of the treatment. To address the problem, I employ several
strategies. First, the choice of survey location in the remote area provides support
to limit the spill over of information between sample villages. Respondent across
village can spread the information in person, but travels between villages involve
significant effort. Also, communication through the telephone is possible but is
very limited, considering the limited network and accessibility of (mobile) phones
in the region. Second, to limit communication between subjects, we simultane-
ously survey all households in every village. Last, I acknowledge that these efforts
might not be perfect in reducing the unintended effect of informational spill over.
Therefore, I use the instrumental variable-technique to resolve the bias problem
as a result of any unintended effect from spill over.
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2.3.3 Measuring food insecurity
A modern definition of food security encompasses five components: availability,
accessibility, effective utilisation, sustainability of the food system, and its stability
(Timmer, 2015). While availability at the community level is not the focus of this
study, the HFSSM module is the appropriate measure to capture the remaining
dimensions. The measure is based on experiences and perceptions of respondents
about their hunger experiences and those of their children.
The HFSSM module consists of 18 questions in total with 15 main questions
that capture the severity of food insecurity originating from the households’ finan-
cial constraints (Table 2.3). Within the HFSSM framework, a household experi-
ences several stages of food insecurity. The process starts with the feeling of, or
being anxious about, running out of food because of the household’s financial con-
straints. The next level of food insecurity involves the perception of inadequacy
regarding the quality or quantity of food eaten by the household members because
there is insufficient money for food. The subsequent stage is where the household
adjusts the use of foods, such as substituting usual diets with fewer and cheaper
foods. The ultimate stage involves instances of reduced food intake by adults, with
the physical sensation of hunger or loss of weight. The most severe instances af-
fect children in the household. Therefore, the severity of household food insecurity
ranges from the perception of running out of food to the situation of children not
eating for a whole day.
In this study, the food security questions regarding the households’ experience
in the past 12 months were asked before the respondents played the alternative
livelihood game. The responses to these questions represent a baseline for house-
hold food insecurity. After the respondents received the treatment through the
alternative livelihood game, the same set of questions was asked once again but on
the expected experience for one week duration given the additional income earned
in the alternative livelihood game. Thus, the changes in response to the food secu-
rity questions form a basis for assessing the impact of having access to an alterna-
tive livelihood on the expected household food security status.
With reference to the HFSSM module, two measures of household food insecu-
rity are used in this study. The first measure is referred to as the raw score that
2.3. FIELD EXPERIMENT 21
TABLE 2.3 – MAIN FOOD INSECURITY QUESTIONS IN THE HFSSM MODULE
Adult-related items Child-related items
Q2. Were you worried whether your food
would run out before you got money to
buy more?
Q10. Did you relied on only a few kinds of low-
cost food to feed your children because
you were running out of money to buy
food?
Q3. Did the food that you bought just did not
last, and you did not have money to get
more?
Q11. Could you not feed your children a bal-
anced meal because you could not afford
that?
Q4. Could you afford to eat balanced meals
or not?
Q12. Were your children not eating enough
because you just couldn’t afford enough
food.
Q5. Did you or other adults in your house-
hold ever cut the size of your meals or
skip meals because there wasn’t enough
money for food?
Q13. Did you ever cut the size of any of your
children’s meals because there wasn’t
enough money for food?
Q6. Did you ever eat less than you felt
you should because there wasn’t enough
money for food?
Q14. Did any of the children ever skip meals
because there wasn’t enough money for
food?
Q7. Were you ever hungry but didn’t eat be-
cause there wasn’t enough money for
food?
Q15. Were the children ever hungry but you
just couldn’t afford more food?
Q8. Did you lose weight because there
wasn’t enough money for food?
Q16. Did any of the children ever not eat for a
whole day because there wasn’t enough
money for food?
Q9. Did you or other adults in your house-
hold ever not eat for a whole day because
there wasn’t enough money for food?
Note: The questions are coded the same as the actual coding in the questionnaire used in the survey.
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is simply derived from the number of affirmative responses to the 15 questions in
Table 2.3. The scale ranges from 0 to 15 with 15 representing the worst food in-
security feeling and 0 representing feeling secure about food. The second measure
is the Rasch scale of the raw score. It is a continuum scale of household food inse-
curity derived from the raw score, which is arguably better at capturing the food
insecurity severity since it triangulates the affirmations across an individual in
the sample and it assigns different importance (weight) to each question (Radimer,
2002; Webb et al., 2006).
The Rasch scale is estimated using the standard item response theory (IRT).
The scale weighting is each question’s importance for the population, which theo-
retically follows the levelling-up stages of food insecurity, from only worrying about
not having a meal up to the occurrence of a child or adult skipping a meal in a day.
The technique estimates a latent trait variable based on binary responses to a set
of questions. The scale indicates the latent trait value as has been used in numer-
ous studies including Agarwal et al. (2009), Gulliford et al. (2004), and Hackett
et al. (2008).
Figure 2.4 shows the distribution of the raw score and the Rasch scale of the
household food insecurity measure for each value pre- (baseline) and post-treatment.
The raw score shows that at the baseline, 22% of respondents feel food secure and
the remaining 78% respondents feel food insecure to varying degrees. The figure
is slightly changed after treatment, with an increase of about 2% in those feeling
food secure. There were two directions of change present in the case of those feel-
ing food insecure. These patterns are much more similar when the Rasch scale is
used.
2.3.4 Measurement error and unobserved behaviour
I acknowledge that during the survey, eliciting food insecurity in the Kei Islands
population using the HFSSM module was not easy. The general problem is about
the precision of the household food insecurity estimate using the 12-month period
of recall. This retrospective question related to a long period might yield imperfect
elicitation of the true state of the food insecurity level. Moreover, another difficulty
arises owing to the complex nature of the 16 questions and the language adapt-
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(a) Raw score (0–15) (b) Rasch scale (0–7.3)
FIGURE 2.4 – RAW SCORE AND RASCH SCALE MEASURE OF HOUSEHOLD FOOD INSECURITY
Note: before = food insecurity scale before the treatment; after = food insecurity scale after the
treatment
ability of the respondent towards the questionnaire. In relation to systematic error
due to treatment value, at the outset of the post-treatment elicitation, I asked the
respondent to be involved in determining the treatment dosage. It is likely that
the measurement of post-treatment food insecurity is conflated by individual at-
titudes or strategic behaviour. Ultimately, such unobserved attributes could be
spot-checked at the time of survey but are difficult to do so for the overall dataset.
To minimise the bias originating from these measurement errors, I use the admin-
istrative randomisation of the treatment as an instrument. Later, I observe that
even though descriptive statistics show indication of such measurement errors (a
two-direction change in Figure 2.4), its correlation with the treatment value is triv-
ial and its influence is minor as shown by a magnitude correction of instrumental
variables (IV) estimates to ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates.
2.3.5 Estimation strategy
In the investment game, treatment intensity is expected to be correlated with indi-
vidual attributes (characteristics and behaviour during the survey) that might be
correlated with the outcome, that is, household food insecurity. Some of these are
observed during the survey, including the risk aversion attitude of the head, and
memory ability, which was obtained at the beginning of the interview. The survey
adopts a simple memory test (memorising 10 words) procedure as in the Indonesian
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Family Life Survey (IFLS). The OLS estimate with covariates of these observables
might reduce the bias, but it might be biased by the unobserved attributes as afore-
mentioned. Hence, an IV approach with an initial offer as an instrument for the
treatment intensity is also used to tackle the potential endogeneity problem.
Hence, the naı¨ve OLS specification of the treatment effect is as follows:
yh = αh + βTh + δHh + εh (2.1)
where yh is the outcome variable or the household food insecurity scale, Th is the
treatment intensity, Hh is a set of household characteristics, including household
head’s age, household head’s risk aversion, measure of social capital, head’s years
of education, household size, the memory test score, household’s total monthly ex-
penditure, and the household’s social capital. The last two variables are used as
a proxy of food access ability for the household. Household expenditure is used
as the proxy of income, and the household’s social capital is used as the proxy of
nonmarket support originating from social networks in which a household partic-
ipates, which support them to access food. The social capital is measured using a
continuum scale derived from a set of questions developed by Burdine et al. (1999).
The operational set of questions that are more simplified and suitable for the con-
text of the sample is as used by Dean and Sharkey (2011). The set of questions load
the factor of social integration and social involvement of a household. The Rasch
technique is used to convert the affirmations to the questions into a continuum
scale. A lower score represents weaker social capital. Lastly, a dummy of villages
is also included to account for supply variations since it is expected to be a proxy of
distance to the market.
The administrative assignment of initial wealth or intention to treat (Zh) is
used as an instrument for the treatment. If Zh is a valid instrument, it is arguably
the IV estimate producing a better estimate than the simple OLS estimate (Raval-
lion and Wodon, 2000). Two conditions for a valid instrument are fulfilled by Zh.
First, the initial wealth is determined at random, so that the instrument is exoge-
nous to the treatment variable or cov(Z, ε) = 0. Second, the only way Zh affects yh
is through Th given the experimental design, that is, v(T, Z) 6= 0. In other words,
the treatment intensity is bounded by the value of intention to treat.
Given that Zh is a valid instrument, the following IV specification is used to
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estimate the impact of the conceived livelihood change on food insecurity of the
h-th household:
yh = α1h+ β1Th + δHh + ε1h (2.2)
Th = α2h+ β2Zh + γHh + ε2h (2.3)
The IV estimation is implemented using two-stage least squares (2SLS)2 to obtain
the correct standard errors. When the instrument is valid, the estimated coefficient
of the treatment variable, β1, can be interpreted as the local average impact of the
treatment on the outcome variable (yh).
2.4 Results
Owing to the attrition of some variables, the estimates account for 487 observa-
tions. The summary statistics for key variables are presented in Table 2.4. Table
2.5 presents a balance test for some observable household characteristics for the
initial values of two groups: households with the high and low initial wealth offer.
It shows that there are no systematic differences between the two groups, suggest-
ing that the initial offer is random. That is, there are no systematic differences
across the IV values regarding outcome, treatment and household observable char-
acteristics.
The sign and statistical significance of equation 2.3 show the instruments’ va-
lidity. Table 2.6 presents the first-stage estimations, which show that the coeffi-
cient of the initial wealth offer has a positive sign and has statistical significance.
More particularly, the treatment for respondents with the high initial wealth is
about Rp18,000 (given that the coefficient is 1.2 and the difference between two
initial values is Rp15,000) larger than the treatment for respondents who were of-
fered the low initial wealth. This sizeable difference is also statistically significant
at the 1% level. In the case of one endogenous regressor in the 2SLS estimate, the
F-test should exceed 10 for the inference to be reliable (Stock and Yogo, 2002). The
excluded-F values suggest sufficient instrument strength. That is, the statistic ex-
ceeds the critical Stock–Yogo value for 10% maximal IV size (16.38) and provides
2The estimation utilises Stata command of ivreg2 (2SLS) to obtain unbiased standard error.
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TABLE 2.4 – SUMMARY STATISTICS
Variables Obs Mean SD Min Max
Household food insecurity
Raw score 487 7.651 5.168 0.000 15.000
Raw score after treatment 487 7.809 5.498 0.000 15.000
Rasch score 487 3.448 2.215 0.000 7.091
Rasch score after treatment 487 3.598 2.452 0.000 7.263
Other variables
Memory test score 487 3.318 1.690 0.000 8.000
HH expenditure (in million Rp) 487 1.879 1.980 0.100 15.800
HH head age 487 40.973 11.571 19.000 75.000
HH head risk aversion 487 -15.307 37.625 100.000 6.326
HH social capital 487 1.118 1.064 -3.044 2.288
HH head years of education 487 8.376 3.085 0.000 17.000
HH size 487 6.517 2.664 1.000 26.000
Note: Note HH=household. Rasch score presented in this table is the rescaled value towards 0 as
the lowest value by adding the original value and the minimum value.
TABLE 2.5 – HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TWO GROUPS OF INITIAL WEALTH OF-
FER
Variables
High initial offer Low initial offer Difference
Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD Coeff. p-value
Household food insecurity
Raw score 297 7.421 5.154 190 8.011 5.182 -0.590 0.220
Raw score after treatment 297 7.505 5.438 190 8.284 5.572 -0.779 0.129
Rasch score 297 3.355 2.211 190 3.594 2.220 -0.240 0.245
Rasch score after treatment 297 3.473 2.426 190 3.794 2.484 -0.322 0.160
Other variables
Memory test score 297 3.242 1.597 190 3.437 1.824 -0.194 0.229
HH expenditure in million Rp 297 1.943 2.060 190 1.779 1.848 0.164 0.363
HH head age 297 40.825 11.463 190 41.205 11.763 -0.380 0.725
HH head risk aversion 297 -16.382 37.687 190 -13.626 37.566 -2.756 0.431
HH social capital 297 1.125 1.090 190 1.107 1.026 0.018 0.857
HH head years of education 297 8.330 3.031 190 8.447 3.173 -0.117 0.685
HH size 297 6.593 2.914 190 6.400 2.220 0.193 0.410
Note: Note HH=household.
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no evidence of weak IV.
2.4.1 Impact estimates
Table 2.7 and 2.8 show the results of OLS and IV estimates. First, to indicate the
presence of measurement error for the elicited value for household food insecurity,
I present the correlation between the individual memory test scores and the out-
comes. It seems that the correlation is weak or not systematic suggesting that
memory recall ability does not over(under)state the food insecurity level (Figure
2.5). Another source of bias is a strategic behaviour among respondents in reveal-
ing their household food insecurity questions and it might depend on the treatment
intensity.
(a) Post–treatment Rasch scale—memory test (b) Pre–treatment Rasch scale—memory
test
FIGURE 2.5 – CORRELATION BETWEEN POST-TREATMENT OUTCOME—MEMORY ABILITY AND
POST-TREATMENT OUTCOME—TREATMENT VALUE
If those with a high initial offer tend to lower the level of household food insecu-
rity after the treatment (with the perception that they would not receive the money
if they revealed a good food security status), then it is likely that the treatment im-
pact is overestimated. Another case is of those with a low initial offer taking the
survey less seriously and tending to reveal any good household food security sta-
tus, causing the treatment impact to be underestimated. The IV estimates using
initial administrative wealth as an instrument are expected to correct this issue.
Comparing the results of OLS and IV estimates, the OLS results are most likely
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TABLE 2.6 – THE FIRST-STAGE ESTIMATES
Dependent variable: Treatment (in 100,000Rp)
Variables Using raw score Using Rasch scale
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial offer 1.200*** 1.169*** 1.199*** 1.169***
(0.061) (0.045) (0.061) (0.044)
Food security before treatment 0.002* 0.001 0.004* 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Memory test score 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
HH expenditure in million Rp 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
HH head age 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
HH head risk aversion -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
HH social capital -0.008** -0.008**
(0.003) (0.003)
HH head years of education 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
HH size 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Excluded-F 386.98 689.08 385.97 695.68
Note: Note HH=household. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered at the
village and initial value level with ***, **, and * indicating 1, 5, and 10% significant
levels, respectively.
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biased upwards, suggesting the presence of the first case. However, the corrections
made by the IV estimates are minor. Thus, based on the IV estimates, the study
suggests that for every Rp100,000 increase in weekly income, the household food
insecurity feeling is reduced by a factor of 2.3 (raw score) and by a factor of 1 (Rasch
scale).
The treatment effect in Table 2.7 or Table 2.8 can be used to predict the amount
of additional income required to reduce the experiences and perceptions of food in-
security among households in the Kei Islands (which consists of Southeast Maluku
District and Tual City). The effect, however, has two strong assumption in making
the prediction. First, I assume that the supply of food is enough to cover the in-
crease of demand whenever the actual positive income shock occurs. Second, it does
not incorporate how the supply of food outside the region can be improved in the
future. Denoting ∆I as the average additional income needed to eliminate house-
hold food insecurity and yˆ as the average feeling of food insecurity, the estimate of
the aggregate additional income in the population is:
Average additional income = ∆I = yˆ/β1 (2.4)
The estimate suggests that an additional household income of approximately
Rp 233–283 thousand ($17.5–21.3) per week is needed, on average, (Table 2.9, row
4) for each district to eliminate household food insecurity. This amount is sig-
nificantly greater than the average amount provided through the existing uncon-
ditional cash transfer programme (known as Bantuan Langsung Tunai or BLT),
which, on average, is $1.8 (Rp 25,000) per week per household (Table 2.9, row 5),
conducted by the Indonesian government (Alatas et al., 2012). Multiplying this
amount by the total number of fishing households in the islands gives us an esti-
mate of the total income change needed. These figures are presented in Table 2.9,
row 6.
Indonesia has two provinces that consist of many small islands and have simi-
lar socioeconomic characteristics, namely Maluku, which Kei Islands belong to, and
East Nusa Tenggara (Table 2.10) where the external validity of this study applies.
According to the national census of Indonesia in 2010, there are 42,769 individuals
who work in fisheries in Maluku and 53,204 in East Nusa Tenggara. I estimate
the total amount of additional income required weekly to alleviate the experience
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TABLE 2.7 – IMPACT ESTIMATE WITH RAW SCORE
Dependent variables: Food insecurity using raw score—after treatment
Variables OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment (in 100,000Rp) -1.855 -2.412** -1.473 -2.260*
(1.295) (0.945) (2.247) (1.198)
Food insecurity using raw score–before treatment 0.875*** 0.850*** 0.874*** 0.850***
(0.021) (0.025) (0.021) (0.024)
Memory test score 0.067 0.067
(0.094) (0.089)
HH expenditure in million Rp -0.121* -0.121**
(0.066) (0.062)
HH head age -0.002 -0.002
(0.014) (0.013)
HH head risk aversion -0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.005)
HH social capital 0.015 0.016
(0.130) (0.124)
HH head years of education -0.075 -0.075
(0.049) (0.047)
HH size 0.035 0.035
(0.069) (0.065)
Village dummy Yes Yes
Constant 1.436*** 3.169*** 1.373*** 3.146***
(0.415) (0.822) (0.504) (0.798)
Observations 487 487 487 487
Adjusted R2 0.674 0.681 0.674 0.659
Note: Note HH=household. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered at the
village and initial value level with ***, **, and * indicating 1, 5, and 10% significant
levels, respectively.
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TABLE 2.8 – IMPACT ESTIMATE WITH RASCH SCORE
Dependent variables: Food insecurity using Rasch score —after treatment
Variables OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment (in 100,000Rp) -0.663 -0.847** -0.588 -0.954*
(0.542) (0.395) (1.025) (0.558)
Food insecurity using Rasch scale–before treatment 0.903*** 0.875*** 0.903*** 0.875***
(0.018) (0.025) (0.018) (0.024)
Memory test score 0.018 0.017
(0.040) (0.038)
HH expenditure in million Rp -0.053* -0.053**
(0.028) (0.026)
HH head age -0.003 -0.003
(0.006) (0.006)
HH head risk aversion -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
HH social capital 0.047 0.046
(0.062) (0.059)
HH head years of education -0.020 -0.020
(0.025) (0.024)
HH size 0.008 0.008
(0.029) (0.027)
Village dummy Yes Yes
Constant 0.598*** 1.341*** 0.586*** 1.357***
(0.167) (0.372) (0.226) (0.366)
Observations 487 487 487 487
Adjusted R2 0.664 0.670 0.664 0.645
Note HH=household. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered at the village
and initial value level with ***, **, and * indicating 1, 5, and 10% significant levels,
respectively.
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TABLE 2.9 – ADDITIONAL WEEKLY INCOME REQUIRED TO ALLEVIATE HOUSEHOLD FOOD
INSECURITY
Variables Southeast Maluku District Tual City
Expected food insecurity using Rasch scale 0 0
Current food insecurity using Rasch scale (means) 3.2 3.9
Number of fishing households 5,145 1,872
Average income change needed (thousand Rp/HH/week) 233 283
Existing official cash transfer (thousand Rp/HH/week) 25 25
Total income change needed (thousand Rp/district/week) 1,198,785 529,776
Note: HH = household.
of household food insecurity among fishing communities fully is approximately Rp
12 billion ($903,343.2) in Maluku and Rp 15 billion ($1,129,179.0) in East Nusa
Tenggara.
At the time of survey, total local government revenues (province and districts
altogether) are Rp 9,017 billion in Maluku and Rp 17,118 billion in East Nusa
Tenggara. Of these amounts, the existing total spending for social assistance were
Rp 32 in Maluku and Rp 100 in East Nusa Tenggara. The sizeable total revenue
indicates that there are rooms for the fiscal space. Yet, the increase in existing
social assistance spending is quite large, especially in Maluku. They are about
38% in Maluku and 15% in East Nusa Tenggara Province if the local governments
adopt any food security campaign and use the magnitude impact extracted from
this study.
TABLE 2.10 – EXTERNAL VALIDITY: HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE AND
TWO RELEVANT PROVINCES IN INDONESIA
Variables My sample Maluku Province* East Nusa Tenggara*
Hh expenditure (Rp/month) 1,744,568.83 2,355,059.00 1,779,690.00
HH head years of education 8 6 5
HH size 4 5 4
HH head age 41 47 47
HH total food expenditure (Rp/month) 968,217.75 1,188,458.00 750,823.60
Note: *calculated using IFLS East 2012, in real term.
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2.5 Conclusion
This chapter quantifies the impact on household food security of providing access
to alternative livelihoods in small and remote island communities. A laboratory
experiment in the field is used to mimic a situation of having additional income
through alternative livelihoods by providing a real stake in the choice of alterna-
tive livelihood options that yield a varying intensity of the treatment. Then, it
was followed by a question about expected household food security status from the
woman in the household. The estimates suggest that income shock does improve
both adult- and child-related food security status. The estimate indicates that for
every Rp100,000 (approximately 21%) of weekly permanent income increase, on av-
erage, the feeling of food security improves by 1 (0–7 scale). This is equal to having
less food insecurity events by a factor of 2.3 out of 15. The actual resulting effect
would depend on the supply side improvement as well as the general equilibrium
effect of the increase of food demand on prices.
The estimates show that an additional household income of approximately Rp
233,000 to Rp283,000 (US$17.5 to US$21.3) per week is needed, on average, to
eliminate household food insecurity in Indonesia’s small islands. This amount is
significantly greater than the average amount provided through the existing un-
conditional cash transfer programme (BLT) conducted by the Indonesian govern-
ment. Roughly, the more suitable magnitude needed is eight times that of the
existing programme. Further, if Indonesia wants to eliminate household food inse-
curity among its fishing households in Maluku and East Nusa Tenggara provinces,
that is, the provinces with the smallest islands, it will need to be able to gener-
ate a total household income of as much as approximately Rp27 million weekly in
this region—a very challenging task that needs a strong will on the part of the
government.
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Appendix
2.A Additional figures and tables
2.A.1 Sensitivity of the relationship between food security
and number of islands
Figure 2.6 shows the alternative version of Figure 2.1 in which the relationship
between the food insecurity and number of island at the province excludes the out-
liers. It shows that the underlying relationship shown in Figure 2.1 is unchanged.
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FIGURE 2.6 – ALTERNATIVE VERSION OF FIGURE 2.1
Chapter 3
Finding better livelihood:
migrating to cities
Abstract
This chapter investigates the consequence of finding a better livelihood by mov-
ing from rural areas to cities. Specifically, it examines the economic assimilation
of rural–urban migrants in Indonesia. It uses cross–sectional, synthetic cohort,
and panel data techniques. The estimates suggest that migrants do not experience
earnings penalties subsequent to their arrival in urban areas. Instead, they have
persistently higher earnings relative to urban natives. However, this increase is
accompanied by worsening mental health status owing to a lack of social support.
The findings on the earnings premium are in contrast to that of earlier studies in
countries with more restrictive policies for rural–urban migration, such as China
and Vietnam. The results provide new evidence for the existing empirical findings
and for inferring the superiority of the economic outcome dynamics of internal mi-
grant in developing economies under a less–restricted internal migration system.
3.1 Introduction
People the world over have been migrating either internally (within a country) or
internationally (between countries) in attempt to find different livelihoods. Com-
mon motivation to migrate could originate from relative deprivation in income or
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skills (Stark and Bloom, 1985). In other words, people tend to move from their
low-wage home labour market, typically in rural areas, to high-wage destination
labour market, typically in urban areas. The expectation is that their earnings
would eventually converge with those of non-migrants in destination areas. This
process of converging earnings between migrants and non-migrants is commonly
known as economic assimilation of migration.
Between two types of migration, internal migrants face fewer barriers, such as
distance or language, compared with international migration. However, in addition
to the natural barriers, often restrictive policies are enforced (e.g., the immigration
policy for international immigrants in the US (Abramitzky et al., 2014) and the
household registration of the Hukou in China (Frijters et al., 2011)) for rural–urban
migrants and become an impediment for economic efficiency.
This chapter focuses on migrants’ performance. Specifically, it investigates the
labour-market integration known as “economic assimilation” of rural –urban mi-
grants, with Indonesia as the case study. The economic assimilation of the migrant
is defined as the rate of wage convergence between immigrants and natives in the
hosting destinations (Chiswick, 1978; Borjas, 1985).
Natural barriers (distance or language) and restrictions (migration policies)
may shape the assimilation profile and their influence depends on two factors.
First is how the policy or nature of the barriers affect migrant selectivity. Sec-
ond is how the policy dynamic alters migrant quality over time. For example, up
to 1924, the US borders were completely open to immigrants, especially those from
Europe. Abramitzky et al. (2014) observed that gradual and stricter US immigra-
tion policies since 1924 have led to a decreasing quality over time of immigrants
to that country. As a result, they found that the assimilation profile of the immi-
grants shows a persistent wage gap between immigrants and natives rather than
the standard assimilation profile which exhibits an earning penalty for migrants
followed by a convergence.
Another example is as follows. China and Vietnam impose internal migration
restrictions with a household registration system known as the Hukou system. The
Hukou system in China prevents rural–urban migrants from accessing social ser-
vices equal to those of urban native workers. The registration system also has
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created notable labour–market segregation between rural–urban workers and ur-
ban workers (Frijters et al., 2011). Although the Hukou has been significantly
relaxed since the mid–1980s (Meng and Zhang, 2001), recent empirical estimates
show that the typical economic assimilation profile as the result of such a policy is
an inferior outcome for migrants relative to urban natives (Ge, 2017).
Number of studies have analysed the assimilation process for international mi-
grants (Chiswick, 1978; Borjas, 1985; Cobb-Clark et al., 2012; Breunig et al., 2013;
Abramitzky et al., 2014), and few studies have examined internal migration (Zhang
and Meng, 2007; Ge, 2017; Zhu, 2016). Further, analysis from different perspective
of the role of institutions in the economic assimilation of the rural–urban migrant
in the absence of a restriction policy is limited and it is what this chapter provides.
Moreover, migration literature, so far, has documented but limited evidence on how
economic assimilation of migration has consequence on mental health. Among oth-
ers, these studies include Lu (2010a), Lu (2010b), and Lerner et al. (2005).
To fill the gap in the literature, this chapter examines both the economic as-
similation processes and mental health condition of rural-urban migrants in In-
donesia in which the environment to internally migrate is less restricted than
in other places, such as China and Vietnam. The investigation allows to infer
the consequences of relaxing internal migration restrictions on the economic as-
similation profile of migrants. Specifically, it determines whether migrants in a
less–restricted system can exploit greater benefits from migrating than migrants
in a restrictive system and whether the former’s relative welfare converges faster
towards that of urban natives than the welfare of the latter. In other words, the
Indonesian case is chosen to add variety in the empirical results of the economic
assimilation of internal migrants in the developing countries.
The findings suggest that the Indonesian economic assimilation profile is quite
similar to that in India (Khan, 2017) but in contrast to that of a restricted internal
migration setting, such as China (Zhu, 2016; Ge, 2017) and Vietnam (Liu, 2017).
Indonesia’s rural–urban migrants do not experience earnings penalty upon arrival
in the cities and have a persistent higher earnings level relative to urban natives
over time. However, the earnings assimilation profile is in line with a worsening
mental health assimilation profile, which initially exhibits no mental health gap
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followed by a modest deteriorating of the mental health problem for every year
since migration. Further estimates suggest that the worsening mental health is
strongly correlated with decreasing social support rather than with pressure from
extended working hours of migrants as predicted by the existing empirical studies.
The expected contribution of this chapter is twofold. The first is providing em-
pirical estimates of the economic assimilation of internal migration in a liberal
internal migration regime. The second is that this is the first study to link two
important outcomes of the analysis of economic assimilation of internal migration,
namely, earnings and mental health, and in the case of Indonesia in particular.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 provides a literature review
and summarises the estimating equation used in the literature on economic assim-
ilation of migrants. Section 3.3 formulates the estimating equation. Section 3.4
describes the data. Section 3.5 presents results of the economic assimilation pro-
files, the channels, and the heterogeneity profiles analysis. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Literature review
In the context of developing economies, studies examining the wage gap between
rural–urban migrants and urban natives are Zhang and Meng (2007), Zhu (2016)
and Ge (2017) in China, Liu (2017) in Vietnam, and Khan (2017) in India. These
studies explicitly examine the economic assimilation of migrants relative to na-
tives. However, these studies only use cross–section or synthetic–cohort data. Liu
(2017), with a particular focus on occupation segregation, examines the wage gap
between rural–urban migrants and urban natives in Vietnam in a static compar-
ative perspective. As for the case of Indonesia, Manning and Alisjahbana (2010)
also attempt to examine the relative performance of rural–urban migrants’ earn-
ings from a dynamic perspective but only uses a cross–section data set.
All of these studies yield diverse patterns or assimilation profiles. A primary ex-
planatory factor is the different settings of the internal migration policy or regime.
While China and Vietnam have been restricting migration through the Hukou sys-
tem that limits the access of rural migrants to cities to service delivery, the Indian
system has been relatively less restrictive. The similarity of the internal migration
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regimes in the two countries seems to yield an assimilation profile for China that
is not very different from that for Vietnam, although I cannot infer directly from
the available static results for Vietnam.
Zhang and Meng (2007) find that the earnings of rural–urban migrants in
China generally assimilate to those of their urban counterparts at the rate of 3.2%
for each additional year spent in the host city. A recent study by Ge (2017) finds
that rural–urban migrants in China start with a wage penalty of 32% relative to
natives, with a rate of convergence of 1.5% for each additional year spent in the
city and a decreasing rate of 0.25% of years-squared. The combined effect yields
the result that migrants’ wages cannot catch up with those of urban workers in
the long run. Liu (2017) estimates that the earnings of rural–urban migrants in
Vietnam, in aggregate, is lower by 31.4% than that of natives, using a standard
Mincerian equation. Since the estimates are based on a static setting, her results
cannot be used to infer how these earnings evolve by time spent in the city. Con-
versely, the attempt by Manning and Alisjahbana (2010) to infer the assimilation
profile of internal migrants who can freely move from rural to urban areas yields a
different result. They indicate that Indonesian rural–urban migrants in four cities
tend to experience a standard assimilation profile with the recent migrant expe-
riencing wage penalty and the lifetime migrants’ earnings overtaking the urban
native’s earnings.
Furthermore, a comprehensive review of studies on migration effect on mental
health provided by Butler et al. (2015) highlights inconsistencies among the ex-
isting research findings. The review at the end argues that more empirical work
observing the mental health consequences of migration is highly needed. Among
others are for the following reasons. Migrant’s vulnerability toward psychologi-
cal disorders arises from the fact that migration is a complex process and entails
family disruption and disconnection from current social ties (Lu, 2012). The exis-
tence of labour market pressure for long working hours (Frijters et al., 2010), as
well as biological and cultural factors in hosting locations Butler et al. (2015), have
been widely known to influence mental health of migrants over time. This present
study hence aims to examine both economic assimilation and mental health con-
sequences of migration to add the empirical findings. The study of this chapter
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differs from Lu (2010a) and Lu (2010b) since I use non-migrant in the destination
as the comparison group instead of non-migrant in the sending location. Hence, I
focus on assimilation rather than impact of migration.
3.3 Empirical strategy
Empirical studies on the economic assimilation of migrants commenced with the
international migration context using a cross–section data in the 1970s. One of
the earlier assimilation models was developed by Barry R. Chiswick in 1978 which
focused on dismantling the dynamic quality of successive migrant cohorts and in-
dividual heterogeneity from the coefficient of interest on Years Since Migration
(YSM). The core of the model by Chiswick (1978) with cross-section data is:
logWi = Xiβ0 + β1Ii + β2Y SMi + β3AGEi + β4AGE2i + εi (3.1)
where i indexes individuals.
The estimating equation prescribes a linear regression of the natural logarithm
of annual earnings logWi on a set of exogenous variables: Ii, a dummy variable that
equals unity if the person is foreign-born and zero if a native; Y SMi, the number of
years the immigrant has resided in the host country, which equals zero for native;
andXi, a vector of socioeconomic characteristics (mainly age and years of schooling,
geographical dummies and weekly hours worked) and AGE, the calendar age to
proxy gross-labour market experience.
Equation 3.1 estimates the earnings assimilation profile of immigrants relative
to natives using two parameters: β1, whether there is a wage penalty/premium
upon arrival and β2, yearly change of the relative earnings as immigrants assimi-
late in the city. Since the total experience effect (labour market) measured by age
and gross education effect measured by years of schooling have been controlled
for, the assimilation coefficients are often attributed to specific training/skills ac-
quired or the extent to which the immigrant obtains the hosting city’s human cap-
ital transferability (Borjas, 1985).
Two important critiques emerge in responding to the core model with cross-
section data: (i) the core model’s lack of attribution for a dynamic change of cohort
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quality, which empirically is a strong confounder for the assimilation coefficient
and (ii) the strong potential bias owing to the nonrandom process of remigration
(Borjas, 1985). The solution for the first concern is to include a cohort effect in
equation 3.1, which requires the use of repeated cross-section data to avoid further
identification problems, known as a synthetic-cohort approach. As for the second
concern, nothing more can be done in a situation in which complete remigration
data are lacking. The use of the synthetic-cohort model as prescribed by Borjas
(1985) has now become the norm.
In his synthetic-cohort model, Borjas (1985) utilizes a repeated cross-section
data obtained in a calendar census Y ear = {1, ..., t} and injects migrant time arrival
(COHORTi) or “cohort effect” into the equation and separates the equation into two
because of the identification problem.
Migrant equation:
logwit = Xit · β0+β1 ·Y SMit+β2 ·AGEit+β3 ·AGE2it+COHORTi+YEARt+ε1it (3.2)
Native equation:
logwit = Xit · β0 + β1 · AGEit + β2 · AGE2it +YEARt + ε2it (3.3)
where t indexes census year, COHORT is a vector of arrival cohort fixed effect
and Y EAR is a vector of census year fixed effect. Subsequent empirical studies
on economic assimilation of migrants follow this approach, and they include Lind-
strom and Massey (1994) for Mexican in the US, Longva and Raaum (2003) for
immigrants in Norway, and Lemos (2013) for immigrants in the UK.
While the synthetic-cohort model refines the estimates from an unobserved sec-
ular change of migrant quality at the cohort level, it does not address the unob-
served heterogeneity of migrants over time at the individual level. The synthetic-
cohort model also assumes that the composition of migrants by cohort is constant
over time, which is a heroic assumption in the presence of re-emigration.
Cobb-Clark et al. (2012) and Abramitzky et al. (2014), hence, suggest to in-
clude individual effects in the estimating equation. Certainly, such an approach
needs panel data at the individual level that tracks the same individual migrant
over time. This type of data is often unavailable or expensive to obtain. The spec-
ifications use YSM in an integer (Cobb-Clark et al., 2012) or a categorical group
44 CHAPTER 3. FINDING BETTER LIVELIHOOD: MIGRATING TO CITIES
(Abramitzky et al., 2014). The categorical approach allows the use of the variable
that identifies the penalty/premium upon arrival (I) in a pooled migrant and native
sample with a panel data fixed-effect estimator. The Abramitzky et al’s model is as
follows:
Occupationscoreit = αi+µi+θt+γit+β1 ·AGEit+β2 ·AGE2it+β3 ·AGE3it+β4 ·AGE4it+εit
(3.4)
where occupation score is a proxy for labour-market earnings that varies between
(but not within) occupations. α denotes the country place of origin fixed effect, µ is
the year of arrival in the hosting country fixed effect and, θ is the census (survey
wave) year fixed effect. γ is a vector of variables γ which separates the foreign-
born individuals into five categories according to time spent in the hosting country
place (0–5 years, 6–10 years, 11–20 years, 21–30 years, and 30 or more years), with
the native-born individuals constituting the omitted category.
The sign and magnitude of the coefficient on the first dummy variable (0–5
years) indicate whether immigrants received an occupation-based earnings penalty
(or premium) upon the first arrival to the hosting country, whereas the remaining
dummy variables reveal whether immigrants eventually catch up with or surpass
the occupation-based earnings of natives. As for the cohort effect concern, their
specification divides the foreign-born into two year-of-arrival cohorts indicated by
µm (arrivals before and after 1890) as for the context of the US immigration policy
dynamic.
In this chapter, which I analyse the assimilation process of rural-urban mi-
grants in Indonesia, I extend the specification at the equation (1) by applying the
framework of Abramitzky et al. (2014), so that the unobserved time-invariant het-
erogeneity of individual migrants is controlled. Specifically, I implement fixed-
effect (FE) approach. It is used as the preferred estimating equation for this reason.
For the purpose of a robustness check, I also adopt Hausman and Taylor (1981), re-
ferred to as HT. The HT estimator formulates an IV estimator for panel data that
controls for possible correlation between included variables and unobserved indi-
vidual effects (Breunig et al., 2013). For HT specification, I use variables as similar
as in Pooled OLS and FE model (see Appendix, Equation 3.6). The general model
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used in this chapter is as follows.
outcomeit = Xit · β1+GROUPit · β2+β3 ·AGEit+β4 ·AGE2it+COHORTi+µi+θt+εit
(3.5)
Our main outcome variables are earning and mental health status. Similar to γ
in the Abramitzky et al. (2014) model, GROUP is a vector of dummies separating
rural–urban migrants into five categories according to time spent in the cities (0–5
years, 6–15 years, 16–25 years, 26–35 years, and 36 or more years), with the non-
migrant as the omitted category. COHORT is the year of arrival dummies. X is a
set of individual level covariates and it includes gender, marital status, education
and occupational category. I also include hosting city dummies and sending region
(province) dummies in the specification (µi). Our coefficients of interest are β2.
The sign and magnitude of the coefficient on the first dummy (0–5 years) in-
dicate whether a migrant received earnings penalty (or premium) upon arrival for
the earnings regression. The specification also includes the time of survey (waves)
dummies, θ, except for an estimate with fixed-effect. This coefficient is interpreted
slightly differently for mental health outcomes and are attributed to the relative
mental health status upon arrival.
The remaining dummy variables reveal whether the migrants’ earnings and
mental health status eventually assimilate with that of nonmigrants in the host
city over time. For robustness purpose, I also implement the alternative specifica-
tion with only a dummy of (0–5) years as the indicator for earning penalty/premium
and YSM as the indicator for the speed of convergence. This specification is used
by Cobb-Clark et al. (2012).
The point estimate of β2 leads to two possibilities of hypothesised economic
assimilation profiles. Type 1 of the hypothesised assimilation profile is, in the case
of economic assimilation, an earnings penalty followed by a convergence when β2
for the first dummy (0–5) years is negative and β2 for all the rest of the dummies are
positive. The common interpretation for this profile is that migrants started with a
lower skill level relative to urban non-migrants and, gradually, they catch-up with
the urban’s labour market skill-level. In other words, the skill transferability has
occurred. Type 2 of the hypothesised assimilation profile is a persistent earnings
gap relative to non-migrants, either lower when all β2 < 0 or higher when all β2 > 0.
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In the case when β2 < 0, migrants started with a lower skill level than urban
non-migrants and the skill transferability has not occurred. In contrary, when
β2 > 0, migrants started with a higher skill level implying that they are highly and
positively selected out from the rural area.
3.4 Data
The dataset utilised in this chapter comes from a longitudinal survey observing
rural-urban migrants, Rural Urban Migration in Indonesia (RUMiI) surveys in
four major Indonesian cities: Medan, Tangerang, Samarinda, and Makassar (Fig-
ure 3.1). These cities are the main migrant destination cities in each major island
groups in the country: Sumatera, Java and Bali, Kalimantan and Eastern Indone-
sia. The survey waves are four consecutive years from 2008 to 2011. It tracked
both rural–urban migrants and urban native households with an initial number
of 1,521 migrant households and 850 native households, that is, a total of 2,371
households, in 2008. The sampling details is documented in Resosudarmo et al.
(2010) and is summarised in the supplementary section on page 172.
In this survey, rural–urban migrants are defined as individuals who stay con-
tinuously in the rural area for at least five years until they turn 12 years old and at
the time of the survey reside in an urban area. Further, recent migrants are those
who moved to a city in the five years preceding the survey and lifetime migrants
are those who moved to a city more than five years before the time of survey. The
information about the time of migration is subjective and retrospective in nature
which was elicited from respondents. In this case, there could be a potential mea-
surement errors-bias when it is correlated with age. Hence, I acknowledge that the
bias originated from this measurement error might still present without an exter-
nal instrument as the exogenous variable despite that I already controlled for the
individual fixed-effects.
The focus of analysis in this chapter is earnings and mental health. Earnings
are defined as the total earnings of three types of occupational categories (employ-
ees, public employees, and self-employed individuals) in the month preceding the
survey. These earnings include fringe benefits (food, transport, housing, and the
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(a) Medan (b) Tangerang
(c) Samarinda (d) Makassar
FIGURE 3.1 – CONCENTRATION OF SENDING REGIONS BY HOST CITY
Note: The darkest of the colour represents higher concentration of migrants. Source:
RUMiI, 2008.
value of in-kind payments). Mental health is measured using the 12-item Gen-
eral Health Questionnaire (GHQ), and the surveys follow the standard approach
of summing the 12 GHQ responses to form an index running from 0 to 36 (Likert
scale) with 0 and 36 representing the highest and lowest levels of mental health,
respectively (Fritjers et al., 2009; Meng and Xue, 2017). A higher score corresponds
to more depressive symptoms affirmed.
To better understand mental health issues this chapter also pays attention on
social support and hours worked. Social support is defined as number of people
in the social network and helping, such as borrowing money, searching for a job,
taking care of children, or friends for sharing and asking for advice. The number
of people is weighted by their education level and relationship (family, extended
family, and friend). Hours worked is measured from a question on number of hours
(average) per week the respondent worked in the main job the previous year. Table
3.1 summarises the key variables of the sample in the baseline survey in 2008.
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TABLE 3.1 – SUMMARY STATISTICS
Variables Recent* Lifetime** Native Total
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Age 28.55 8.78 43.96 10.9 43.57 10.74 41.04 11.99
Years of schooling 10.25 3.14 10.34 3.78 9.94 3.93 10.16 3.74
Married 0.51 0.5 0.89 0.31 0.9 0.31 0.83 0.38
Share of male 0.78 0.41 0.92 0.27 0.92 0.27 0.9 0.3
Earnings (million
Rp.)
1.36 1.08 2.45 12.91 1.98 5.92 2.06 9.1
Hours worked 52.33 33.24 52.67 39.92 49.76 26.44 51.4 33.72
Mental health score 11.73 3.96 11.13 4.27 11.34 4.44 11.32 4.3
Social support score 17.16 11.33 14.66 10.86 13.56 10.65 14.65 10.93
Share of employee 0.74 0.44 0.56 0.5 0.57 0.5 0.6 0.49
Share of public em-
ployee
0.02 0.14 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.26
Share of self-
employed
0.24 0.43 0.34 0.47 0.36 0.48 0.33 0.47
Note: *(1–5 years), **(>5 years)
Source: RUMiI, 2008.
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 The cohort effect
One of the empirical tasks in this chapter is to disentangle the cohort effect, in-
dividual heterogeneity and cities’ human capital transferability in explaining the
internal migrants’ economic assimilation. Concerning the cohort effect and indi-
vidual heterogeneity, first, the estimates examine whether the cohort effect plays
a role in bias formation for the assimilation estimates. To do so, it quantifies the
extent to which the unobserved factors explain the wage gap between natives and
migrants relative to observable factors by each cohort group. A standard Blin-
der–Oaxaca decomposition/B–O decomposition (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973) is
used, and the decomposition assumes that there is discrimination by wage between
the two groups based on migration status. The discrimination is attributed to both
the skill gap and a latent trait that can explain the gap, such as ability or motiva-
tion.
The B–O decomposition implements the twofold decomposition into the RUMiI
dataset, and it comprises endowment and unknown parts with the pooled coeffi-
cients as the benchmark for the two groups. Although the use of another tech-
nique, such as the Nopo decomposition (Pakrashi and Frijters, 2017), is plausible,
all distributions of key variables support the use of the standard B–O decomposi-
tion. Distribution of key variables of migrants and urban natives is identical (see
Appendix, Figure 3.6).
The included covariates are age, education (proxied by years of schooling), gen-
der, occupational type (employee, self-employed, public employee, and unpaid do-
mestic labour), and city dummies. Figure 3.2 shows the decomposition results. It
tells us that the individual heterogeneity presents in explaining the gap (net of the
city factors) apart from the observables. The shares of the unexplained part vary
across the cohort, which indicates that the cohort effect should be controlled for in
the main estimate. For the recent migrants, the earnings gap is explained more by
the endowment effect than the unobserved effect. The opposite case applies for the
oldest year since it belongs to the migration group of lifetime migrants.
I use three definition of COHORT for estimating equation 3.5. First is to di-
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(a) Scatter plot
(b) Quadratic fit
FIGURE 3.2 – B–O DECOMPOSITION
Note: Each dot represents the mean differences of log earnings between each group
m in Y SM with urban natives in twofold decomposition: a part that is explained by
differences in determinants of earnings (AGE, GENDER, EDUCATION , MARITAL,
OCCUPATION , and CITY ), and another part that cannot be explained by such group
differences.
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TABLE 3.2 – COHORT EFFECTS
Dependent variable: natural log of monthly earnings
GROUP Without COHORT Finest Crisis dummy 3-period
1–5 years 0.046 0.671*** 0.262** 0.261**
(0.082) (0.035) (0.047) (0.049)
6–15 years 0.060 0.857*** 0.281* 0.287**
(0.066) (0.049) (0.093) (0.086)
16–25 years 0.073 1.237*** 0.296 0.310**
(0.047) (0.204) (0.106) (0.097)
26–35 years -0.020 1.480*** 0.204 0.216
(0.045) (0.214) (0.117) (0.103)
> 36 years 0.125* 2.017*** 0.349* 0.494**
(0.069) (0.236) (0.106) (0.099)
Observations 2340 2340 2340 2340
Note: All columns are Pooled OLS estimates. YSM = years since migrating. Standard
errors are in parentheses and clustered at each cohort definition level with ***, **, and *
indicating 1, 5, and 10% significant levels, respectively.
vide waves of migrant into pre–and post–1998 Asian financial crisis which system-
atically differ due to labor market structural change (Manning and Alisjahbana,
2010). Second is to divide the waves into three period of presidency which can lead
to different rural-urban migrant types (Effendi et al., 2010). Last is to divide the
waves by each calendar year or arrival. I prefer the last division as it is the most
conservative definition. Table 3.2 presents the estimate without and with cohort
dummies and confirms the need of controlling cohort effect as the B-O decomposi-
tion result suggests.
3.5.2 Main estimates
Key results for the estimates are presented in Table 3.3. To facilitate interpreta-
tion, Figure 3.3 describes the assimilation profile for each outcome by specification
(specification with and without cohort effect and remigration effect; and panel data
fixed effect). In general, the results show type 2 of the hypothesised profile: a per-
sistent gap of earnings (higher) and mental health (lower) for migrants relative to
urban natives.
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My preferred estimates are the fixed effects (FE) because it eliminates the time-
invariant and relevant unobserved factors, such as motivation at the time of migra-
tion. Based on the fixed-effect estimates, the rural–urban migrants in Indonesia’s
four big cities do not experience a wage penalty upon arrival (see in Table 3.3-
column 1-4 or Figure 3.3-Panel A). Instead, their income overtook average income
of urban natives by about 46% since the early time of arrival in the cities. This su-
perior relative earning remains for the rest of the year since migration and almost
triples after 36 years of time spent in the city. The large portions of our sample
by occupation is self-employed individuals both for migrants and non-migrants.
Therefore, the earning gaps captured in the analysis is a representation of en-
trepreneurship activity. The profile is robust to the alternative specification and
attrition bias as reported in Appendix (see Appendix, Tables 3.7 and 3.8).
However, along with the earning superiority, the migrants suffer mental health
problems (see Table 3.3-column 5-8 or Figure 3.3-Panel B). The estimates based on
the fixed-effect model, which each of them controls for time-invariant individual
heterogeneity, show that the migrants are consistently having worse mental health
scores ranging from about 3 to 6 (out of 36) above the average score of the urban
native.1
I should note, however, the sample data does not cover each cohort of birth
evenly. It is likely that the distribution oversampled younger cohorts that makes
the assimilation estimate might be overstated. As the consequence, the estimates
serve as the upper bound of the magnitude impact of time on earnings gap.
3.5.3 Channels
Further estimates test two possible channels that have been used in the literature
for investigating why rural–urban migrants suffer greater deterioration in mental
health status than non-migrants. I test two possible channels: extended working
1Up to this point, it is important in an economic efficiency point of view that we should com-
pare the earning premium with the actual cost of solving the mental health problem. This type
of analysis, unfortunately, despite its importance is beyond the scope of my study. I leave the de-
tailed analysis calculating a net benefit from migrating by comparing earning premium and mental
health costs for future study.
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(a) Earnings
(b) Mental health
FIGURE 3.3 – ECONOMIC ASSIMILATION PROFILE
Note: Each dot represents 100 · β of coefficients in Table 3.3. It measures the percentage
gap of earnings and mental health score for each arrival group of m relative to urban
native.
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TABLE 3.3 – MAIN OUTCOME ESTIMATES
log(monthly earnings) log(mental health score)
GROUP Pooled OLS FE HT Pooled OLS FE HT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1–5 years 0.643*** 0.671*** 0.466*** 0.611*** 0.430*** 0.481*** 0.339*** 0.470***
(0.032) (0.035) (0.103) (0.068) (0.019) (0.014) (0.037) (0.030)
6–15 years 0.850*** 0.857*** 0.494*** 0.790*** 0.770*** 0.872*** 0.508*** 0.787***
(0.060) (0.049) (0.160) (0.101) (0.037) (0.027) (0.058) (0.055)
16–25 years 1.253*** 1.237*** 0.643** 1.087*** 1.005*** 1.131*** 0.553*** 0.983***
(0.182) (0.204) (0.265) (0.218) (0.101) (0.121) (0.140) (0.135)
26–35 years 1.329*** 1.480*** 0.744** 1.303*** 1.128*** 1.227*** 0.453* 1.009***
(0.206) (0.214) (0.280) (0.217) (0.123) (0.175) (0.240) (0.201)
≥ 36 years 1.875*** 2.017*** 1.139*** 1.896*** 1.498*** 1.642*** 0.599* 1.343***
(0.235) (0.236) (0.308) (0.231) (0.203) (0.240) (0.317) (0.276)
COHORT Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Balanced panel No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2991 2340 2340 2340 3091 2410 2410 2410
Note: YSM = years since migrating. All specifications except FE include AGE, EDUCATION, GENDER, MAR-
ITAL, OCCUPATION, CITY, SENDING PROVINCE, and arrival COHORT. FE estimate uses time variant
controls of AGE and MARITAL. COHORT uses the finest definition. Standard errors are in parentheses and
clustered at year-of-arrival level with ***, **, and * indicating 1, 5, and 10% significant levels, respectively. Full
estimates are available in Appendix, Table 3.9.
hours (Fritjers et al., 2009) and a decline in social support (Lu, 2010a). I present
the mental health-estimates with and without the channels as covariates in Table
3.4. They suggest that working hours and social support are reasonable channels
on statistical point of view. First, each channel variable has statistical significance
which indicates that the channel pickups the main variables’ effect on the outcome.
Second, some of the magnitude of the main coefficients is getting smaller after
we introduce each covariate. Given the validity to use these two variables as the
channels, I then estimate assimilation profile for working hours and social support
as similar as I did for the earning variable.
As for the first channel of extended hours of work, in the context of negative
selection of migrants from rural areas, it has been argued that internal migrants
often spend more hours in the labour force to compensate for their lower produc-
tivity and to maintain a level of earnings comparable with that of non-migrants
(Frijters et al., 2010). The situation in Indonesia is rather different. We have seen
that migrants have persistently higher incomes following arrival. If working hours
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TABLE 3.4 – CHANNELS ESTIMATE FOR MENTAL HEALTH
Variables No channel With working hours With social support
1-5 years 0.341*** 0.362*** 0.317***
(0.037) (0.032) (0.029)
6-15 years 0.511*** 0.513*** 0.454***
(0.059) (0.056) (0.060)
16-25 years 0.557*** 0.547*** 0.526***
(0.141) (0.134) (0.140)
26-35 years 0.462** 0.442** 0.421*
(0.220) (0.213) (0.224)
>36 years 0.611** 0.614** 0.545*
(0.301) (0.295) (0.314)
Working hours -0.002**
(0.001)
Social support -0.041**
(0.019)
Observations 2481 2476 2333
is the channel for superior earnings and deteriorating mental health, we would ex-
pect persistently higher working hours for migrants than for non-migrants. In con-
trast, the estimates based on FE specification show that rural–urban migrants in-
deed work longer hours (about 8 per week) upon arrival, but the hours converge to-
wards those of non-migrants about 16 years after migration (see Table 3.5 columns
1–4 or Figure 3.4 Panel (a)).
Since a factor related to labor market seems not explaining the mental health
assimilation profile, I test another non-labor market factor, a lack of social sup-
port. Lu (2010b) tested it using Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) data for the
case of Indonesia and showed that the mental health problem is associated with
reduced social support. The specifications replicate the earning assimilation esti-
mating equation for this outcome of interest and add relevant covariates. For the
estimating equation of social support, to limit the influence of between variation
of the hours worked, I use hours worked as the covariate. Figure 3.4—Panel B
shows that social support declines for migrants relative to natives over time spent
in cities (see Table 3.5 column 5-8 as well). This profile is in line with the mental
health and earning assimilation profile. Further, the social support estimate in-
dicates that it might be the case of internal migrant in Indonesia, a lack of social
support drives mental health problem and not the extended working hours.
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(a) Hours worked
(b) Social support
FIGURE 3.4 – POSSIBLE CHANNELS FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEM
Note: Each dot in panel (a) represents β and each dot in panel (b) represents 100 · β of
the coefficients Table 3.5. It measures the hours gap and percentage gap of social support
score for each arrival group of COHORT relative to the urban native, respectively. Not
all coefficients plotted in panel (a) are statistically significant.
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TABLE 3.5 – MENTAL HEALTH CHANNEL –ESTIMATES
Working hours log(social support)
GROUP Pooled OLS FE HT Pooled OLS FE HT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1–5 years -4.974*** 7.478*** 11.471*** 10.072*** -0.691*** -0.796*** -0.272*** -0.541***
(1.071) (0.807) (1.651) (1.545) (0.028) (0.023) (0.062) (0.049)
6–15 years -13.994*** -5.886 10.142*** 6.378* -1.449*** -1.474*** -0.479*** -1.024***
(2.165) (4.600) (3.344) (3.533) (0.116) (0.158) (0.161) (0.168)
16–25 years -40.570*** -14.573** 3.339 -2.848 -2.224*** -2.292*** -0.696*** -1.546***
(13.057) (6.168) (6.030) (6.043) (0.125) (0.181) (0.186) (0.188)
26–35 years -49.527*** -22.523*** -1.269 -9.676 -2.987*** -2.966*** -0.976*** -2.079***
(13.398) (6.992) (7.616) (7.013) (0.189) (0.189) (0.288) (0.213)
≥36 years -52.310*** -16.470** 2.807 -9.278 -4.182*** -4.194*** -1.602*** -3.152***
(13.667) (6.959) (8.395) (7.442) (0.198) (0.200) (0.299) (0.214)
Observations 2986 2336 2336 2336 2889 2264 2264 2264
COHORT Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Balanced panel No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Note: YSM = years since migrating. All specifications except FE include EARNINGS, AGE, EDUCATION,
GENDER, MARITAL, OCCUPATION, CITY, SENDING PROVINCE, and arrival COHORT. FE estimate uses
time variant controls of EARNINGS, AGE and MARITAL. COHORT uses the finest definition. Standard errors
are in parentheses and clustered at year-of-arrival level with ***, **, and * indicating 1, 5, and 10 % significant
levels, respectively. Full estimates are available in Appendix, Table 3.10.
3.5.4 Interpretation of the economic assimilation profile
Figure 3.5 presents the fixed-effect estimates and the simple average difference
of the earnings gap between migrants and urban natives; i.e. without controlling
heterogeneity between cohorts. The simple average difference (solid line) shows
the simple earnings difference at the level for each cohort group relative to urban
natives. Inferring with this line, it seems that migrants experience a standard as-
similation process as predicted by the general Immigrant Assimilation Hypothesis
(IAH) with an inverted U shape. In other words, they seem to experience earnings
penalty upon arrival followed by a convergence toward that of urban natives with
diminishing return. The literature on immigrant assimilation, such as (Borjas,
1985), however argued that these figures are not economic assimilation measures
since they do not control for heterogeneity between cohort groups as well as be-
tween individuals.
This pattern, in Figure 3.5, is driven by a condition that migrants are highly
motivated and better in terms of quality, which implies that the estimate is under-
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stated with the simple average difference estimate when we compare them with
native separately in each cohort. In addition, the pattern is also influenced by dy-
namic change of cohort’s quality. The true measure of the assimilation or the hu-
man capital transferability by time spent in the city is provided by the estimates
which each of them conditionals on other migrant’s performance with different time
spent in the city, i.e. Equation 5 or results in Table 3.3.
It reveals that the actual speed of “convergence” of the migrants’ earning rel-
ative to that of urban natives after the cohort effect and individual heterogene-
ity effect are ruled out differs. Ultimately, the fixed-effect estimate measures an
earnings’ premium upon arrival at the rate of nearly 50% followed by a moderate
increase subsequent to years since migrating up to more than 100% in 36 years.
In addition, the widening gap between coefficients of the specification with and
without cohort effect (Figure 3.3) also tells us about the tendency of a declining
quality of migrant cohorts over time2. The interpretation is that the positive se-
lection out of village has occurred strongly in the early periods of internal mi-
gration when the hurdle to migrate associated with the cost of moving from ru-
ral–to–urban areas is relatively still high. This secular positive selection trend
across cohorts mainly explains the persistence gap of earning of migrants relative
to that of urban natives. The comparison of the coefficients between those of the full
observation and balanced panel shows that the remigration effect is relatively low.
Unlike in the international migration context, it seems that the internal migra-
tion—remigration dynamic possesses a relatively more random processes across
cohorts owing to non–systematic changes to the migration policy in various period.
3.5.5 Heterogeneity by demography and geography
I extend the analysis with subsampling the estimates for main outcomes by demog-
raphy and geography variables that matters for migrant quality selection3. The
2One of direct ways to look at the pattern is by observing the average years of schooling by time of
arrival. I provide the graph in the Appendix section (Figure 3.7). It shows an inverted-U pattern of
years of schooling across time of arrival which suggests a moderate decline in the recent years. The
graph, however, serves as an indicative tool to see changes of quality proxied by years of schooling.
3The approach of heterogenous analysis in this section is by subsampling. I provide the interac-
tion terms specification-approach to test the statistical significance of the heterogenous variables
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FIGURE 3.5 – FIXED-EFFECT ESTIMATE VS. SIMPLE AVERAGE DIFFERENCE
results are presented in the Table 3.6. It reveals that the superior earning assimi-
lation profile varies between cities, by category of intermarriage and by migration
distance but not by gender. Fast growing cities such as Tangerang and Makassar
are destination that the key result hold. On the other hand, a less attractive cities
such as Samarinda yield an opposing economic assimilation profile for migrants
in which their earnings is persistently lower than those of natives. I argue that
different city maturity might have attracted migrants who differ in quality Effendi
et al. (2010), and hence, the assimilation profiles could differ among cities.
The main estimates hide several possible heterogeneities of economic assimi-
lation profiles of the rural–urban migrant. Meng and Gregory (2005), in the Aus-
tralian context, show that people who are intermarried, including migrants, have
significantly higher earnings than those who are endogamous. As for the Indone-
sian case, intermarriage seems to explain largely the rapid assimilation profile of
earnings. Intermarriage seems to be the mechanism for the intermarried migrant
to absorb the city’s human capital faster than those who are endogamous.
Further, migration distance also matters for migrant selectivity and so their
economic assimilation profile. Estimates by migration distance suggest that within-
in the Appendix section, see Table 3.11 and Table 3.12. They show that the interaction terms of the
key variable dummy a the heterogenous factors are mostly statistically significant. It suggests that
the heterogeneity of assimilation profile by these factors exists.
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island migration seems to be the case of a positive selection of the migrant workers
from rural to cities. It indicates that higher skill transferability occurs between
hosting and destination region that have proximate location and, perhaps, a simi-
lar sectoral composition. This heterogeneity indicates that the archipelagic setting
which entails higher cost-of migration, however, still creates a hurdle for migrating
in Indonesian context.
Lastly, by gender dimension, females perform less than the males in the assim-
ilation process. This dissimilarity performance indicates that among the house-
hold heads, there is a quality difference between female and male migrant worker
engaged in the city labor market with males being more positively selected than
females from the sending region.
3.6 Conclusion
The chapter aims to measure the economic assimilation of internal migrant in In-
donesia as a case study which have a less restrictive policy than countries in Asia
such as China and Vietnam. The individual panel data of RUMiI is used to obtain
a precise measure from the cohort effect bias and individual heterogeneity bias.
Results in this paper show that Indonesia’s rural–urban migrants do not ex-
perience earnings penalty upon arrival in the cities and have a persistent higher
earnings level relative to urban natives over time. Results show rural–urban mi-
grant economic assimilation profiles that exhibit the second type of hypothesised
profile. In other words, increasing permanent gaps are observed for the migrants
relative to urban natives. The permanent gaps are superior for the migrants in
the case of earnings but inferior as regards the mental health condition. These
results on earnings are partially in line with the existing literature on Indonesia.
Manning and Alisjahbana (2010) find that recent migrants have lower earnings
compared with urban natives, but lifetime migrants have higher earnings. Their
findings suggest the first type of assimilation profile. Migrants to cities start with
an earnings penalty, but over time, the gaps are narrowed by human capital trans-
ferability.
These findings of the Indonesian economic assimilation profile are quite similar
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to that in India by Khan (2017) but in contrast to that of a restricted internal
migration setting, such as China (Ge, 2017) and Vietnam (Liu, 2017). Liu (2017)
finds using a cross-sectional setting that rural–urban migrants have lower hourly
earnings than urban natives. Some studies in the context of China, such as Ge
(2017) or Zhang and Meng (2007), find that the rural–urban migrant in China
experiences earnings penalty upon arrival followed by convergence.
The results of this chpater provide new evidence to a general pattern of stan-
dard assimilation process of rural–urban migrants in large developing economies,
and it contrasts two resulting profiles from two different settings. The setting in
this study, which exhibits no formal internal migration restriction, possesses a su-
perior economic assimilation process relative to a setting that restricts internal
migration flows.
However, the earnings assimilation profile is in line with a worsening mental
health assimilation profile, which initially exhibits no mental health gap followed
by a modest deteriorating of the mental health problem for every year since migra-
tion. These findings support the work of Lu (2010b), who employs IFLS data. She
argues that the increased risk of psychological disorders for migrants is the result
of reduced social support.
This paper tests both possible causes of the increasing pressure from longer
hours worked (Fritjers et al., 2009) and lack of social support (Lu, 2010b; Meng
and Xue, 2017). The results show that the latter cause is more relevant for the In-
donesian context since the migrants’ length of hours worked converges with those
of natives over time. However, it shows a systematic decline of social support expe-
rienced by migrants relative to urban natives over time spent in the cities.
Appendix
3.A Additional figures and tables
3.A.1 Distribution of key variables
Figure 3.6 shows the distribution of some key variables to show that their shapes
are identical so that the use of B–O decomposition that requires identical distribu-
tion is valid.
3.A.2 Hausman–Taylor specification
I use the following Hausman-Taylor estimator as a robustness purpose:
outcomeit = X1it · δ1 +X2it · δ2 + Z1i · δ3 + Z2iδ4 + α2i + ε4it (3.6)
Hausman and Taylor (1981)—referred to as HT—formulated an instrumental vari-
able estimator for panel data that controls for possible correlation between in-
cluded variables and unobserved individual effects. It allows estimation of endoge-
nous time-invariant variables. It requires that the number of included exogenous
variables that are varying over both individuals and time are greater than the
number of included endogenous variables that are time invariant. The specifica-
tion: X refers to time varying variables and Z refers to time unvarying variables.
Subscript 1 denotes assumed exogenous variables and subscript 2 denotes assumed
endogenous variables. Time variant exogenous are age, gender; time variant en-
dogenous are years of schooling, marital status, years since migrating (YSM); time
invariant exogenous are city and province; and time invariant endogenous are co-
hort of arrival in city.
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FIGURE 3.6 – DISTRIBUTIONS OF KEY VARIABLES
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3.A.3 Alternative specification
This section provides the use of an alternative specification by Cobb-Clark et al.
(2012) (Table 3.7). Instead of using the discrete of dummy variable, their specifi-
cation utilises the integer value of YSM to capture the speed of assimilation. The
gain from this functional form is that it can directly measure the yearly assimila-
tion rate. In replicating their specification, I use the following equation to replace
equation 3.5:
outcomeit = Xitδ+
∑
COHORTmµm +β1AGEit +β2AGE
2
it +β4Y SMit +β5Y SM
2
it + εit
(3.7)
Basically, I replace the term time spent in cities groups with Y SMit and Y SM2it.
The alternative specification yields the estimate of yearly assimilation speed of
about 9% with fixed-effect specification.
TABLE 3.7 – ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATION FOR EARNING ASSIMILATION
Dependent variable: natural log of monthly earnings
Variables Pooled OLS Fixed-effect Hausman-Taylor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1–5 years -0.017 0.127* 0.194*** 0.153** 0.151
(0.056) (0.070) (0.058) (0.062) (0.094)
Time spent in city 0.003 0.107*** 0.126*** 0.089** 0.124***
(0.003) (0.027) (0.028) (0.038) (0.023)
Time spent in city2/100 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Cohort dummies No Yes Yes No Yes
Balanced panel No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2991 2991 2340 2410 2340
Note: All specifications except FE include AGE, EDUCATION, GENDER, MARITAL,
OCCUPATION, CITY, SENDING PROVINCE, and arrival COHORT. COHORT uses the
finest definition. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at year-of-arrival level
with ***, **, and * indicating 1, 5, and 10% significant levels, respectively.
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3.A.4 Attrition: dropout and remigration effect
The attrition of household heads in the sample entails two possible cases: a com-
mon dropout and a truncation such as death. Attrition might affect the outcome
estimate, and it depends on the nature of the attrition bias. One favourable condi-
tion is if the outcomes are missing completely at random in which case, the miss-
ingness is independent of any outcome. If the outcome missing is independent of all
missing outcomes conditional only on observed outcomes, the outcomes are missing
at random (Daza et al., 2017). However, the nature of attrition of dropouts in the
migration survey, in general, is about the missing at random case. Concerning the
attrition bias of this category, the inverse-probability weights (IPW) may be used to
ensure the consistency of the estimates provided that the data missingness model
is correctly specified from observed covariates (Wooldridge, 2007). To test whether
there are influencing observed variables to the dropout and then apply the IPW, I
use the xtrccipw command provide by (Daza et al., 2017). The first two columns of
Table 3.8 present estimates with and without the weighting and it barely changes
the magnitude of the estimate, which suggests that the presence of bias owing to
missing at random outcomes is not severe.
Another viewpoint for considering the attrition in the migration dataset is the
remigration process. It is likely that the dropout samples are individuals who de-
cide to return to the village (negative selection out of the city) or leave the city
towards a higher-wage city or country (positive selection out of the city). In gen-
eral, the remigration or stepwise migration processes are driven by an unobserved
factor, such as ability, of which I do not have the measure. The use of panel data
fixed effect might eliminate the bias originating from remigration assuming the
conditional dependence of the missingness on unobserved that is time invariant,
such as ability (Abramitzky et al., 2014). The ability components will be eliminated
in both the comparison of migrant and native and the comparison of migrants in
each cohort. The last two columns of Table 3.8 present the fixed-effect estimates
between two specifications with a full sample and only with a balanced sample,
and it shows insignificant differences in the coefficients.
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TABLE 3.8 – THE ESTIMATE WITH AND WITHOUT THE INVERSE-PROBABILITY WEIGHTS
(IPW) AND FIXED EFFECT WITH FULL AND BALANCED SAMPLE ONLY
Variables Pooled OLS Fixed-effect
without IPW with IPW full sample balanced panel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
YSM group
1–5 years 0.643*** 0.628*** 0.483*** 0.483***
(0.032) (0.030) (0.097) (0.097)
6–15 years 0.850*** 0.881*** 0.555*** 0.555***
(0.060) (0.075) (0.142) (0.142)
16–25 years 1.253*** 1.286*** 0.712*** 0.712***
(0.182) (0.184) (0.250) (0.251)
26–35 years 1.329*** 1.399*** 0.816*** 0.816***
(0.206) (0.215) (0.263) (0.263)
> 36 years 1.875*** 1.844*** 1.219*** 1.219***
(0.235) (0.258) (0.291) (0.291)
Age 0.079*** 0.074*** 0.152*** 0.152***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.036) (0.036)
Age2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years of schooling 0.071*** 0.073*** 0.010 0.010
(0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012)
Gender = female -0.243*** -0.242***
(0.060) (0.071)
Marital = married -0.032 -0.049 -0.199 -0.199
(0.074) (0.067) (0.225) (0.225)
Marital = divorced -0.271*** -0.126 0.075 0.075
(0.090) (0.128) (0.299) (0.300)
Marital = widowed -0.458*** -0.467*** -0.413*** -0.413***
(0.110) (0.105) (0.150) (0.150)
Occu = public emp. 0.397*** 0.393*** 0.427*** 0.427***
(0.046) (0.040) (0.149) (0.149)
Occu = self-emp. 0.082 0.079 0.227** 0.227**
(0.061) (0.063) (0.111) (0.112)
City = Tangerang 0.087 0.083
(0.094) (0.091)
City = Samarinda 0.129 0.149
(0.122) (0.121)
City = Makassar 0.037 0.082
(0.140) (0.134)
Province fixed effect Yes Yes No No
Constant -3.207*** -3.194*** -4.720*** -4.752***
(0.409) (0.402) (0.730) (0.742)
R2 0.270 0.277 0.162 0.162
Observations 2991 2887 2991 2409
Note: The number of observations in the second column is slightly lower because of failure in generating weights
for some observations owing to nonconvergence with the full sample. Standard errors are in parentheses and
clustered at year-of-arrival level with ***, **, and * indicating 1, 5, and 10% significant levels, respectively.
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FIGURE 3.7 – AVERAGE YEARS OF SCHOOLING BY COHORT
3.A.5 Full estimates
Table 3.9 and Table 3.10 provide all coefficients of the covariates used in the esti-
mates for all outcomes.
3.A.6 Dynamics quality across cohorts
Figure 3.7 shows the average of years of schooling by times arrival (cohorts) as a
proxy of quality of migrant in the labour market.
3.A.7 Heterogenous significance-test
This section provides the estimation results of each variable of interest for het-
erogenous analysis as the interaction terms with the main variable of interest.
Table 3.11 and Table 3.12 provides the estimation results.
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TABLE 3.9 – MAIN OUTCOMES—FULL ESTIMATE RESULTS
Earnings Mental health
Variables Pooled OLS FE HT Pooled OLS FE HT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1–5 years 0.643*** 0.671*** 0.466*** 0.611*** 0.430*** 0.481*** 0.339*** 0.470***
(0.032) (0.035) (0.103) (0.068) (0.019) (0.014) (0.037) (0.030)
6–15 years 0.850*** 0.857*** 0.494*** 0.790*** 0.770*** 0.872*** 0.508*** 0.787***
(0.060) (0.049) (0.160) (0.101) (0.037) (0.027) (0.058) (0.055)
16–25 years 1.253*** 1.237*** 0.643** 1.087*** 1.005*** 1.131*** 0.553*** 0.983***
(0.182) (0.204) (0.265) (0.218) (0.101) (0.121) (0.140) (0.135)
26–35 years 1.329*** 1.480*** 0.744** 1.303*** 1.128*** 1.227*** 0.453* 1.009***
(0.206) (0.214) (0.280) (0.217) (0.123) (0.175) (0.240) (0.201)
≥36 years 1.875*** 2.017*** 1.139*** 1.896*** 1.498*** 1.642*** 0.599* 1.343***
(0.235) (0.236) (0.308) (0.231) (0.203) (0.240) (0.317) (0.276)
Age 0.079*** 0.075*** 0.155*** 0.136*** 0.006 0.004 0.059*** 0.040***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.036) (0.019) (0.004) (0.005) (0.020) (0.008)
Age-squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** 0 0 0 -0.000***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Years of schooling 0.071*** 0.068*** 0.014 0.043*** -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.002 0.024
(0.007) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.003) (0.003) (0.023) (0.018)
Gender = female -0.243*** -0.308*** -0.407*** 0.048 0.120*** -0.175*
(0.060) (0.080) (0.083) -0.035 -0.041 (0.094)
Marital = married -0.032 -0.069 -0.172 -0.201 -0.069** -0.021 -0.145* -0.244
(0.074) (0.089) (0.234) (0.207) (0.027) (0.033) (0.077) (0.155)
Marital = divorced -0.271*** -0.399*** 0.087 0.041 -0.016 -0.007 -0.219* -0.181*
(0.090) (0.101) (0.310) (0.230) (0.038) (0.033) (0.114) (0.107)
Marital = widowed -0.458*** -0.577*** -0.432** -0.569*** -0.028 -0.006 -0.066 -0.236***
(0.110) (0.135) (0.163) (0.141) (0.056) (0.056) (0.102) (0.085)
Occu = public emp 0.397*** 0.421*** 0.480*** 0.471*** -0.028 -0.028 -0.254 0.065**
(0.046) (0.056) (0.144) (0.073) (0.029) (0.039) (0.213) (0.030)
Occu = self-empl. 0.082 0.130* 0.237** 0.158** 0.030* 0.042*** 0.054* 0.172**
(0.061) (0.07) (0.11) (0.08) (0.016) (0.015) (0.028) (0.07)
City = Tangerang 0.087 0.129 0.553*** -0.006 0.02 0.151
(0.094) (0.133) (0.155) (0.04) (0.04) (0.102)
City = Samarinda 0.129 0.235 0.738*** -0.092* -0.015 0.189
(0.122) (0.166) (0.211) (0.052) (0.047) (0.161)
City = Makassar 0.037 0.096 0.805*** -0.102* -0.026 -4.331*
(0.140) (0.178) (0.230) (0.057) (0.057) (2.260)
Constant -3.207*** -2.821*** -4.909*** -18.156** 2.207*** 2.212*** -0.412
(0.409) (0.358) (0.772) (8.946) (0.110) (0.153) (0.460)
N 2991 2340 2340 2340 3091 2410 2410 2410
COHORT Dummy Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
PROVINCE Dummy Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Balanced panel No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
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TABLE 3.10 – CHANNEL OUTCOMES—FULL ESTIMATES RESULTS
Working hours Social support
Variables Pooled OLS FE HT Pooled OLS FE HT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1–5 years -4.974*** 7.478*** 11.471*** 10.072*** -0.691*** -0.796*** -0.272*** -0.541***
(1.071) (0.807) (1.651) (1.545) (0.028) (0.023) (0.062) (0.049)
6–15 years -13.994*** -5.886 10.142*** 6.378* -1.449*** -1.474*** -0.479*** -1.024***
(2.165) (4.600) (3.344) (3.533) (0.116) (0.158) (0.161) (0.168)
16–25 years -40.570*** -14.573** 3.339 -2.848 -2.224*** -2.292*** -0.696*** -1.546***
(13.057) (6.168) (6.030) (6.043) (0.125) (0.181) (0.186) (0.188)
26–35 years -49.527*** -22.523*** -1.269 -9.676 -2.987*** -2.966*** -0.976*** -2.079***
(13.398) (6.992) (7.616) (7.013) (0.189) (0.189) (0.288) (0.213)
≥36 years -52.310*** -16.470** 2.807 -9.278 -4.182*** -4.194*** -1.602*** -3.152***
(13.667) (6.959) (8.395) (7.442) (0.198) (0.200) (0.299) (0.214)
Age 0.067 -0.201 0.008 0.134 -0.049*** -0.045*** -0.269*** -0.247***
(0.525) (0.400) (0.782) (0.551) (0.009) (0.008) (0.053) (0.030)
Age-squared -0.003 -0.001 -0.018** -0.005 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001 0.002***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) 0.000 0.000 (0.001) 0.000
Years of schooling -0.445** -0.547*** 0.168 -0.499 0.037*** 0.036*** -0.033** -0.074***
(0.174) (0.196) (0.542) (0.383) (0.006) (0.007) (0.015) (0.016)
Log of monthly earnings 0.527 2.456*** 3.542*** 2.155**
(1.115) (0.743) (1.128) (0.900)
Working hours 0.001** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002**
0.000 0.000 (0.001) (0.001)
Gender = female 1.234 1.244 -2.437 0.012 0.046 -0.048
(1.605) (1.757) (2.541) (0.055) (0.058) (0.109)
Marital = married 7.681*** 11.055*** 3.152 2.993 -0.059 -0.058 0.067 0.123
(2.717) (3.011) (2.825) (3.534) (0.054) (0.059) (0.112) (0.111)
Marital = divorced 14.575*** 20.659*** 16.126** 15.868* -0.153** -0.140** -0.203 -0.178
(3.511) (4.419) (6.647) (9.585) (0.075) (0.065) (0.195) (0.191)
Marital = widowed 0.447 4.745 -0.593 0.407 0.005 -0.041 0.031 0.283
(3.204) (3.144) (3.396) (4.344) (0.073) (0.069) (0.145) (0.187)
Occu = public emp -7.540*** -10.041*** 1.135 -9.075*** 0.130*** 0.194*** -0.036 0.520***
(2.140) (2.755) (4.821) (2.312) (0.047) (0.043) (0.217) (0.107)
Occu = self-empl. 3.752** 0.819 -0.134 0.846 -0.048* -0.067* -0.134** -0.112
(1.833) (1.062) (1.902) (1.047) (0.028) (0.034) (0.051) (0.069)
City = Tangerang -2.268 -4.968 -5.917 0.249*** 0.177* 0.153
(4.122) (3.978) (3.944) (0.077) (0.094) (0.157)
City = Samarinda -1.526 -3.729 -4.106 0.251*** 0.172 0.365*
(3.580) (4.233) (4.325) (0.086) (0.122) (0.196)
City = Makassar -7.886** -10.695** -11.648** 0.239** 0.158 0.371
(3.494) (4.590) (4.631) (0.117) (0.159) (0.243)
Constant 75.107*** 67.245*** 74.090*** -2.777 4.342*** 4.831*** 12.525*** 8.463***
(12.018) (7.922) (20.187) (117.637) (0.140) (0.237) (1.025) (0.525)
N 2986 2336 2336 2336 2889 2264 2264 2264
COHORT Dummy Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
PROVINCE Dummy Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Balanced panel No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
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TABLE 3.11 – HETEROGENOUS SIGNIFICANCE-TEST (1)
Variables By city By intermarriage By gender By distance
1-5 years=1 0.624*** 0.283*** 0.649*** 0.701***
(0.21) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
6-15 years=1 0.521*** 0.491*** 0.815*** 0.722***
(0.11) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
16-25 years=1 1.051*** 0.885*** 1.231*** 1.182***
(0.20) (0.23) (0.21) (0.21)
26-35 years=1 1.245*** 1.128*** 1.441*** 1.409***
(0.24) (0.24) (0.22) (0.22)
>36 years=1 1.784*** 1.676*** 1.952*** 2.008***
(0.28) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25)
Intermarriage dummy -0.200***
(0.01)
Female dummy -0.709***
(0.03)
Interisland dummy 0.290***
(0.02)
Tangerang -0.022**
(0.01)
Samarinda 0.218***
(0.01)
Makassar -0.100***
(0.01)
1-5 years=1 # Tangerang 0.082
(0.22)
1-5 years=1 # Samarinda -0.075
(0.15)
1-5 years=1 # Makassar -0.15
(0.27)
6-15 years=1 # Tangerang 0.313***
(0.09)
6-15 years=1 # Samarinda 0.273**
(0.13)
6-15 years=1 # Makassar 0.292***
(0.10)
16-25 years=1 # Tangerang 0.164
(0.12)
16-25 years=1 # Samarinda -0.085
(0.12)
16-25 years=1 # Makassar 0.127
(0.18)
26-35 years=1 # Tangerang 0.172
(0.15)
26-35 years=1 # Samarinda -0.231*
(0.14)
26-35 years=1 # Makassar 0.450***
(0.14)
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TABLE 3.12 – HETEROGENOUS SIGNIFICANCE-TEST (2)
Variables By city By intermarriage By gender By distance
>36 years=1 # Tangerang 0.319
(0.32)
>36 years=1 # Samarinda -0.213
(0.23)
>36 years=1 # Makassar 0.21
(0.45)
1-5 years=1 # intermarriage dummy 1=yes -0.013
(0.14)
6-15 years=1 # intermarriage dummy 1=yes 0.210**
(0.10)
16-25 years=1 # intermarriage dummy 1=yes 0.256***
(0.05)
26-35 years=1 # intermarriage dummy 1=yes 0.204***
(0.08)
>36 years=1 # intermarriage dummy 1=yes 0.478**
(0.19)
1-5 years=1 # Female 0.615***
(0.14)
6-15 years=1 # Female 0.514***
(0.12)
16-25 years=1 # Female -0.286
(0.37)
26-35 years=1 # Female 0.001
(0.23)
>36 years=1 # Female 0.212
(0.19)
1-5 years=1 # interisland=1 -0.301***
(0.08)
6-15 years=1 # interisland=1 0.017
(0.09)
16-25 years=1 # interisland=1 -0.229**
(0.09)
26-35 years=1 # interisland=1 -0.353***
(0.09)
>36 years=1 # interisland=1 -0.657**
(0.26)
Constant -2.841*** -2.712*** -2.669*** -2.716***
(0.24) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
Observations 2340 1977 2340 2340
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at year-of-arrival level with ***, **, and * indicating 1,
5, and 10% significant levels, respectively.
Chapter 4
Developing social capital for
livelihood
Abstract
This chapter is on adding empirical evidence of the possibility of creating individ-
ual social capital through education. It tests the long-term effects on social skills
formation of individuals exposed to state ideology indoctrination courses during
their adolescence. Using the case of Indonesia, the empirical analysis investigates
the long-term outcomes between individuals exposed to the massive Indonesian
state ideology indoctrination courses during their schooling years and those who
were not. The empirical strategy exploits the sudden and unexpected termination
of the courses in 1998 as an RDD setting. The results of this chapter show that
the courses had a positive but minor intermediate-term impact on cognitive but
not on non-cognitive skills. Further, the estimates on social capital measures, such
as trust and community participation, also consistently showing no impact. This
chapter concludes that the role of state ideology indoctrination courses of the type
seen in Suharto’s Indonesia might on individual social capital formation is limited.
4.1 Introduction
Social capital influences the livelihood development of individuals since its posi-
tive form affects key economic outcomes, such as reducing poverty (Cleaver, 2005;
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Narayan and Pritchett, 1999), increasing income (Zhang and Anderson, 2011), im-
proving food security (Levien, 2015; Martin et al., 2004) and reducing violent crime
(Lederman et al., 2002). On the other hand, a perverse social capital also may lead
to an adverse effect such as an increasing civil violent along with the existence of
underground economy in Colombia (Rubio, 1997). Despite the opposite effect of so-
cial capital, researcher have used the concept in social sciences and economics. As
for economics research in particular, in addition to the concept of standard physical
capital, the notion of social capital has demanded attention in development analy-
sis because of its nature of participatory, sustainability and the contextualisation
of the social dimension of development (Bebbington et al., 2004; Woolcock, 1998).
Moreover, the definition and concept of social capital also have evolved and covered
a wide range of views and interpretations.
Pierre Bourdieu defines social capital as follows: ‘the aggregate of the actual or
potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or
less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition’ (Bour-
dieu, 1986). Other scholars emphasise the element of possession of social ties and
collective action in their definitions of social capital (Bloch et al., 2007; Fukuyama,
2001). Further, social capital can simply be defined as community resources that
increase the welfare of that community (Glaeser, 2001). The bottom line of the role
of social capital is thus inferred as arising from the function of collective action in
improving efficiency (Ostrom, 1994).
Some empirical tests have shown that collective actions improve social out-
comes by correcting market failures, such as correcting information asymmetry
for local decision-making (Olken, 2010) and monitoring local governance for public
goods provision (Olken, 2007), and improve social targeting precision (Alatas et al.,
2012). Social capital is also found to play a role in securing income fluctuation by
informal insurance from friends, neighbours, and the community to maintain wel-
fare (Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2016).
Numerous studies examine the role of social capital on social outcomes. How-
ever, analyses that place social capital on the left-hand side, that is, analyses ex-
amining social capital formation, have been so far relatively limited. A larger body
of literature empirically tests the importance of community development programs
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to build social capital, acknowledging the notion of social capital as a measure at
the community level (Dale and Newman, 2008; Olken, 2010; Torres-Vitolas, 2017;
Woodhouse, 2001; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). This approach argues that social
capital is an aggregate outcome at the community level, which can be enhanced by
stimulating the community to perform a collective action. Examples of this commu-
nity development program would be such as the Prodepine in Ecuador (Bebbington
et al., 2004) or the Kecamatan Development Program in Indonesia (Guggenheim
et al., 2004). The conclusions, so far, have been as follows. Such a program yields
mixed results as regards whether it promotes community social capital (Labonne
and Chase, 2011), has limited ability to maintain the local social structure, and
results in other problems such as corruption, including elite capture (Woodhouse,
2001) and unfavourableness to vulnerable groups (Torres-Vitolas, 2017).
A large body literature has investigated how social capital formation occurs at
the individual level through education since the seminal work by Haveman and
Wolfe (1984). These studies use human capital framework and introduced social
capital as one of non-market returns on education. Among others, is the frame-
work introduced by Glaeser (2001), who postulated the investment towards indi-
vidual social capital as an analogue to investment in individual human capital.
He suggests two possible interventions to promote social capital formation at the
individual level, education and environment, that is, ethnicity heterogeneity.
The investigation in the present chapter considers the potential role of educa-
tion/training in the formation of personal social capital. It focuses on private edu-
cational experience that promotes collective action and hence creates social capital
at the individual level during adolescence. In particular, this chapter tests the im-
pact of students’ exposure to the Indonesian state ideology indoctrination courses,
commonly called as the P4 training. P4 is an abbreviation of Pedoman Penghay-
atan dan Pengamalan Pancasila which can be translated as of ‘The Guidelines for
Understanding and Practices of Pancasila (the Indonesian state ideology)’. The
training was part of their high school (junior and senior) and university education
within the period 1978–1998, i.e. during the Suharto’s presidency. My main out-
come of interests is on students’ social skills or personality traits related to social
capital, such as agreeableness, openness, extraversion, emotional stability, and ex-
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traversion. Further, I also test the long–run effect on standard measure of social
capital, trust and social participation.
The sudden discontinuation of these state ideology indoctrination courses in
1998 owing to the political reform (Reformasi) provides a natural experiment that
allows us to test the effect of the programme on individual social capital. The birth
cohort exposed and the one not exposed because of the discontinuation are valid
treatment and counterfactual groups to test the long-term impact of the courses
taught in the P4 programme on elements of individual social capital.
This analysis aims to add empirical findings in the literature in the sense that
I focus on a large-scale, education-embedded intervention that has consequence on
individual social capital. The empirical finding of this chapter is expected to add
variety of result for nation building literature Alesina et al. (2013) and persuasion
literature DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010). Note that Indonesia is the fourth most
populous country in the world, after China, India and the US. This national pro-
gram did significantly absorb the state’s fund and involve large number of trainers
all over the country. It might not be as radical as the Chinese Cultural Revolution,
1966 until 1976. The intention to reform societies’ social capital might be, however,
more or less similar.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follow. Section 4.2 explains the frame-
work, Section 4.3 describes a background of the state ideology indoctrination courses,
Section 4.4 formulates the empirical strategy, Section 4.5 describes the data, Sec-
tion 4.6 presents the results, and Section 4.7 provides discussion and interpretation
and Section 4.8 concludes.
4.2 Conceptual framework
4.2.1 Social skills formation during adolescence
This section outlines the stock of individual elements of social skills (St) formation
in the spirit of (Cunha and Heckman, 2007) as the following. St comprises cogni-
tive skills (e.g., a piece of knowledge that one should trust others) and noncognitive
skills (e.g., extroversion and agreeableness). Let assume that St is formed in a mul-
tistage technology during individuals’ lifecycle period, for example, early childhood,
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adolescence and adulthood, and that each stage can have different technologies.
The input in every stage is a parental investment, schooling, social environment,
individual investment (e.g., participating in the social club) or policy intervention
to produce outputs, that is, social skills at the next stage. The production function
of such skill at time t+ 1 is:
S(t+1) = ft(St, It) (4.1)
For all past inputs, the current stock of social skills for an individual born with the
initial condition of S1 is
S(t+1) = ft(S1, I1, I2, It) (4.2)
The framework further assumes a positive and diminishing return on investment
in every stage, that is, the production function ft is increasing and concave with
respect to It. However, every stage may have a different productivity level, such as
the same noncognitive skills investment made at adolescence yields a higher return
than at adulthood. If period t∗ is a “golden period” for producing noncognitive skill
S(t+1), then holding other inputs constant, interventions that affects this outcome
are more profound than in other stages (s 6= t∗).
(∂S(t+1))/(∂Is) < (∂S(t+1))/(∂I
∗
t ), for all s 6= t∗ (4.3)
In an empirical application, I test the hypothesis that massive state ideology
indoctrination courses as one of policy intervention given during one’s adolescence
years could affect one’s social skill lifecycle.
I also test the interactions between inputs over time. For example, whether
education intervention could yield higher St+1 = inter–ethnic trust for individuals
with better past inputs, such as living in a more heterogeneous ethnic environment
than individuals with a homogeneous environment. There would also be other
inputs that could also matter, such as gender dimension and, parental investment,
for the interaction assumption or a growing fate at regional community toward
central government who implemented the policy intervention also matters.
4.2.2 The intermediate–term and long–term effect
The analysis in this chapter divides outcomes into two categories. First is out-
comes related to intermediate effect of the courses: a cognitive skills evaluated
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reative–shortly after the program and a non–cognitive skills developed during the
period of programme implementation. As for the cognitive skill measure, the exit
score for knowledge related to the state ideology is used. The non-cognitive skills
are measured using the element the big five personality factors that are related to
social capital, namely agreeableness, openness, extraversion, emotion stability and
consciousness (Roberts et al., 2005).
Second is social capital outcomes related to long-term effect of the programme.
I use two standard measures: trust and community participation. These outcomes
are observed when these individuals have become adult.
4.3 The state ideology indoctrination courses in
Indonesia
In 1973, the Indonesian government governed by the late President Soeharto, also
known in Indonesia as the New Order government, started a massive construc-
tion of primary schools all over the country to increase access to education to all
Indonesian children. By 1978 more than 61 thousand primary schools were built;
increasing primary school enrolment rate among children aged 7 to 12 from 69 %
in 1973 to 83 % in 1978 (Duflo, 2001). To further increase enrolment rate among
children in 1984, the government set a compulsory elementary (6 years) education
program (known as Wajib Belajar or Wajar) among children. The length of this
compulsory education later on in 1994 was increased to 9 years.
Given this above background of a relatively successful in increasing school en-
rolment rate among children, in 1978, the government introduced state ideology
indoctrination courses, called as the Penataran P4 or the P4 training, as part of
the Indonesian education system. Any Indonesian citizen entering formal educa-
tion at junior or senior high school or university level, that is their adolescence
period, from 1978 to 1998, was likely participating in this state ideology indoctri-
nation courses. The training typically was in a form of a week’s intensive work-
shop in the beginning of junior or senior high school or university. The training
was also expanded in the non–education sector on an ad–hoc basis, such as during
the orientation days of civil servant recruits and some farmers’ association events
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(Nishimura, 1995). However, this chapter does not focus on this type of program
because of the difficulty in identifying the participants.
The state ideology indoctrination courses was massive and intense in the sense
that it was supported by the strong environment of a strong government that had a
full back up from the military. The program was designed by a group of civilian and
military intellectuals who are loyal to Soeharto. The training was implemented
throughout the country and supported by all government institutions.
Social environment situation at that time could be illustrated by the fact that
most of the media campaigns were engineered by the government to support the
effectiveness of these ideology indoctrination courses (Aditjondro, 1994; Aditjondro
and Kowalewski, 1994). For these reasons, one would expect that the program
would have strongly influenced an individual’s noncognitive skills related to social
capital. It was politically incorrect for Indonesians in the New Order period to
criticise the norms and values introduced by the course. One could face the risk of
social sanction in case one criticised it.
The state ideology indoctrination courses was an inclusion of the new ‘inter-
pretation’ of the state ideology as teaching materials in schools—not only public
schools but also private schools. They tried to ensure that the state ideology be-
came the citizen’s inherent social norms and values (Nishimura, 1995). These state
ideology indoctrination courses were given at various levels, mostly during (junior
and senior) high school and university years.
The main content of this state ideology indoctrination courses is practical inter-
pretation and guidance of the state ideology, which consisted of 36 items derived
from the five pillars of the state ideology, Pancasila. Some of the state ideology
indoctrination courses items emphasise the norm to enhance social engagement,
trust, and collective action, which are the elements of social capital.
The courses was suddenly abandoned in 1998 at the same time that the Soe-
harto regime fell, and along with the demands for national political reform, the
Reformasi. Therefore, Indonesian citizens entering junior high school in 1999 will
never participate in this state ideology indoctrination courses.
This chapter investigates of an open question whether the state ideology indoc-
trination courses could have formed the long-term social skills of individuals? The
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possibility that it potentially has an effect is due to the fact that it taught norms
and values encouraging collective actions, it occurred at the ‘golden period’, that
is, adolescence period and it happened during a ‘well-supported environment’ of
Indonesia’s dictator, Soeharto. Nonetheless, the program was too superficial in its
form and only last a week also raise a doubt of its power in creating such effect. I
let the two competing hypotheses as an open question and test them empirically.
4.4 Empirical method
4.4.1 The discontinuity setting
There are three fundamental elements of a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD)
setting: a running variable, a cut-off and a treatment. The introduction of the state
ideology indoctrination courses in 1978 and unexpectedly and sudden discontinu-
ation of the courses in 1998 provide an opportunity to treat the implementation of
the courses as a natural experiment and to exploit the events as an RDD setting.
The discontinuation of courses provides a more reliable exogenous shock due to the
sudden nature of the event than the introduction of the courses in 1978 that has
been relatively gradual. This paper hence defines the state ideology indoctrination
courses as the treatment.
To best of my knowledge, unfortunately, there is no publicly available data on
individual participation in the state ideology indoctrination courses. Nevertheless,
the age- and education-specific components of the course provide us the opportu-
nity to extract information in the publicly available household survey data to re-
veal the course take up. If an individual was in the first year of junior or senior
high school or university during the period 1978–1998, ignoring absenteeism or the
school fails to deliver the courses at the time of the program, that individual should
have participated in the program or treated, otherwise, they are not. Hence, the
fact that the probability of receiving treatment changes abruptly in 1998 provides
a key feature of RDD setting.
The running variable in this paper is the year Xi when an individual i experi-
enced the first year in the junior high school with the cut–off equals to 1998. Thus,
an individual is assigned as treated (participating in the state ideology indoctrina-
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tion courses), Ti = 1, if Xi ≤ 1998 and Xi ≥ 1978.
Important to note, however, are as follows. First, the introduction of the state
ideology indoctrination courses in 1978 was confounded by other major policies,
such as compulsory 6 years education program in 1984 and compulsory 9 years
education program in 1994. The effects of these policies are deemed to be asym-
metrically applied only to the treatment cohorts and not the control cohort.
Second, as aforementioned, there was a euphoria to disregard norms and val-
ues associated with the New Order era. The euphoria seems to be uniformly ex-
perienced by most adult Indonesians who witnessed the reform, but not by young
Indonesians in 1998. Its relevance to the analysis of this paper is that the euphoria
will not invalidate my comparative analysis of the program effect as long as I do
not mix the control group with young Indonesians who did not feel the euphoria. In
other words, the correct use of bandwidth will be crucial for comparability purpose.
The discussion on this issue is provided in heterogeneous analysis.
Third, another big event that accompanied the political turmoil was the 1998
economic crisis. This paper recognises the potential bias due to this event since
the effects of economic crises are not symmetrically distributed across all cohorts.
Thomas et al. (2004) show that the trend of increased enrolments among school-age
children in Indonesia was dramatically reversed at the time of the crisis. Hence,
the one possible mechanism for the bias is that the negative income shock by the
crisis postpones one’s enrolment to school which might lead to sorting issue for the
RD setting. I address this issue in the falsification analysis.
4.4.2 The RDD framework
There are two alternative frameworks for implementing RD estimates: a continuity-
based framework or local randomisation framework (Cattaneo et al., 2018). Both
frameworks measure the impact estimates by taking the difference of local regres-
sions’ intercept at points close to the cut-off. The difference is that the first ap-
proach assumes a continuity of the outcome variable at the cut-off in the absence
of the treatment and the latter approach assumes that there exists some X at
around the cut-off so that observations are placed randomly as if a random experi-
ment. Both assumptions justify the validity of exploiting the fact that observations
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at below and above the cut-off are similar in most aspects except the treatment
status to establish the causal link of the programme to the outcome of interest.
In addition to the difference assumption being used, the two frameworks pre-
scribe different estimation techniques. The continuity-based framework uses a
local-polynomial or a non-parametric regression within the optimal bandwidth
while local randomisation framework utilises the difference between the average
observed outcomes among observation below and above the cut-off within a small
window around the cut-off.
I choose the local randomisation framework for two reasons. This approach
requires a less restrictive assumption. Assuming that the local-randomisation ex-
ists implies that local continuity also exists but the reverse is not true (Cattaneo
et al., 2018). Second, when the running variable takes a discrete value, a local-
polynomial regression produces a low approximation error if there are large enough
observations near the cut-off which is not the case of this study. The relationship
between a discrete running variable and the outcome in my data exhibits a con-
densed “mass-point” that makes the local-randomisation estimates is suitable.
A general framework to implement a local-randomisation sharp RD design with
a constant treatment effect (τ ) for observations above the cut-off with a potential
outcome of Yi∈W+0 (1) and observations below the cut-off with a potential outcome of
Yi∈W−0 (0) within the window W0 is :
Yi(1) = Yi(0) + τ (4.4)
which leads to null hypothesis HFτ0 : τ = τ0 = 0 with Fisherian (finite sample) in-
ference framework (Cattaneo et al., 2018). I also implement a local randomisation
sharp RD effect with Neyman approach for the large-sample approximation as a
comparison.
Window selection is the most important step for implementing local–randomisation
RDD framework. When the running variable takes a discrete value, a well–defined
window is the smallest value, and this is the advantage of local–randomisation ap-
proach for an RDD with a discrete running variable. Therefore, the window se-
lection procedure is no longer needed (Cattaneo et al., 2018). By default, I use
W0 = [−1, 1].
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4.5 Data and variables
There are two household data sets utilized in this paper: the Indonesia Family Life
Survey (IFLS)–5 collected in 2014 and the Indonesian National Socio-Economic
Survey (SUSENAS)’s Social and Culture Module collected in 2012. The datasets
contained information on individual social capital, demography and social-economic
information. IFLS–5, in general, contains much more rich information that SUSE-
NAS. SUSENAS, however, all the Indonesian provinces and so providing repre-
sentative information for the whole nation. Meanwhile, IFLS–5 only covers 13
provinces. Both datasets are used for robustness purpose and for checking the
consistency of the results.
For IFLS–5, this paper uses the self-reported information on time entering ju-
nior high school (Question dl11a2) of the education section construct the X variable.
Such a running variable definition raises two issues. First is about the accuracy of
the Xi which depends on memory recall ability. Second, is about to what extent the
subject can (perfectly) manipulate the running variable value so do their treatment
status. To address the first issue, I perform a balance test on memory test. It indi-
cates that no systematic bias due to recall ability as it is not statistically significant
(see Appendix, Table 4.10). Nonetheless, I acknowledge that the running variable
might be not perfect. As for the second concern, I employ a density test to qualify
that there is no sorting issue regarding whether individual can choose to delay or
to advance their admission to the first year of junior high school in relation to the
state ideology indoctrination courses participation.
For generating the outcome variables, this paper utilises four sections of IFLS–5
data: education, personality, trust, and community participation. The personal-
ity section contains information on individuals’ personality factors representing
social skill, namely agreeableness, openness, extraversion, emotion stability and
consciousness. Psychology literature suggests that the social skills measured by
these traits are formed throughout multiple stages over the lifecycle, and there are
noticeable golden periods at different points of life, such as early childhood, early
adolescence, and early adulthood (Roberts et al., 2005; Skirbekk et al., 2015; Soto
and Tackett, 2015). Hence, although the information on individuals’ social skill
is gather during the IFLS–5 survey, this paper assumes that such skills mostly
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are formed during individuals’ adolescence years which some individuals in the
IFLS–5 are exposed to the state ideology indoctrination courses and some others
are not.
For each factor, IFLS–5 asks three questions on a five–point Likert–type scale.
The operational definition from the Likert scale is standardised using Z–scores for
each of the five factors and then is averaged. Among the factors, extroversion,
openness to experience, and agreeableness are used as social skill measures at the
individual level.
The education section, besides providing information on time entering junior
high school, contains junior high school exit score related to the five national prin-
ciples subject, known as Pendidikan Moral Pancasila (PMP) or Pancasila Moral
Education subject. The social skills available at the personality section and PMP
scores available at the education section are utilised by this paper to proxy the
non-cognitive and cognitive immediate effect of the courses, respectively.
The section on trust has information about the trust of neighbours and people
in the village, and on tolerance of people of different faiths, which are considered
the outcomes of interest in this paper. Trusts in this section are oriented towards
a heterogeneous people since it has a context, for example, trust in other people by
various dimensions, such as ethnicity and religion. The Likert–scale of these trusts
is standardised using Z–scores for each of the five factors and then is summed.
The section on social participation records individuals’ participation on com-
munity activities, such community meetings, cooperatives, and voluntary labour.
Counting the number of types of community activity that an individual engages in
allows us to proxy individual’s social capital.
As for SUSENAS data, the running variable uses the birth of year with 1985 as
the cut–off since I do not have information on when the individual entered school.
Individual born in 1985 or earlier should have entered junior high schools in or
before 1998. Therefore, they are expected to be treated. By such definition, the
estimates using SUSENAS data are best interpreted as an intention to treat (ITT).
SUSENAS data provide two measures of social capital: the number of type of
social activities (religious, skill, sport, art, saving, funeral, art, and other) in which
an individual participates; and trust in various external parties (village head, vil-
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TABLE 4.1 – SUMMARY STATISTICS
Panel A-IFLS
Control Treatment Total
mean SD count mean SD count mean SD count
log(social skills) 0.83 0.16 808 0.83 0.16 787 0.83 0.16 1595
log(trust) 0.85 0.17 808 0.85 0.16 787 0.85 0.17 1595
log(participation) -3.99 2.36 808 -3.91 2.4 787 -3.95 2.38 1595
PMP score 6.02 1.05 229 6.43 1.01 234 6.22 1.05 463
Age 27.98 1.50 805 29.01 1.65 782 28.49 1.66 1587
Year of Schooling 12.12 2.53 800 12.02 2.55 778 12.07 2.54 1578
Share of:
Gender (male=1) 0.49 0.50 805 0.46 0.50 782 0.48 0.50 1587
Location(Urban=1) 0.64 0.48 808 0.63 0.48 787 0.63 0.48 1595
Islam 0.90 0.30 808 0.90 0.30 787 0.90 0.30 1595
Catholic 0.04 0.21 808 0.05 0.22 787 0.05 0.21 1595
Protestant 0.01 0.08 808 0.01 0.09 787 0.01 0.08 1595
Hindu 0.04 0.20 808 0.03 0.17 787 0.04 0.19 1595
Buddhist 0.00 0.05 808 0.00 0.05 787 0.00 0.05 1595
Household head is gov. emp. 0.09 0.29 808 0.10 0.29 787 0.09 0.29 1595
Panel B-SUSENAS
log(trust) 1.37 0.18 453 1.39 0.17 492 1.38 0.18 945
log(participation) 0.99 0.49 453 1.01 0.5 492 1.00 0.49 945
Age 26 0 453 27 0 492 26.52 0.5 945
Year of Schooling 11.62 2.73 453 11.14 2.47 492 11.37 2.61 945
Share of:
Gender(Male=1) 0.33 0.47 453 0.33 0.47 492 0.33 0.47 945
Location(Urban=1) 0.53 0.5 453 0.54 0.5 492 0.54 0.5 945
Note: The summary statistics uses observations within W0 = [−1, 1] and includes only
individual who ever entered junior high schools in the 13 provinces of IFLS coverage. The
rule applies also to SUSENAS data.
lage leader, local religious leader, and neighbour). The first measure is extracted
from the individual and household–head level and the second measure is from the
household–head level only. The sum of Z–score of the Likert–scale is computed to
obtain the trust score.
All of these outcomes of interest are transformed into a natural log to ease the
interpretation. The summary statistics of key variables are presented in Table 4.1.
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4.6 Results
4.6.1 Treatment status
This section presents the result of the discontinuity in the treatment status and
discuss whether subjects have influence on their position in the running variable
and so the treatment status. Figure 4.1—Panel (a) plots the treatment status
and running variable to show that the probability of receiving treatment changes
abruptly at Xi = 0 for IFLS–5 data. The perfect jump is a result of imposing an
assumption that all individual who entered junior high school before or in 1998
participated in state ideology indoctrination courses. Some cases make the actual
take–up did not take place. First is absenteeism. Individuals might not participate
if they were absent at the time of the workshop. Second, the student did not par-
ticipate in the school which fails to deliver the program courses for many reasons.
One of the examples is religious schools with a view of opposing Pancasila’s values
and refused to offer the workshop.
(a) Treatment status over running variable (b) Year entering junior high school
by birth cohorts
FIGURE 4.1 – TREATMENT STATUS
Note: The dashed line in panel b indicates plots of individual who entered junior high
school exactly at 13 years old. The vertical line is at year of birth equals to 1985 when the
last cohort exposed to the P4 program is expected to be born. The horizontal line is at the
year of admission to junior high school equals to 1998.
To address absenteeism issue, I use information on experiencing retention and
disruption in the first year as a proxy of their absence during the workshop. IFLS–5
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shows that retention rate and the proportion of individual with disruption in the
first year is very low (0.8% and 0.6% respectively), making the absenteeism issue
is ignorable. And, to address the school failure–issue, I exercise two estimates:
one which includes all type of schools and one which only includes the public
schools. The later subsampling is expected to limit the school failure in deliver-
ing the courses. I argue that the compliance of public school toward government
programme during the New Order Era is likely to be perfect. I present the results
in the heterogeneous analysis section.
The dashed line of Figure 4.1—Panel (b) passes dots that represent admission
at the year recommended for school. The dots to the left of the line represent in-
dividuals who delay the admission and the dots to the right of the line represent
individuals who forward the admission to school. Thus, we observe that individ-
ual can influence their position along years entered junior high school, that is the
running variable. Our concern is to what extent this decision is related to the
treatment status. Explicitly, whether individual delay or forward their admission
to avoid (to be in) the state ideology indoctrination courses if the perceive a loss
(gain) associated with their participation in the program. The density test indeed
confirms this behaviour so that there is a minor drop in the number of observations
just to the right of the cut-off. However, I argue that the drop is not because of sub-
ject’s strategic decision in relation to benefit or loss related to their participation in
the state ideology indoctrination courses, but it is due to adverse economic effect of
the Asian Financial Crisis as I explain shortly in the robustness test section.
4.6.2 Intermediate-term effect
Figure 4.2 displays state ideology indoctrination courses intermediate-term effect
on cognitive aspect (Panel A) and on non-cognitive skills (Panel B). Table 4.2 presents
the estimates of equation 4.3 for these graphical representations. The effect on
PMP subject–exit score is 0.41 out of a ten scale which corresponds to about 7%
higher than the control group and statistically significant at 1% level. However,
the effect on the non-cognitive skills related to social capital is small and not statis-
tically significant. These results suggest that the program design was more toward
shaping knowledge rather for developing the social skills.
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(a) PMP score (b) Social skills index
FIGURE 4.2 – EFFECTS OF THE P4 TRAINING ON PMP SCORE AND PERSONALITY-SOCIAL
SKILLS INDEX
Note: The plot implements polynomial of degree zero or p(0) and bandwidth/window
equals to one or h(1). Dots represent the average value of the index by each bin or ”mass
point” of the running variables. The solid lines indicate the fitted values from a local
polynomial specified and the grey lines are the 95% confidence interval.
TABLE 4.2 – EFFECT OF THE P4 TRAINING ON PMP SCORE AND PERSONALITY—SOCIAL
SKILLS INDEX
Cognitive Non-cognitive
PMP score log(PMP score) social skills index log(social skills)
RDD-estimate 0.410 0.068 -0.001 0.000
P-value small 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.969 0.980
P-value large - - 0.976 0.985
Obs-left 229 229 808 808
Obs-right 234 234 787 787
Window-left -1 -1 -1 -1
Window-right 1 1 1 1
Note: ***, **, and * indicate 1, 5, and 10% significant levels, respectively. The estimates
utilise rdrandinf command developed by Cattaneo et al. (2016) with the default–a poly-
nomial of order zero and use a Kernel type of uniform for observations within W0. All
estimates include only individual who ever entered junior high schools in the 13 provinces
of IFLS coverage. A smaller number of observations for cognitive estimates is due to lower
response rate of questions on EBTANAS score in section DL than questions on personality
in section PSN.
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TABLE 4.3 – EFFECT OF THE P4 TRAINING ON TRUST AND SOCIAL PARTICIPATION
IFLS SUSENAS
log(trust) log(participation) log(trust) log(participation)
RDD-estimate 0.008 0.087 0.017 0.021
P-value small 0.332 0.468 0.149 0.504
P-value large 0.327 0.474 0.15 0.504
Obs-left 808 808 453 453
Obs-right 787 787 492 492
Window-left -1 -1 -1 -1
Window-right 1 1 1 1
Note: ***, **, and * indicate 1, 5, and 10% significant levels, respectively. The estimates
utilise rdrandinf command developed by Cattaneo et al. (2016) with the default–a poly-
nomial of order zero and use a Kernel type of uniform for observations within W0. All
estimates include only individual who ever entered junior high schools in the 13 provinces
of IFLS coverage for both IFLS and SUSENAS estimates.
(a) IFLS (b) SUSENAS
FIGURE 4.3 – EFFECTS OF THE P4 TRAINING ON TRUST
Note: Both figures plot the trust index (trust in neighbourhood and village environment)
on running variable using IFLS data and SUSENAS data respectively with rdplot com-
mand. The plot implements polynomial of degree zero or p(0) and bandwidth/window
equals to one or h(1). Dots represent the average value of the index by each bin or ”mass
point” of the running variables. The solid lines indicate the fitted values from a local
polynomial specified and the grey lines are the 95% confidence interval.
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(a) IFLS (b) SUSENAS
FIGURE 4.4 – PROGRAMME EFFECTS ON SOCIAL PARTICIPATION
Note: Both figures plot the community participation score on running variable using IFLS
data and SUSENAS data respectively with rdplot command. The plot implements poly-
nomial of degree zero or p(0) and bandwidth/window equals to one or h(1). Dots repre-
sent the average value of the index by each bin or ”mass point” of running variables. The
solid lines indicate the fitted values from a local polynomial specified and the grey lines
are the 95% confidence interval.
4.6.3 Long-term effect
Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 display the long-term effect on trust and participation
which indicate a positive program’s effect on trust and social participation. How-
ever, the estimates of Table 4.3 shows no long-term program effect as none of these
coefficients is statistically significant both using IFLS and SUSENAS data. These
results are not surprising since earlier we observe a minor effect on outcomes in
the intermediate-term. It seems that the minor positive effect of the state ideology
indoctrination courses on cognitive aspect in the intermediate-term is not enough
to promote individual trust in the long-term. Clearly, insignificant effect in the
intermediate-term on social skills leads to no effect in the long-term for social par-
ticipation.
4.6.4 Possible heterogeneous effects
In this section, I first divide school into public and non-public school for examining
the effectiveness of the program. As aforementioned, the compliance in the imple-
mentation of the state ideology indoctrination courses might differ between public
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and non-public schools. This public and not-public school grouping could also be a
proxy for different parental investment toward children education.
Second, I group the samples into female and male groups. Third, I check
whether the impact of state ideology indoctrination courses would be different for
those living in rural (typically rather homogenous environment) and those in urban
(typically more heterogeneous environment) areas. Finally, I also observe whether
the impact of the program would be different in regions with some aspiration of in-
dependence during the New Order era, representing regions with relatively lower
trust to the central government. For this last case, I observe the impact of the
program in Aceh and Papua provinces.
Panel A of Table 4.4 shows the intermediate-term effect by school admin–type
on cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes. The estimates results suggest no differ-
ence between the two types of school admin in regard to cognitive (PMP score) and
non–cognitive (social skills index). The coefficients on cognitive outcome remain
statistically significant and each point estimate’s magnitude are close to the point
estimate with full sample. Similarly, coefficient on non–cognitive outcome remain
statistically insignificant as in the full sample estimates.
Panel B of Table 4.4 shows the heterogenous long-term effect by gender. De-
spite the tendency of higher effect for female than male, the coefficients are not
statistically significant. The estimates suggest no program effect–difference by
gender. Panel C of Table 4.4 presents the heterogenous effect by location whether
in urban or rural. I consider that the environment in the rural area with a homoge-
nous community could make the individuals easier to maintain trust level than in
a heterogeneous environment of the urban area. Similar to the result of effect by
gender. The estimates indicate such tendency, but the coefficients are statistically
insignificant.
The specific factor that is hypothesised to become an offsetting factor is being
the resident of Aceh and Papua Provinces. The estimates in Table 4.5 indicate
to support the hypothesis. Overall signs are negative which indicates an adverse
effect of the courses. The reversed sign might suggest the backlash effect. However,
the coefficients are also remaining statistically insignificant.
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TABLE 4.4 – HETEROGENOUS EFFECTS
Panel A
Public school Non-public school
log(PMP score) log(soc. skills) log(PMP score) log(soc. Skills)
RDD-estimate 0.055 0.016 0.093 -0.004
P-value small 0.005*** 0.408 0.000*** 0.635
P-value large 0.007*** 0.404 - 0.62
Obs-left 146 157 83 651
Obs-right 158 157 76 630
Window-left -1 -1 -1 -1
Window-right 1 1 1 1
Panel B
Male Female
log(trust) log(participation) log(trust) log(participation)
RDD-estimate 0.001 0.144 0.020 -0.035
P-value small 0.884 0.340 0.178 0.854
P-value large 0.891 0.348 0.182 0.844
Obs-left 517 517 291 291
Obs-right 492 492 295 295
Window-left -1 -1 -1 -1
Window-right 1 1 1 1
Panel C
Urban Rural
log(trust) log(participation) log(trust) log(participation)
RDD-estimate 0.008 0.071 0.012 0.120
P-value small 0.479 0.693 0.305 0.452
P-value large 0.483 0.703 0.299 0.456
Obs-left 397 397 408 408
Obs-right 359 359 423 423
Window-left -1 -1 -1 -1
Window-right 1 1 1 1
Note: ***, **, and * indicate 1, 5, and 10% significant levels, respectively. The estimates
utilise rdrandinf command developed by Cattaneo et al. (2016) with the default–a poly-
nomial of order zero and use a Kernel type of uniform for observations within W0. All
estimates include only individual who ever entered junior high schools in the 13 provinces
of IFLS coverage. The observations by subsample are different with regard to remaining
number of observation within W0[−1, 1] by category of school administration, gender and
location (rural/urban). The largest drop is in school administration type division due to a
lot of missing responses.
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TABLE 4.5 – PROGRAMME EFFECT IN ACEH AND PAPUA PROVINCE
Aceh Papua
log(trust) log(participation) log(trust) log(participation)
RDD-estimate -0.007 -0.001 -0.060 -0.101
P-value small 0.819 0.993 0.133 0.250
P-value large 0.796 0.995 0.16 0.268
Obs-left 49 49 53 53
Obs-right 51 51 66 66
Window-left -1 -1 -1 -1
Window-right 1 1 1 1
Note: ***, **, and * indicate 1, 5, and 10% significant levels, respectively. The estimates
utilise rdrandinf command developed by Cattaneo et al. (2016) with the default–a poly-
nomial of order zero and use a Kernel type of uniform for observations within W0. The
estimates use SUSENAS data since IFLS surveys do not cover these provinces. Papua
consists of Papua and West Papua Provinces.
4.6.5 Robustness tests
To check the robustness of the results, I employ a set of standard strategies in an
RD with local randomisation approach. It comprises of predetermined outcomes
and placebo outcome balance–test, the density of the running variable–test, and
the placebo cut-off–test. I do not perform the sensitivity to window choice–test
since the window selected is the lowest one and no window smaller than W0 in
the analysis. In addition to these procedures, I also use two datasets of IFLS–5
and SUSENAS of Social and Cultural Module 2012 to check for consistency of the
results.
The idea behind the predetermined outcomes test is that there should be no
systematic differences between treated and control group concerning outcomes be-
fore the treatment at the cut-off. Proving such condition is necessary to show that
the treatment or the programme could not have affected these variables. In a local
randomisation approach, both predetermined covariates and placebo outcome anal-
ysis are analysed within W0, the window that is being used in the primary analysis
(Frandsen, 2017). Table 4.6 shows the predetermined covariates–test, and we can
infer that most of these covariates when the subject was 12 years old are not sta-
tistically different relative to the control group. The only exception is the number
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TABLE 4.6 – PREDETERMINED COVARIATES–TEST
Panel A - Household condition
Dep. Vars.: # of room HH size Live w mother Live w father
RDD-estimate 0.042 0.107 0.019 0.002
P-value small 0.635 0.363 0.216 0.930
P-value large 0.645 0.354 0.25 0.941
Panel B - Number of brothers/sisters
Dep. Vars.: # older brother # older sister # younger brother # younger sister
RDD-estimate 0.056 0.051 -0.012 0.016
P-value small 0.298 0.330 0.780 0.718
P-value large 0.325 0.356 0.799 0.708
Panel C - Proxy for wealth
Dep. Vars.: Have electricity Have piped water Own toilet Have up to 25 books
RDD-estimate -0.037 -0.017 -0.011 0.002
P-value small 0.061* 0.444 0.672 0.930
P-value large 0.054* 0.481 0.693 0.941
Obs-left 666 666 666 666
Obs-right 650 650 650 650
Window-left -1 -1 -1 -1
Window-right 1 1 1 1
Note: ***, **, and * indicate 1, 5, and 10% significant levels, respectively. The estimates
utilise rdrandinf command developed by Cattaneo et al. (2016) with the default–a poly-
nomial of order zero and use a Kernel type of uniform for observations within W0. The
estimates use IFLS–5 data.
of older sister and probability of having electricity that has a statistical difference
yet the magnitudes are negligible.
To implement the placebo test, I replicate the RDD-estimate using exit test
score at the junior high school for Bahasa and Science subject as the outcome. The
requirement for a good placebo outcome is that it occurs after the treatment, but
by programme causal mechanism it could not possibly have been affected by the
treatment. The exit test, known as EBTANAS occurs at the final year of junior
high school, three years after the P4 workshop and at best of my knowledge its test
design is stable at around cut-off. Also, the Bahasa and Science subjects are the
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TABLE 4.7 – PLACEBO OUTCOME—EBTANAS SCORE FOR BAHASA AND SCIENCE
ln(Bahasa score) ln(Science score)
RDD-estimate 0.006 0.027
P-value small 0.720 0.178
P-value large 0.740 0.185
Obs-left 293 230
Obs-right 251 237
Window-left -1 -1
Window-right 1 1
Note: ***, **, and * indicate 1, 5, and 10% significant levels, respectively. The estimates
utilise rdrandinf command developed by Cattaneo et al. (2016) with the default–a poly-
nomial of order zero and use a Kernel type of uniform for observations within W0. The
estimates use IFLS–5 data. The sample size is smaller than the main estimate due to
lower response rate for variables related to EBTANAS score.
ones that have no relation to the content of the P4 workshop, unlike other subjects
such as Pancasila Moral Education (PMP) which is closely related. The insignifi-
cant coefficients for Bahasa and Science score in Table 4.7 confirm the results that
the state ideology indoctrination courses only affect individual scores for PMP sub-
ject.
The third step in the robustness analysis is the running variable density test.
In an RD design with discrete running variable—local randomisation approach,
the researcher cannot use a standard McCrary (McCrary, 2008) density test which
based on a continuity assumption (Frandsen, 2017). Instead, the density test ex-
ploits whether the discrete running variable’s probability mass function (pmf) sat-
isfies a certain smoothness condition. If yes, then the observed frequency at the
threshold has a known conditional distribution and allows the use of mass point
adjacent to the cut-off (Frandsen, 2017). The general similarity of the test with
standard McCrary density test is that it seeks whether the number of observa-
tions at around the cut-off within the window W0 are roughly similar. Specifically,
I use Stata command rddisttestk developed by Frandsen (2017) to implement
the test.
Figure 4.5 plots the density of observations by running variable and shows the
test results. Three chosen value of k which determines the maximal degree of non-
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linearity in the pmf that is still considered to be compatible with no manipulation
fails to reject the null of no difference (no manipulation). One possible explanation
for a dip in the density at X = 0 is that the admission to school drops when the
Asian financial crises hit in 1998. Thomas et al. (2004) demonstrate that the finan-
cial crisis has had a dramatic negative effect on school attendance among young
Indonesians. Among 8-13year-olds, the fraction of individuals that were not in
school in 1998 was nearly 20% higher. In my sample, Figure 4.6 also shows the
junior high schools’ admissions drop by about 5% in 1998.
To what extent this crisis effect confounds the impact estimates are twofold.
First, the control group are dominated by the student from crisis—survival family.
If social capital measures are positively related to the survival, then the impact es-
timates are overstated. Second, the non-surviving students might postpone their
enrolment and enter later which adds the density in the control group. Thus, the
control group is contaminated with lower social capital students—assuming that
social capital measures are positively related to the survival. This later case rein-
forces the overstated impact estimates. Given that most of the estimates are not
statistically significant, the required correction from this density result, if any, is
to revise the coefficients downward.
Last, I implement the placebo outcome test using two artificial cut-offs: 1988
and 2008. These two years are picked up arbitrarily with a gap of ten from original
cut-off both above and below it. I expect no effect on the outcomes of interest
since at these two cut-offs the probability of treatment assignment does not change.
Furthermore, each of artificial cut-off contains observations of treated only (for
1988) and control only (for 2008), respectively. Table 4.8 shows the RDD-estimate
with these fake cut-offs. All coefficients are statistically insignificant, including the
coefficients on trust and participation outcomes. The coefficients of these outcomes
were statistically significant with the real cut-off.
4.6.6 Interpretation
Up to this point, I have documented an empirical assessment to show that indi-
viduals’ exposure to state ideology indoctrination courses in Indonesia does not
have a long-lasting effect on the individual social capital formation. There are two
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FIGURE 4.5 – DENSITY TEST
Note: The p-value tests are implemented using Stata command rddisttestk developed
by Frandsen with the chosen k = 0, 0.01, 0.02. The larger k represents the mass at the
threshold can deviate substantially from linearity before the test will reject with high
probability, while a small k means even small deviations from linearity will lead the test
to reject with high probability (Frandsen, 2017).
TABLE 4.8 – PLACEBO CUT-OFFS
cut-off=1988 cut-off=2008
Dep. Vars.: log(soc. skills) log(part.) log(trust) log(soc. skills) log(part.) log(trust)
RDD-estimate -0.029 -0.102 0.018 -0.002 -0.166 -0.002
P-value small 0.408 0.828 0.589 0.884 0.317 0.873
P-value large 0.431 0.842 0.591 0.874 0.338 0.88
Obs-left 42 42 42 426 426 426
Obs-right 38 38 38 363 363 363
Window-left -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Window-right 1 1 1 1 1 1
Note: ***, **, and * indicate 1, 5, and 10% significant levels, respectively. The estimates
utilise rdrandinf command developed by Cattaneo et al. (2016) with the default–a poly-
nomial of order zero and use a Kernel type of uniform for observations within W0. The
estimates use IFLS–5 data and public school only.
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FIGURE 4.6 – ADMISSION RATE (JUNIOR) BY RUNNING VARIABLE
argumentations for this result. The first is the reverse effect of the reform. For
the anti-New Order group, the reform in 1998 is a momentum to disregard all the
norms and values dictated by the regime. Since it is difficult to identify whether an
individual belongs to this group or the opposing group, that of New Order loyalists,
and hence, the analysis infers such behaviour to be from regions that hate the New
Order the most, that is, Aceh and Papua Provinces as aforementioned.
The second argument is about the programme design. The P4 programme lacks
real-life practice for the value and norms taught in the class to be effective. More-
over, the workshop was dominated by discussions and activities such as cognitive-
building. The effectiveness to cast a strong effect seems to be weak as the offsetting
effect takes place. The heterogeneous analysis of the program effect by location
provides tentative support for this argument. Living in a more heterogeneous en-
vironment of urban area erodes the program effect quicker than in the rural area.
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4.7 Conclusion
This paper aims to test whether individual exposure to the Indonesian state ide-
ology indoctrination courses affects the relevant short–run outcomes and whether
the program effect lasts to influences individual social capital formation in the long
run. Using both the IFLS–5 data and the SUSENAS data, the empirical analysis
exploits the sudden and unexpected termination of the program in 1998 as a Re-
gression Discontinuity Design setting.
The results suggest that the program effect does not last in the long run to
affect individual social capital measured by trust and social participation. While
the training increased cognitive score related to the program, it did not alter the
personality traits related to social skills. The measures of the big five factors of
personality namely agreeableness, extraversion, openness, consciousness and emo-
tional stability are not statistically different between the treatment and the con-
trol groups. The results also suggest that a combination of the course itself and the
real–life facilitating environment could ensure that the program is more effective
than only exposure to the course.
This chapter, hence, concludes that the role of state ideology indoctrination
courses of the type experienced in Soeharto’s Indonesia on the long–run individual
social capital formation is limited. It could be effective for promoting bridging so-
cial capital at the cognitive level. A combination of intense cognitive learning and
a supportive environment might improve the program effectiveness. In general,
however, such an indoctrination approach will not be a valid approach to form indi-
vidual social capital, despite a significant amount of resources dedicated to prepare
and train the instructor for the program as well as to implement the program itself.
I hope that this finding could contribute to the debates whether a government can
develop social capital through education.
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Appendix
4.A Additional tables and figures
4.A.1 Effect of the P4 training on five factors—social skills
This section provides tables mentioned in the main text for adding information and
some estimate details.
The RD-plots of Figure 4.7 on every five factors of social skills—Panel (b) to (f)
indicates that consciousness, extraversion, and emotional stability have a positive
impact and agreeableness and openness have a negative impact. The estimates
in Table 4.9 confirm these directions, but none of these coefficients is statistically
significant.
TABLE 4.9 – EFFECT OF THE P4 TRAINING ON FIVE FACTORS—SOCIAL SKILLS
Dep. Vars.: Agreeableness Openness Extraversion Consciousness Emotional stability
RDD-estimate -0.006 -0.039 -0.014 0.029 0.026
P-value small 0.861 0.254 0.699 0.368 0.447
P-value large 0.862 0.261 0.723 0.385 0.444
Obs-left 667 667 667 667 667
Obs-right 651 651 651 651 651
Window-left -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Window-right 1 1 1 1 1
4.A.2 Balance test on memory test score
Table 4.10 shows the balance test between treatment and control group at around
cut-off. The t-test fails to reject the equality of the mean between the two groups
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(a) Aggregate index of social skills (b) Agreeableness
(c) Openness (d) Extraversion
(e) Emotion stability (f) Consciousness
FIGURE 4.7 – EFFECT OF THE P4 TRAINING ON THE BIG FIVE PERSONALITY FACTORS
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over variables memorising word-score and portion of individual who correctly an-
swer the current date. Hence, the potential bias owing to the measurement error
due to mis-remember the year entering junior high school, if any, is negligible.
TABLE 4.10 – BALANCE TEST—COGNITIVE CAPACITY
Control Treatment
Variable Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Diff. P-value
Memorizing words-score 5.793 667 5.685 651 0.108 0.200
Accuracy about date 0.982 667 0.992 651 -0.010 0.321
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Two chapters (Chapters 2 and 3) in this thesis provide empirical analyses about
a livelihood diversification strategy, namely, having an alternative livelihood and
migrating from rural–to–urban areas, and its consequence on contemporary de-
velopment outcomes, which are food security, earnings, and mental health. As a
possible means for improving livelihood, another chapter considers the possibility
of developing social capital at the individual level through education. The specific
context of the issues addressed in the first two papers (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3)
are about acknowledging the food insecurity in the small remote islands and inter-
nal migrant economic assimilation in the less restrictive environment of Indonesia.
The context of the issue examined in the third paper (Chapter 4) considers the pos-
sibility of improving livelihoods by creating social capital at the individual level
through indoctrination education. The findings reveal significant consequences for
policy.
In general, diversifying the livelihood affects development outcomes positively.
Chapter 2 provides empirical evidence that having an alternative livelihood mat-
ters for food entitlement of people living in remote areas. Concerning the case of
study, a geographical context of small islands, the result suggests a moderate im-
pact of additional income from an alternative livelihood on household perception
on food security. Chapter 3 reveals that by migrating from rural areas to urban ar-
eas, internal migrants not only can earn better but can also sustain better relative
earnings than the natives. Although our expectation of education might be a good
place to develop social capital, Chapter 4 shows that a massive effort to develop
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social skills during adolescence through indoctrination education as observed in
Indonesia’s Soeharto era was not effective to cast individual social skills.
Each chapter’s result contributes to the literature in each theme. First, my
case of study in the Kei island provides an additional empirical result to the liter-
ature of acknowledging food insecurity problem by territorial basis. I show that,
for people living in the small islands, additional income matters for their feeling
toward food security improvements. Second, the analysis of economic assimilation
of Indonesian rural-urban migrants adds variety to the existing finding on internal
migration dynamics literature in the developing countries. I show that under the
less-restrictive policy, in general, migrants outperform their counterpart of non-
migrants in the labour market. The archipelagic setting which entails higher cost-
of migration, however, still creates a hurdle for migrating. Inter-island migrants
are less benefited from the migration process. Last, the investigation on educa-
tion as a mean for social capital formation contribute to the non-market return on
education and nation-building literature. Indonesian case shows that special ed-
ucation at the time of adolescence in a non-democratic system is less effective to
develop social capital at the individual level.
In addition, some lessons learned from the case studies, as well as policy con-
sequences, emerge. First, the impact magnitude that I found in the laboratory ex-
periment in the field of Chapter 2 emphasises one direct and indirect consequence.
The direct one is that, in general, actions to promote any additional income, such as
through an alternative livelihood, are a desirable means to improve food security.
A more specific study to test what types of alternative livelihood yield the most ef-
ficient impact is beyond the scope of my research, and it is one of the directions for
future research. Further, the indirect consequence is that the impact magnitude
suggests revising the amount of social assistance upwards (e.g., cash transfer) for
achieving SLs by eradicating the hunger experience for the lowest–income group
of the context of the population. In general, the finding implies acknowledging the
different rate on a regional basis of any income intervention in eradicating hunger.
However, the results have a limited context of generalisation, which applies only
to a population similar to that of the present study.
Second, the results of Chapter 3 show that diversifying livelihood by migrating
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is a viable strategy and imply two critical values about migration policy. The accen-
tuation of the analysis is to distinguish the assimilation process of the rural–urban
migration in a place with less restriction towards internal migrants with those of
more restrictive ones. First, allowing free movement of people across places, which
implicitly eases livelihood diversification, leads to the migrants having superior
labour–market outcomes persistently. Although I found a subnational variation of
the case, Indonesian rural–urban migrants tend to exhibit persistent higher earn-
ings (relative to the urban natives) after their arrival in cities. Second, unintended
consequences might arise along with the superior achievement in the labour mar-
ket, such as a detrimental effect on the mental health condition. Identifying affir-
mative policies to address this side effect is beyond the scope of this research, and
I leave it for future research.
Third, to enrich the analysis of social capital formation, in Chapter 4, I provide
empirical evidence that special education might have limited ability to develop
social skills at the individual level. The Indonesian case shows that massive indoc-
trination and correct timing during the lifecycle (i.e., adolescence) are not sufficient
for the course to significantly affect individual social skills. A practical policy re-
sponse emerging from the analysis is that in designing any similar programme in
the future, the real–life practicality of the norms and values taught for developing
personal social capital through education must be considered.
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Supplementary Materials
Supplement 1
This supplementary section is related to Chapter 2 of the main text.
The food insecurity scale
Model and framework
The household food security measure in this chapter uses the Food Insecurity Ex-
perience Scale (FIES) derived from the HFSSM module. The scale reflects answers
to set questions on subjective, and experience-based observation on household food
insecurity and hunger that resulted from financial resource constraint during the
past 12 months (Radimer et al., 1990). The questions are designed in a sequence
to capture the severity level of hunger experience, which hypothetically has some
stages.
The stage starts with feeling anxiety about running out of food, originating
from financial constraints (Q2, Q3). The next stage indicates a higher level of food
insecurity, which is the perception of inadequacy in the quality or quantity of food
eaten by household members (Q4). Then, the stage of household food insecurity
worsens, which is the adjustment of normal use of food, such as substituting with
fewer and cheaper food items than those usually consumed (Q5, Q6, Q7). The ulti-
mate stage following this deterioration of food security condition is instances of re-
duced food intake by adults with the physical sensation of hunger or loss of weight
(Q8, Q9). For households with children, the questions are extended to capture sim-
ilar stages for children in the family (Q10–Q16). Thus, the order of questions from
Q2 to Q16 suggests monotonicity of food insecurity severity.
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In summary, the responses to the questions are coded as binary for affirmative
answers (1 = Yes and 2 = No) or on a Likert scale for severity answers (e.g., 1 = Of-
ten, 2 = Sometimes, and 3 = Never). The aggregation of the responses into a scale
uses two approaches: simple sum and a Rasch scale. The simple sum approach
puts the same weight on each question and does not consider the order of severity.
Conversely, the Rasch scale weights each question based on its “difficulty” level.
The Rasch model is one of the IRT models that estimate the latent value of individ-
uals corresponding to their affirmation of a set of questions. IRT is becoming the
dominant framework for measurement in many social sciences, and in particular,
in psychology and educational testing (Ballard et al., 2013). Unlike the standard
linear scaling, such as principal component analysis, IRT is more appropriate for
the underlying data that have binary responses in nature. Further, the use of
nonlinear scaling is also suitable for the non-normally distributed error variance
assumption.
In education research, the main use of the IRT model is to determine how an
individual with a certain ability level will respond to an item associated with a
particular difficulty level. Specifically, in a Rasch model, which is known as the
one-parameter logistic model, the probability that a subject with ability Ai re-
sponds correctly to a test item m characterised by difficulty level Dm is modelled as
a logistic function of the distance between Ai and Dm:
Pr(Yim = 1|Ai) = exp(Ai −Dm)
1 + exp(Ai −Dm) (5.1)
An application of the model to the measurement of food insecurity severity in-
terprets the Ai parameters as reflecting the severity associated with the experience
captured by the different questions and of theDm parameters as the measure of the
level of food insecurity experienced by household i. I implement the Rasch model
on the survey data using a set of 15 questions as used by Hackett et al. (2008).
Two important assumptions must be made to ensure that the IRT estimation
is valid. First is the assumption of conditional independence, which states that the
probability of affirming one experience by a respondent, conditional on his or her
food insecurity level, does not depend on whether or not he or she has affirmed
other experiences, or on whether or not other respondents have affirmed the same
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experience (Ballard et al., 2013). To test this assumption practically, we expect to
observe a similar fit of superimposing test characteristic curve and the items’ em-
pirical proportions. Second is the assumption of unidimensionality, which suggests
that all items used contribute in the same way to the underlying latent trait. This
later assumption is fully satisfied given that the questions asked are related to food
insecurity experiences and are coded consistently for each response.
The Rasch model
1 Imputing the missing responses
To calculate the Rasch scale of the food security experience scale, I implement the
following steps. First, to fit the data to the Rasch model, I uniformly recode the
answers to the questions Q2 to Q16 into binary responses. The answers that are
originally coded 1 = Yes and 2 = No are recoded into 1 = Yes and 0 = No. The
answers that have a value of 1 = Almost every [...], 2 = Some [...] but not every [...]
and 3 = Only one or two [...] are recoded 1 = Almost every or Some [...] and 0 =
Only one or two [...]. Similarly, answers that have a value of 1 = Often true, 2 =
Sometimes true, and 3 = Never true are recoded 1 = Often true or Sometimes true
and 0 = Never true (Hackett et al., 2008).
The Rasch model requires a nonmissing response for each item used in the
model. Unfortunately, the raw data from the survey are quite spotty regarding
the fillings and the compliance expected from the chain set in the questionnaire
(see, e.g., the condition in Q4 Part H) I acknowledge that this problem is because
of fatigue from answering the lengthy questions. To fill in the missing responses,
I follow the procedure of imputing missing values in the Rasch model by imple-
menting command imputerasch in Stata. The imputation procedure is as follows:
The parameters of the Rasch model are estimated on complete data, and then, the
missing data are imputed from the estimated probability for every individual to re-
spond to each item (Hardouin, 2008). Table S1 presents the summary statistics for
each question in Part H and Part J of its original and imputed value, respectively.
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TABLE S1 – SUMMARY OF ORIGINAL (H *) AND IMPUTED VALUE (IMPH *) OF QUESTIONS
Q2 TO Q16
Question
code
Mean SD
Count of
nonmissing
Imputed
question code
Mean SD
Count of
nonmissing
H P2 0.58 0.49 530 impH P2 0.59 0.49 533
H P3 0.53 0.5 529 impH P3 0.53 0.5 533
H P4 0.58 0.49 531 impH P4 0.58 0.49 533
H P5 0.45 0.5 520 impH P5 0.46 0.5 533
H P6 0.49 0.5 519 impH P6 0.5 0.5 533
H P7 0.58 0.49 520 impH P7 0.59 0.49 533
H P8 0.58 0.49 513 impH P8 0.59 0.49 533
H P9 0.48 0.5 341 impH P9 0.55 0.5 533
H P10 0.5 0.5 491 impH P10 0.51 0.5 533
H P11 0.55 0.5 490 impH P11 0.55 0.5 533
H P12 0.38 0.48 489 impH P12 0.39 0.49 533
H P13 0.52 0.5 479 impH P13 0.53 0.5 533
H P14 0.5 0.5 472 impH P14 0.52 0.5 533
H P15 0.55 0.5 477 impH P15 0.55 0.5 533
H P16 0.58 0.49 479 impH P16 0.59 0.49 533
J P2 0.51 0.5 527 impJ P2 0.51 0.5 532
J P3 0.47 0.5 518 impJ P3 0.48 0.5 532
J P4 0.56 0.5 520 impJ P4 0.56 0.5 532
J P5 0.52 0.5 508 impJ P5 0.52 0.5 532
J P6 0.55 0.5 513 impJ P6 0.56 0.5 532
J P7 0.62 0.49 512 impJ P7 0.62 0.49 532
J P8 0.63 0.48 511 impJ P8 0.62 0.48 532
J P9 0.41 0.49 309 impJ P9 0.55 0.5 532
J P10 0.48 0.5 485 impJ P10 0.48 0.5 532
J P11 0.52 0.5 487 impJ P11 0.52 0.5 532
J P12 0.35 0.48 487 impJ P12 0.38 0.48 532
J P13 0.57 0.5 469 impJ P13 0.58 0.49 532
J P14 0.56 0.5 467 impJ P14 0.57 0.5 532
J P15 0.58 0.49 473 impJ P15 0.59 0.49 532
J P16 0.63 0.48 472 impJ P16 0.63 0.48 532
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(a) Rasch and raw scales before the treatment
(b) Rasch and raw scales after the treatment
FIGURE S1 – CORRELATIONS BETWEEN RASCH AND RAW SCALES
2 Predicting the scale using Rasch model
To predict the scale using the Rasch model, I implement IRT 1PL command in
Stata. This command is comparable with the raschtest command. Both commands
assume that items vary in difficulty but share the same discrimination parameter.
Figure S1 presents the correlation between the predicted Rasch scale using IRT
1PL command and the raw score. The discrepancy between the two reflects the
weights assigned by the Rasch model to each item.
3 Tests
Item response function
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FIGURE S2 – ITEM CHARACTERISTIC CURVE
The main concept in IRT estimates is an item characteristic curve (ICC), also
known as item response function. It describes the relationship between the latent
trait level and the probability of affirming ’Yes’ (success) for an item. In the Rasch
model, we assume that the slope of ICC, which is known as the discrimination
parameter, is the same across items. The position of each item’s ICC along the
continuum value of the latent trait shows as the item’s difficulty level. Figure S2
describes the estimated values of item difficulty using the data on 533 households
in the Kei Islands. The figure plots the ICC according to its difficulty level, with Q8
as the easiest item and Q12 as the most difficult item; see the following verbatim
copy of the estimates report for the complete order. The difficulty parameter is
shown by coefficients on Diff with the absolute value reflecting the difficulty level
for each item.
. estat report, sort(b) byparm
One-parameter logistic model Number of obs = 533
Log likelihood = -3874.5349
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Coef. Std. err. z P>|z| [95\% Conf. interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
Discrim | 2.79416 .1383668 20.19 0.000 2.522966 3.065354
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
Diff |
Q8 | -.1786069 .0607153 -2.94 0.003 -.2976067 -.0596071
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Q2 | -.1624043 .0604937 -2.68 0.007 -.2809698 -.0438388
Q7 | -.1570323 .0604227 -2.60 0.009 -.2754587 -.038606
Q4 | -.1516744 .0603532 -2.51 0.012 -.2699645 -.0333844
Q9 | -.0676534 .0594303 -1.14 0.255 -.1841346 .0488279
Q16 | -.0522118 .0592961 -0.88 0.379 -.16843 .0640064
Q3 | .003733 .0589056 0.06 0.949 -.1117198 .1191858
Q15 | .0388723 .0587386 0.66 0.508 -.0762532 .1539979
Q11 | .0438679 .0587199 0.75 0.455 -.0712209 .1589567
Q6 | .0737315 .0586338 1.26 0.209 -.0411887 .1886517
Q13 | .1083736 .0585905 1.85 0.064 -.0064616 .2232088
Q14 | .133019 .0585967 2.27 0.023 .0181715 .2478665
Q10 | .162519 .0586449 2.77 0.006 .0475771 .277461
Q5 | .1821577 .0587016 3.10 0.002 .0671046 .2972108
Q12 | .471423 .0617677 7.63 0.000 .3503606 .5924854
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ICC curve reveals that local cultural and linguistic factors might alter the
prescribed order of the items’ difficulty level, which suggests Q2 as the easiest and
Q16 as the most difficult item. In my observation during the survey, the cultural
influence that causes such altering is, for example, the habit of fasting. It could
conflate the estimate for the true level of the item’s difficulty of the question on
not eating the whole day for adults (Q8: Did you or other adults in your household
ever not eat for a whole day because there wasn’t enough money for food?) or for
children (Q16: Did any of the children ever not eat for a whole day because there
wasn’t enough money for food?). These two items’ difficulty is ranked among that
for the easiest items.
In general, the empirical estimate shows that the difficulty level of items is not
well spread (concentrated at around median) along with the value of the latent
trait. The only noticeable distinctive value is the difficulty level of Q12—Our chil-
dren were not eating enough because we just couldn’t afford enough food ? which
stands out at the highest level among other items’ difficulty parameters. This, in
turn, suggests that having children eat less is the norm for the highest food inse-
curity status among our sample in the Kei Islands.
Test characteristic curve
The test characteristic curve plots the expected score (sum of the probabilities
given the difficulty estimates for each item) and the latent trait. Figure S3 shows
the droplines for each expected score of 2, 3 6, and 7, which are the lower bound
for each category of food insecurity status. According to the estimate, the expected
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FIGURE S3 – TEST CHARACTERISTIC CURVE
score of 2 corresponds with the latent trait value of -0.666 and the expected score
of 7 corresponds with the latent trait value of -0.023.
Invariance and item fit
To check whether the assumption of unconditional independence (invariance)
holds, we need to plot the ICC and the items’ empirical proportions. The superim-
posing of the two illustrates that the model fits the data for certain items (e.g., Q3
and Q7) but relatively poorly fits the data for some items (e.g., Q2 and Q6). Assum-
ing that the measurement error might arise from the violation of the invariance
assumption, the impact estimate in the chapter relies on the use of an IV to correct
the bias originated from this issue.
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FIGURE S4 – ICC AND ITEM EMPIRICAL FIT
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Questionnaire
SURVAI PERIKANAN MASYARAKAT PESISIR DI KEPULAUAN KEI
Kei Islands Coastal Community Food Security and Fishery Survey 2016
Interviewer (full name):
Date of interview (day/month/year):
Time of interview (hh/mm):
Respondent (full name):
Respondent 2013ID:
Village:
Sub-district:
District:
Instructions for enumerators:
• Introduce yourself as a researcher from the University of Pattimura/ Politeknik
Perikanan Tual.
• Provide the Information Sheet.
• Explain the purpose of this interview (You can use the Information Sheet).
Explain that:
• You are going to ask them about the food eaten in their households and their
fishing activity in the last 12 months; and
• This interview is for the purpose of academic research only (not politics or
other things).
• Many questions are related to fishing activities in Kei islands over the last 12
months. Guide the respondent patiently to remind them about the period of
time we are interested in
• For a multiple choice question, circle the ”number” corresponding to your an-
swer to each question (eg. 1. Yes, 2. No). Where instructed, circle multiple
numbers.
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PART A COGNITIVE CAPACITY
Now we want to ask you some simple questions.
1. Please mention date, month and year of today (BC calendar)
Date: Month: Year: Don’t know
2. Please mention what day is today?
1. Monday 2. Tuesday 3. Wednesday 4. Thursday 5. Fri-
day 6. Saturday 7. Sunday
3. Interviewer check the answer of date mentioned above:
1. Correct 2. Wrong
4. Now we will read a list of words consists of 10 words and we will ask you to
remember those words as many as possible. We intentionally make a long
list so that it is hard for anyone to remember all of the words. Most of people
are only remember some of the words. Please listen carefully when we read
along the list as we will only read once for each word. When we’re done in
read them, we ask you to mention as many as words that you are remember
and not necessarily in order. Is that clear enough?
5. Interviewer check the list code: A. B. C. D.
6. Read these words slowly, about two seconds for each word.
7. Ask the respondent to mention the words and write them down here.
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A B C D
HOTEL LANGIT GUNUNG AIR
SUNGAI SAMUDERA BATU MAKAN
POHON BENDERA KONFLIK DOKTER
KULIT RUPIAH SUDUT ISTANA
EMAS ISTRI SEPATU API
PASAR MESIN SURAT TAMAN
KERTAS RUMAH GADIS LAUT
KONFLIK BUMI RUMAH DESA
RAJA MAKAN LEMBAH BAYI
BUKU MENTEGA MOBIL MEJA
A B C D
Total number Total number Total number Total number
of correct words: of correct words: of correct words: of correct words:
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PART B IDENTIFY MAIN FISHER
• Identify MAIN fisher in the household. The main fisher is the person who
spends the MOST TIME involved in the fishing activity in the household.
• Ask if a spouse can join the interview to answer questions about household?s
food situation.
FIRST VISIT
Q1 Are you the main fisher who is most involved in the fishing activity in the
household?
1. Yes (go to Q3) 2. No (go to Q2)
Q2 (a) Could I please speak to the main fisher in the household?
1. Yes (go to Q3) 2. No (go to Q2b)
(b) Could I please speak to anyone involved in fishing activities in the house-
hold?
1. Yes (go to Q3) 2. No (ask when to come back recommence the survey
from Q5)
Date/Time to come back:
Q3 Have you done any fishing in the last 12 months? 1. Yes 2. No
Q4 Can your spouse participate in the interview to answer questions about your
household’s food situation? 1. Yes (go to Part C) 2. No (go to Part C)
SECOND VISIT (if the contact is made at the first visit, go to Part B)
Q5 Are you the main fisher who is most involved in the fishing activity in the
household?
1. Yes (go to Q7) 2. No (go to Q6)
Q6 (a) Could I please speak to the main fisher in the household?
1. Yes (go to Q7) 2. No (go to Q6b)
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(b) Could I please speak to anyone involved in fishing activities in the house-
hold?
1. Yes (go to Q7) 2. No (ask when to come back and recommence the sur-
vey from Q9)
Date/Time to come back:
Q7 Have you done any fishing in the last 12 months? 1. Yes 2. No
Q8 Can your spouse participate in the interview to answer questions about your
household’s food situation?
1. Yes (go to Part C) 2. No (go to Part C)
THIRD VISIT (if the contact is made at the second visit, go to Part B)
Q9 Are you the main fisher involved in the fishing activity in the household?
1. Yes (go to Q11) 2. No (go to Q10)
Q10 (a) Could I please speak to the main fisher in the household?
1. Yes (go to Q11) 2. No (go to Q10b)
(b) Could I please speak to anyone involved in fishing activities in the house-
hold?
1. Yes (go to Q11) 2. No (thank and terminate)
Q11 Have you done any fishing in the last 12 months?
1. Yes 2. No
Q12 Can your spouse participate in the interview to answer questions about your
household’s food situation?
1. Yes (go to Part C) 2. No (go to Part C)
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PART C CHARACTERISING YOUR FISHING OPERATION
Now I am going to ask you questions about your fishing operation.
Q1 How many years have you been fishing? (record the years) years
Q2 How many years have you been fishing in the Kei islands? (record the years)
years
Q3 (a) Thinking back over the last 12 months, on average, how many days per
week did you go fishing? (probe for days and record 1, 2, . . . , or 7. If nil record
0)
days per week
(b) On average, how many hours did you spend fishing each day? (probe for
hours and record 1, 2,. . . If nil record 0) hours per day
Q4 (a) Where is your current main fishing area? (read all options out and record
one option)
1. Within my own village sea territory 2. Outside my own village sea
territory
(b) How many hours did you usually spend travelling to your main fishing
area? (probe for hours and record 1, 2, . . . If less than 1 hours record 0)
hours
(c) Did you change the main fishing area during the last 12 months? (record
Yes=1, No=2)
1. Yes (go to Q4d) 2. No (go to Q5)
(d) Before you changed your main fishing area, where was your main fishing
area? (read all options out and record one option)
1. Within my own village sea territory 2. Outside my own village
sea territory
Q5 In the last 12 months, what was the proportion of your household income from
different activities? (use Table S2. read each item and record % and confirm
that the total is 100%)
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TABLE S2 – PART C Q5.
Activities Percentage(%)
Fisheries
Food crops
Horticulture
Livestock
Plantation
Seaweed farm
Home industry
Trade
Services
Civil servant
Tourist operation
Porter labour
Private work
Remittance
Other (specify)
Total 100%
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Q6 Please tell me if you think whether the following factors have negatively af-
fected your fishing in the last 12 months. (read each factor and answer cate-
gory until terminated in Table S3.)
TABLE S3 – PART C Q6
Factors Not affected Affected Highly
at all little affected
(a) Population growth 1 2 3
(b) Fishing by vessels from outside the Kei islands 1 2 3
(c) Tourism development 1 2 3
(d) Deforestation of mangroves 1 2 3
(e) Fishermen from Kei villages 1 2 3
(f) Urban Development 1 2 3
(g) Seaweed and pearl cultivation 1 2 3
(h) Fishing with bomb and poison 1 2 3
Q7 (a) Do you think that the condition of the fish stocks in your fishing grounds
is increasing or decreasing over time? (read all options out and record one
option)
1. Increasing 2. No change 3. Decreasing
(b) Do you think that the habitat condition in your fishing grounds is getting
better or worse over time? (read all options out and record one option)
1. Improved 2. No change 3. Damaged
Q8 What are the two main strategies you take to prepare your household upon
your expectation of decline in income? (read all options out and record maxi-
mum two options)
(a) Spend more time to catch more fish
(b) Spend more time for agriculture
(c) Spend more time for aquaculture (e.g., seaweed cultivation)
(d) Spend more time for construction services
(e) Spend more time for other activities not listed above (specify)
(f) Spend less money and save more
(g) Move to other villages within the Kei islands
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(h) Move out from the Kei islands
(i) Do nothing
(j) I don’t know
(k) Other (specify)
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PART D CATCH
Now I am going to ask you questions about the fish you caught in the last 12 months.
Use Table S4 for Q1 to Q3.
Q1 Please provide a list of species you actually caught in the last 12 months.
(read each species and record Yes=1, No=2. record any species not on the list)
Q2 For each species you caught, what was your average catch per trip in the last
12 months? (read each species and record catch in Bucket OR the number
of tail OR Kg)
Q3 (a) Of the fish you caught, which one is the most important species for gener-
ating your household income? (record 1 for the most important species)
(b) What about the second most important species? (record 2 for the 2nd most
important species)
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TABLE S4 – PART D Q1-3
Species
Caught Average catch per trip Importance
1. Yes Record in Bucket OR Tail OR Kg 1. Most impor-
tant species
2. No (Note 1 ton = 1,000 kg) 2. 2nd most im-
portant species
Q1 Q2 Q3
Bucket Tail Kg
Puri
Momar
Komu
Kawalinya
Palala
Lemma
Sikuda
Bubara
Kakapmerah
Kerapu
Tenggiri
Baronang
Ekor Kuning
Ikan Terbang
Kakakutua
Kembung
Lainnya
Lalosi
Tamimi
Tembang
Cumi
Other (specify)
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Q4 Do you think that your catch amount during the last 12 months has increased
or decreased compared to 2 years ago? (read all options out and record one
option)
(a) Catch amount increased
(b) Catch amount decreased
(c) Catch amount did not change
(d) I don’t know
Q5 Do you think that the species you caught in the last 12 months are different
from the species you caught 2 years ago? (read all options out and record one
option)
(a) No, the species I caught did not change
(b) Yes, the species I caught in the last 12 months are more valuable
(c) Yes, the species I caught in the last 12 months are less valuable
(d) I don’t know
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PART E CAPITAL, FISHING EQUIPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT
Now I am going to ask you questions about the fishing equipment you used in the
last 12 months.
Use Table S5 for Q1
Q1 (a) Thinking back over the last 12 months, which type of fishing boat did you
use? (read each item and record Yes=1, No=2)
(b) For each fishing boat you used, did it have an engine? (read each item
used and record Yes=1, No=2)
(c) How many years have you been using these fishing boats? (read each item
used and record the years)
(d) Do you own these fishing boats? (read each item and record Yes=1, No=2)
TABLE S5 – PART E Q1
Items
Used Engine Years Own
1. Yes 1. Yes 1. Yes
2. No 2. No 2. No
Q1(a) Q1(b) Q1(c) Q1(d)
Traditional boat 1
Traditional boat 2
Traditional boat 3
Longboat 1
Longboat 2
Longboat 3
Speedboat 1
Speedboat 2
Speedboat 3
Q2 (a) Over the last 12 months, did you use bagan for fishing? (record Yes=1,
No=2)
1. Yes (go to Q2b) 2. No (go to Q3a)
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(b) How many bagan did you use in the last 12 months? (record the number
of bagan used)
(number)
(c) Do you own any of the bagan you used? (record Yes=1, No=2)
1. Yes 2. No
(d) How many years have you been using bagan for fishing? (record the years)
years
Q3 (a) Over the last 12 months, did you use rumpon for fishing? (record Yes=1,
No=2)
1. Yes (go to Q3b) 2. No (go to Q4a)
(b) How many rumpon did you use in the last 12 months? (record the number
of rumpon used)
(number)
(c) Do you own any of the rumpon you used? (record Yes=1, No=2)
1. Yes 2. No
(d) How many years have you been using rumpon for fishing? (record the
years)
years
Q4 (a) Thinking back over the last 12 months, what other fishing gears did you
use? (read each item and record Yes = 1, No = 2. record any gears not in the
list)
(b) How many years have you been using each of these fishing gears? (read
each item and record years for each item)
(c) Do you own these fishing gears? (read each item used and record Yes = 1,
No = 2)
Q5 Do you think that your fishing equipment you used in the last 12 months has
changed compared to 2 years ago? (read all options out and record one option)
(a) Changed to more modern equipment
(b) Changed to more traditional equipment
(c) No change
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TABLE S6 – PART E Q4
Items
Used Years Own
1. Yes 1. Yes
2. No 2. No
Q4(a) Q4(b) Q4(c)
Bubu 1
Bubu 2
Bubu 3
Nets (jaring) 1
Nets (jaring) 2
Nets (jaring) 3
Lines (pancing) 1
Lines (pancing) 2
Lines (pancing) 3
Light 1
Light 2
Light 3
(d) Other (specify)
Q6 (a) Thinking back over the last 12 months, how many people, including your-
self, were in your fishing boat as paid employees? If the number varies over
time, please tell me the average number of people. (record the number of paid
employee, if nil record ’0’)
people
(b) On average, how many people were in your fishing boat as unpaid helpers?
(record the number of helpers, if nil record ’0’)
people
(c) Are you a captain of the fishing boat? (record Yes=1, No=2)
1. Yes 2. No
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PART F SOCIAL CAPITAL
Now I’m going to read you several statements that people have made about the situ-
ation of your village. For these statements, please tell me your opinion.
Q1
a. If there is a problem in my village, the people who live here work together to
get it resolved. (read all options out and record one option)
1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Strongly agree
b. People in the village where I live are only out for themselves. (read all options
out and record one option)
1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Strongly agree
c. I am afraid when I am out alone after dark in my village. (read all options out
and record one option)
1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Strongly agree
d. In my village, small groups of people have all the power. (read all options out
and record one option)
1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
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3. Agree
4. Strongly agree
e. I feel like an outsider in my village. (read all options out and record one option)
1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Strongly agree
f. There is nothing I can do to solve problems in my village when they happen.
(read all options out and record one option)
1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Strongly agree
g. If I go out in the boat or to work and I need to leave my children I feel safe to
entrust them to my neighbour. (read all options out and record one option)
1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Strongly agree
h. Relationship and trust between fishers and village leaders is good in my vil-
lage. (read all options out and record one option)
1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Strongly agree
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i. Relationship and trust between fishers in my village and officers at the district
fisheries department is good. (read all options out and record one option)
1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Strongly agree
j. Relationship and trust among fishers in my village is good. (read all options
out and record one option)
1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Strongly agree
Now, please tell me your opinion about the following statements.
Q2
a. During the last 12 months, did you have any problem with other marine re-
source users in your own village? (record Yes=1, No=2)
1. Yes (go to Q2b)
2. No (go to Q3)
3. Don’t want to answer (go to Q3)
b. Did the problem involve any violence? (record Yes=1, No=2)
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don’t want to answer
c. How many people were involved in the problem? (read all options our and
record one option out)
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1. Fewer than 2 people
2. Between 3 and 10 people
3. More than 10 people
4. Don’t want to answer
d. Is the problem, which occurred during the last 12 months, new or old? (read
all options out and record one option)
1. Conflict started this year
2. Conflict started more than 1 year ago
3. Conflict started more than 2 years ago
4. Don’t want to answer
Q3
a. During the last 12 months, did you have a problem with other marine re-
source users outside your own village? (record Yes=1, No=2)
1. Yes (go to Q3b)
2. No (go to Q4)
3. Don’t want to answer (go to Q4)
b. Did the problem involve any violence? (record Yes=1, No=2)
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don’t want to answer
c. How many people were involved in the problem? (read all options our and
record one option out)
1. Less than 2 people
2. Between 3 and 10 people
3. More than 10 people
4. Don’t want to answer
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d. Is the problem, which occurred during the last 12 months, new or old? (read
all options out and record one option)
1. Conflict started this year
2. Conflict started more than 1 year ago
3. Conflict started more than 2 years ago
4. Don’t want to answer
Q4
a Have you seen outsiders fishing in the village sea territory in the last 12
months? (probe)
1. Yes (go to Q4b)
2. No (go to Part G)
b. Do you know where they come from? (read all options our and record ALL
options)
1. Don’t know
2. From other villages in the Kei islands
3. From other areas of Indonesia
4. From other countries
c. How often did you see the outsiders entering the village territory? (read all
options out and record one option)
1. Almost every day
2. Once a week
3. Once a fortnight
4. Once a month
5. Less than once a month
d How big was the boat? (read all options out and record ALL options)
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1. Smaller than 5m
2. 5-10m
3. 10-30m
4. Larger than 30m
e. Do you think that the occurrence of outsiders fishing in the village territory
is increasing or decreasing compared to 2 years ago? (read all options out and
record one option)
1. Increasing
2. Decreasing
3. No change
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PART G DEMOGRAPHIC
Q1 What is your age? years old.
Q2 What is your gender?
1. Male 2. Female
Q3 What is your ethnic group?
1. Kei
2. Buton
3. Bugis
4. Arab
5. Banjar
6. Other (specify)
Q4. How many years have you lived in this village? years
Q5. (a) What is your main occupation?
1. Farmer
2. Fisher
3. Home industry
4. Civil servant
5. Private business
6. Trader
7. Services
8. Labour
9. Driver
10. Ojek
11. Other (specify)
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(b) What is your second occupation?
1. Farmer
2. Fisher
3. Home industry
4. Civil servant
5. Private business
6. Trader
7. Services
8. Labour
9. Driver
10. Ojek
11. Other (specify)
Q6. (a) What is the highest degree you have attained?
1. No formal education
2. Primary school
3. SLTP
4. SLTA
5. Diploma
6. University degree
7. Other (specify)
(b) How many years of formal school education do you have? years
Q7. What is your religion?
1. Christian Protestant
2. Catholic
3. Islam
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4. Buddhism
5. Hindu
6. Konghucu
7. Other (specify)
Q8. (a) Other than you, how many people normally live and eat in this household
including adults, children and babies? (probe for the number)
Number of people: years
(b) Of these, how many people are not working? (probe for the number)
Number of people: years
(c) Of these, how many people are usually involved in fishing activities? (probe
for the number)
Number of people: years
Q9. (a) How long has your household had electricity? (record the years. If no elec-
tricity at the household, record ’0’)
years
(b) What is your source of electricity? (read all options out and record one
option)
1. PLN
2. Village own diesel power generator
3. Village own solar power generator
4. Village own ocean based power generator
5. Your own diesel power generator
6. Your own gasoline power generator
7. Your own solar power generator
8. Other (specify) years
(c) What is the main problem with your electrical system? (read all options
out and record one option)
155
1. Cost of fuel
2. Maintenance of machinery
3. Availability of fuel
4. Environnemental damage (pollution, noise, etc)
5. No problem
6. Other (specify)
(d) Do you use biomass/organic matter for your household energy needs (e.g.,
cooking, light)? (record Yes=1, No=2)
1. Yes 2. No
(e) Have you ever heard of renewable energy? (record Yes=1, No=2)
1. Yes 2. No
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PART H FOOD SITUATION LAST 12 MONTHS
Respondent: Mother/household member responsible for food
P0. Name of respondent:
These next questions are about the food eaten in your household in the LAST 12
MONTHS. We would like to ask you whether you were able to afford the food you
needed.
A household includes father, mother, children (boys and girls) and other persons
who live in the same house and eat from the same kitchen for more than 6 months.
Q1. Which of these statements best describes the food eaten in your household in
the last 12 months? (read all options out and record one option)
1. Enough of the kind of food we want to eat
2. Enough but not always the kind of food we want
3. Sometimes not enough to eat
4. Often not enough to eat
Now I’m going to read you several statements that people have made about
their food situation. For these statements, please tell me whether the statement
was often true, sometimes true, or never true for your household in the LAST
12 MONTHS.
Q2. We worried whether our food would run out before we got money to buy more.
Was that often true, sometimes true, or never true for your household in the
last 12 months (record one option)
1. Often true
2. Sometimes true
3. Never true
Q3. The food that we bought just didn’t last, and we didn’t have money to get
more. Was that often, sometimes, or never true for your household in the last
12 months? (record one option)
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1. Often true
2. Sometimes true
3. Never true
Q4. We couldn’t afford to eat balanced meals. Was that often, sometimes, or never
true for your household in the last 12 months? (record one option)
1. Often true
2. Sometimes true
3. Never true
Go to Q5a if the respondent answered 1 or 2 in any of Q2-Q4 OR if 3 or 4 in
Q1.
In other cases,
Go to Q10 if children under age 18 are present in the household.
Go to Part C if children under age 18 are not present in the household.
Q5. (a) In the last 12 months, since January 2015, did you or other adults in your
household ever cut the size of your meals or skip meals because there wasn’t
enough money for food? (record Yes=1, No=2)
1. Yes (go to Q5b)
2. No (go to Q6)
(b) How often did this happen? (read all options out and record one option)
1. Almost every month
2. Some months but not every month
3. Only 1 or 2 months
Q6. In the last 12 months, did you ever eat less than you felt you should because
there wasn’t enough money for food? (record Yes=1, No=2)
1. Yes
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2. No
Q7. In the last 12 months, were you ever hungry but didn’t eat because there
wasn’t enough money for food? (record Yes=1, No=2)
1. Yes
2. No
Q8. In the last 12 months, did you lose weight because there wasn’t enough money
for food? (record Yes=1, No=2)
1. Yes
2. No
Go to Q9a if the respondent answered 1 in any of Q5-Q8.
In other cases,
Go to Q10 if children under age 18 are present in the household.
Go to Part I if children under age 18 are not present in the household.
Q9. (a) In the last 12 months, did you or other adults in your household ever not
eat for a whole day because there wasn’t enough money for food? (record
Yes=1, No=2)
1. Yes (go to Q9b)
2. No (go to Q10)
(b) How often did this happen? (read all options out and record one option)
1. Almost every month
2. Some months but not every month
3. Only 1 or 2 months
Continue to Q10 if children under age 18 are present in the household.
Go to Part I if children under age 18 are not present in the household.
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Q10. Now I’m going to read you several statements that people have made about
the food situation of their children. For these statements, please tell me
whether the statement was often true, sometimes true, or never true in the
LAST 12 MONTHS for your children living in the household who are under
18 years old.
We relied on only a few kinds of low-cost food to feed our children because we
were running out of money to buy food. Was that often, sometimes, or never
true for your household in the last 12 months? (record one option)
1. Often true
2. Sometimes true
3. Never true
Q11. We couldn’t feed our children a balanced meal, because we couldn’t afford
that. Was that often, sometimes, or never true for your household in the last
12 months? (record one option)
1. Often true
2. Sometimes true
3. Never true
Q12. Our children were not eating enough because we just couldn’t afford enough
food. Was that often, sometimes, or never true for your household in the last
12 months? (record one option)
1. Often true
2. Sometimes true
3. Never true
Go to Q13 if the respondent answered 1 or 2 in any of Q10-Q12.
Go to Part I otherwise.
Q13. In the last 12 months, since January of last year, did you ever cut the size
of any of your children’s meals because there wasn’t enough money for food?
(record Yes=1, No=2)
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1. Yes
2. No
Q14. (a) In the last 12 months, did any of the children ever skip meals because
there wasn’t enough money for food? (record Yes=1, No=2)
1. Yes (go to Q14b)
2. No (go to Q15)
(b) How often did this happen (read all options out and record one option)
1. Almost every month
2. Some months but not every month
3. Only 1 or 2 months
Q15. In the last 12 months, were the children ever hungry but you just couldn’t
afford more food? (record Yes=1, No=2)
1. Yes
2. No
Q16. In the last 12 months, did any of the children ever not eat for a whole day
because there wasn’t enough money for food? (record Yes=1, No=2)
1. Yes
2. No
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PART I LIVELIHOOD CHANGE AND RISK PREFERENCE
Respondent: 1. Main Fisher 2. Mother 3. Both (please circle
one)
People’s fortune and livelihood might change over time due to the uncertain nature of
life. On this occasion, we would like to ask you to imagine your future better fortune
and livelihood due to a good catch or engaging in another job, resulting in additional
income to your current income. To mimic the situation and to help you think about it,
we would like to ask you to participate in a livelihood change experiment. Again, this
experiment is part of our research. We are interested in understanding how people make
decisions. There is no right or wrong decision in this experiment. We would like you to
just make a decision that feels right for you.
The experiment, called an investment game is as follows:
Initial Capital
We are going to provide you with some initial capital for this experiment.
I have two marbles, blue and yellow. I am going to put them behind my back,
shake them and put one in each hand and bring them forward. I have one marble
in each hand, concealed. Now, you must pick one hand. If you pick the hand con-
taining the blue marble, the amount of initial capital you have is Rp5,000. If you
pick the hand containing the yellow marble, the amount of initial capital you have
is Rp20,000.
Q1. Now, please pick one hand. (record the outcome. do NOT make a payment yet)
1. Blue (Rp5,000)
2. Yellow (Rp20,000)
Livelihood Change Scenarios
Now, if you invest your initial capital into one of the six alternative livelihood op-
tions, you will get the money. How much you can get depends on your initial capital
as well as your luck. You choose one of the livelihood options and we will use the
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”which hand is it in” game to determine your winnings.
I have two marbles, red and green. I am going to put them behind my back,
shake them and put one in each hand and bring them forward. Now, I have one
marble in each hand, concealed. Now, you must pick one hand. If you pick the hand
containing the red marble you receive the amount of money on the column of Red
Marble. If you pick the hand containing the green marble you receive the amount
of money on the column of Green Marble.
Finally, I will pay you according to what happened in the experiment. Any
money you receive is real money and is yours to keep.
For Q2:
• Use the first two columns of Table S7 if the respondent got Blue in Q1
• Use the last two columns of Table S7 if the respondent got Yellow in Q1
Q2 . (a) Now, please choose your livelihood option you prefer. (record one option)
1. A 2.B 3. C 4. D 5. E 6.F
(b) Now, please pick one hand. (record the outcome and make payment ac-
cordingly)
1. Red 2. Green
Refer to Table S7 to determine the amount of money given to respondent i.e. use
first two column of Table S7 if the respondent got BLUE marble (Rp50,000) for
the initial capital, and use the last two column in Table S7 if the respondent got
YELLOW marble (Rp20,000) for the initial capital
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TABLE S7 – INVESTMENT GAME
Scenarios Low Initial Offer (Rp5,000) High Initial Offer (Rp20,000)
Red Marble Green Marble Red Marble Green Marble
A Rp5.000 Rp5.000 Rp20.000 Rp20.000
B Rp4.500 Rp6.500 Rp16.000 Rp25.000
C Rp4.000 Rp8.000 Rp12.000 Rp30.000
D Rp3.000 Rp10.000 Rp8.000 Rp35.000
E Rp2.000 Rp12.000 Rp4.000 Rp40.000
F 0 Rp14.000 0 Rp50.000
PART J FOOD SECURITY NEXT 1 (ONE) WEEK
Now, we want to relate your livelihood change to the questions about the food that
will be eaten in your household in the next 1 week, from now, and whether you
will be able to afford the food you need in this period. Imagine that the amount
of funding from the livelihood change experiment will be your additional monthly
income, beside your usual income.
I’m going to read you several statements that people have made about their food
situation in the next 1 week. For these statements, please tell me whether the state-
ment will be often true, sometimes true, or never be true for your household in the
next 1 week-that is, since last week.
Q1. Which of these statements best describes the food eaten in your household in
the next one week? (read all options out and record one option)
1. Enough of the kind of food we want to eat
2. Enough but not always the kind of food we want
3. Sometimes not enough to eat
4. Often not enough to eat
Now I’m going to read you several statements that people have made about
their food situation. For these statements, please tell me whether the statement
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was often true, sometimes true, or never true for your household in the next
one week.
Q2. We worry whether our food will run out before we got money to buy more.
Do you expect this will be often true, sometimes true, or never true for your
household in the next one week (record one option)
1. Often true
2. Sometimes true
3. Never true
Q3. The food that we buy will not be enough, and we won’t have money to get more.
Was that often, sometimes, or never true for your household in the next one
week? (record one option)
1. Often true
2. Sometimes true
3. Never true
Q4. We won’t afford to eat balanced meals. Do you expect this will be often, some-
times, or never true for your household in the next one week? (record one
option)
1. Often true
2. Sometimes true
3. Never true
Go to Q5a if the respondent answered 1 or 2 in any of Q2-Q4 OR if 3 or 4 in
Q1.
In other cases,
Go to Q10 if children under age 18 are present in the household.
Go to Part C if children under age 18 are not present in the household.
Q5. (a) In the next one week, will you or other adults in your household cut the
size of your meals or skip meals because there will be not enough money for
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food? (record Yes=1, No=2)
1. Yes (go to Q5b)
2. No (go to Q6)
(b) How often will this happen in the next one week? (read all options out
and record one option)
1. Almost every week
2. Some weeks but not every week
3. Only 1 or 2 week
Q6. In the next one week, do you expect you will eat less than you should because
there will be not enough money for food? (record Yes=1, No=2)
1. Yes
2. No
Q7. In the next one week, do you expect that you will be hungry but won’t eat
because there will be not enough money for food? (record Yes=1, No=2)
1. Yes
2. No
Q8. In the next one week, do you will lose weight because there will be not enough
money for food? (record Yes=1, No=2)
1. Yes
2. No
Go to Q9a if the respondent answered 1 in any of Q5-Q8.
In other cases,
Go to Q10 if children under age 18 are present in the household.
Go toPart I if children under age 18 are not present in the household.
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Q9. (a) In the next one week, do you expect that you or other adults in your
household will not eat for a whole day because there won’t be enough money
for food? (record Yes=1, No=2)
1. Yes (go to Q9b)
2. No (go to Q10)
(b) How often will this happen? (read all options out and record one option)
1. Almost every week
2. Some weeks but not every week
3. Only 1 or 2 weeks
Continue to Q10 if children under age 18 are present in the household.
Go to Part I if children under age 18 are not present in the household.
Q10. Now I’m going to read you several statements that people have made about
the food situation of their children. For these statements, please tell me
whether the statement was often true, sometimes true, or never true in the
next one week for your children living in the household who are under 18
years old.
We will rely on only a few kinds of low-cost food to feed our children because
we will be running out of money to buy food. Do you expect this will be often,
sometimes, or never true for your household in the next one week? (record
one option)
1. Often true
2. Sometimes true
3. Never true
Q11. We won’t be able to feed our children a balanced meal, because we won’t be
able afford that. Do you expect that it will be often, sometimes, or never true
for your household in the next one week? (record one option)
1. Often true
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2. Sometimes true
3. Never true
Q12. Our children won’t be eating enough because we won’t afford enough food. Do
you expect that it will be often, sometimes, or never true for your household
in thenext one week ? (record one option)
1. Often true
2. Sometimes true
3. Never true
Go to Q13 if the respondent answered 1 or 2 in any of Q10-Q12.
Go to Part I otherwise.
Q13. In the next one week, will you cut the size of any of your children’s meals
because there won’t be enough money for food? (record Yes=1, No=2)
1. Yes
2. No
Q14. (a) In the next one week, will any of the children skip meals because there
won’t be enough money for food? (record Yes=1, No=2)
1. Yes (go to Q14b)
2. No (go to Q15)
(b) How often will this happen (read all options out and record one option)
1. Almost every week
2. Some week but not every week
3. Only 1 or 2 week
Q15. In the next one week, do you expect that your children will be hungry but
you just won’t afford more food? (record Yes=1, No=2)
1. Yes
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2. No
Q16. In the next one week, do you expect that any of the children will not eat for
a whole day because there won’t be enough money for food? (record Yes=1,
No=2)
1. Yes
2. No
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PART K HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURES
The next questions deal with your HOUSEHOLD’s expenses.
Q1. About how much did you and your household spend per day on food that you
use at home in the LAST WEEK? Include expenditures on drinking water,
spices, and cooking oil, and other fuel for cooking (fire woods, kerosene).
ribu Rupiah
Q2. How much do you and your household spend for cigarettes PER DAY?
ribu Rupiah
Q3. How much do you and your household spend for alcohols in the LAST WEEK?
ribu Rupiah
Q4. How much did you and your household spend for mobile phone in the LAST
WEEK?
ribu Rupiah
Q5. How much did you and your household spend for electricity in the LAST
MONTH?
ribu Rupiah
Q6. About how much did you and your household spend on transportation in the
LAST MONTH? Include expenditures on public transportation, and if your
household owns a motorcycle, include expenditures on gas, repairs and tax.
ribu Rupiah
Q7. About how much did you and your household spend on health services in the
LAST MONTH? Include expenditures on medicine and seeing doctors and
nurses.
ribu Rupiah
Q8. How much did you and your household spend for education in the LAST
MONTH? Include expenditure on tuition fees, living costs for children who
live outside your home, and school activities.
ribu Rupiah
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Q9. How much did you and your household spend for entertainment in the LAST
MONTH? Include expenditure on eating out, drinking with friends, and all
other recreational activities.
ribu Rupiah
Q10. How much did you and your household spend for soap, detergent, and other
cleaning equipment in the LAST MONTH?
ribu Rupiah
Q11. About how much did you and your household spend on loan payments in the
LAST MONTH?
ribu Rupiah
Q12. About how much did you and your household spend on the maintenance of
fishing equipment (boat, net, machine) in the LAST 6 MONTHS?
ribu Rupiah
Q13. About how much did you and your household spend on clothing (including
shoes and head covers) in the LAST YEAR?
ribu Rupiah
Q14. About how much did you and your household spend on ceremonial activities in
the LAST YEAR? Include expenditures on religious and cultural ceremonies,
parties, circumcision and weddings.
ribu Rupiah
Q15. About how much did you and your household spend on rent for your house in
the LAST YEAR?
ribu Rupiah
Q16. About how much did you and your household spend in total in the LAST
MONTH?
ribu Rupiah
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PART K INTERVIEWER QUESTION
Q1. How confident are you about the accuracy of the respondent’s recollection of
fishing activities in the last 12 months?
1. Confident
2. Not confident
Interviewer’s comments
-
Response report
1. Full response with main fisher
2. Full response with non-main fisher
3. Full refusal
4. Part refusal
5. No fishers in household
6. Other (specify)
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Supplement 2
This supplementary section is related to Chapter 3 of the main text.
Summary of sampling details
The survey design and implementation of the RUMiI project is well and compre-
hensively documented in Resosudarmo et al. (2010). From the documentation,
herewith, this section provides some extraction of the sampling details. The pri-
mary sampling unit of the survey is big islands-groups representing main enclave
of rural–urban migrants. These groups are Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi
and Papua. They have diverse culture, language and socio-economic character-
istics. Of these five regions, proportion of rural-urban migrants counted from the
2005 intercensal Population Survey (Survei Penduduk antar Sensus, or Supas) pro-
vides basis for choosing municipalities or districts as sample locations. In most
cases, the largest enclave in each region was selected for the survey with Papua as
the excluded region: Medan in Sumatera, Samarinda in Kalimantan, and Makas-
sar in Sulawesi. The reason for not to include Papua is the cost-efficiency problem
for conducting survey in Papua. Besides, Tangerang is chosen for Java. Its number
of rural-urban migrants is smaller than Jakarta as the primary sampling target.
The cost of conducting survey in Jakarta was too high and Tangerang is considered
a suitable substitute.
Construction of outcome variables
This section provides the explanation for calculating the mental health score and
social support score, the construction of panel setup for RUMiI data apart from the
RUMiCI data, a further elaboration why the return (remigration) might not be an
issue despite the high attrition in the dataset, and additional tables of estimates.
The mental health score
Table S9 presents the questions used to elicit the mental health problems in the
RUMiI surveys. It covers a wide range of dimensions ranging from sleep condition
up to feeling fulfilled or not. The questions are available for the first wave (2008),
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third wave (2010), and fourth/last wave (2011) but not the second wave (2009).
I decide to use data form only the first and last wave in the analysis, and not
the other waves, for this reason, in addition to the justification of getting clearer
variations for some key variables with a reasonable time gap, that is, four years.
FIGURE S5 – DISTRIBUTIONS OF MENTAL HEALTH SCORE BY MIGRATION
The steps for calculating the mental health score is as follows. First, I reverse
the Likert’s index of question P01 and P02 to reflect the same scale order with the
rest of questions (P03 to P12). Thus, all questions now have the same response
of 1 to reflect the best level of the mental health status and 4 to reflect the worst
level of the mental health status. Second, I recode the Likert’s scale as follows:
(1 = 0), (2 = 1), (3 = 2), and (4 = 3) or simply minus one for all index values to
comply with the scale as used in Fritjers et al. (2009) for ease of comparison with
other studies. Third, I construct a simple equally weighted scale by summing all
questions’ indices and assigning 0 to the healthiest level and 36 to the worst level of
mental health status. Figure S5 shows the distribution of this scale by migration
status at baseline (the year 2008). It seems to be normally distributed with the
most at around the mean, a clear indication that migrants have a slightly higher
score than natives.
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FIGURE S6 – DISTRIBUTIONS OF SOCIAL SUPPORT SCORE BY MIGRATION
The social support measure
The social support variable is measured by utilising two responses from the social
networks section of the survey. The first is the answer to the question whether
the respondent has been helped by other people. The second is the answer to the
question on the education level of the person. From this information, I construct
a weighted sum of the number of the network in which the education level of the
people in the network is used as the weight. The idea is to weight more people with
higher education when helping, despite a low variation if we take the network size
at face value. The following simple algebra is used to calculate the social support
scale measure:
∑
k
Dk · EDUk (5.2)
For each column k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, respondents affirm whether they have people who
have helped them (D = 1 means there is one person and 0 = otherwise) and EDU
is the level of education (I convert it into years of schooling) for each person k. The
algebra makes 0 the lowest scale in which no one helped and 51 the highest scale
(three people in the columns with a postgraduate degree (17 years of schooling)).
Figure S6 presents the distribution of this scale by migration status at baseline
(the year 2008). It seems to be widely distributed and shows a mixed pattern in
terms of whether the scale for migrants is lower/higher than natives.
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RUMiCI Panel Setup
The details on the study design and selection of the cities of the RUMiCI surveys
are available in Resosudarmo et al. (2010). The study in this chapter is the first to
use the panel feature of the Indonesian dataset, that is, RUMiI. Hence, this section
explains how to construct the panel data at the household-head level, which is
the unit used in the empirical analysis. To append data of all four waves, I unify
the household ID, which originally has different coding: five digits of migration id
(2008), six digits of idr (2009), eight digits of migration id (2010) and eight digits of
hhid (2011).
The migration id (2008) is in the XYYYY format with X denoting city number
(1 = Medan, 2 = Tangerang, 3 = Samarinda, and 4 = Makassar) and YYYY denot-
ing the household ID number. The idr (2009) is in the 0XYYYY format with 0X
denoting the city in 2008 and YYYY denoting the household ID number in 2008.
The migration id (2010) is in the XYYYYABC format with X denoting city in 2008,
YYYY denoting household ID number in 2009, A is 1 if the household is an addi-
tional observation in 2010 and 0 otherwise, B is 1 if the household is formed from
any household member in previous waves and 0 otherwise, C is the ID for individ-
uals who become the household head taken from his/her person ID in the previous
waves. The hhid (2011) has similar coding as migration id (2010). To unify these
different household ID formats, I create a uniform code similar to the 2011 code,
which is XYYYYABC, and impose 000 for ABC in 2008 and 2009.
TABLE S8 – ATTRITION RATE OF HOUSEHOLD SAMPLES IN RUMII DATA
Waves 2008 2009 2010 2011
Observations 2437 2023 1686 1565
Attrition 414 751 872
Attrition rate 17% 31% 36%
With this uniform format, the new households (additional and split households
in 2010 and 2011) are treated as a different entity from their parent households.
In the analysis, I only utilise the observation of the original household in 2008.
The new households originated from splits (303 households in 2010) and new sam-
ple (109 in 2010) do not have base information for 2008, which is required in the
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analysis. Table S8 shows the attrition rate of the household samples in RUMiI
data, which is considerably high. To test the potential effect of this attrition on the
coefficient estimate, I employ several strategies as explained in the main text.
Survey questions
The following table provides questions used to elicit the mental health condition in
RUMiI surveys.
Supplement 3
This supplementary section is related to Chapter 4 of the main text.
Survey questions
The following tables list questions to measure social skills attributed to five factors,
trust, and community participation in IFLS–5; and social participation, and trust
measure in SUSENAS of Social and Culture Module 2012.
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TABLE S9 – MENTAL HEALTH QUESTIONS IN RUMICI SURVEYS
Have you experienced the following in the past few weeks?
<P01> Can concentrate on a range of tasks 1. Cannot concentrate
2. Can concentrate sometimes
3. Can concentrate often
4. Can concentrate always
<P02> Do not get enough sleep because of excessive worrying 1. Often not able to sleep well
2. Sometimes not able to sleep well
3. Often can sleep well
4. Always can sleep well
<P03> A positive attitude to life 1. Very positive
2. Usually positive
3. Rarely positive
4. Usually not positive
<P04> Capable of making swift decisions 1.Very capable of making decisions
2.Usually capable of making decisions
3.Usually not capable of making decisions
4. Not capable of making decisions at all
<P05> Often feel depressed 1. Never
2. Rarely
3. Often
4. Very Often
<P06> Capable of solving problems or difficulties 1. Very capable
2. Capable
3. Less capable
4. Not capable
<P07> Can enjoy life/daily activities 1.Can enjoy daily activities very much
2. Usually can enjoy daily activities
3. Usually cannot enjoy daily activities
4. Not able to enjoy daily activities
<P08> Want to solve problems and not avoid them 1. Never avoid problems
2. Rarely avoid problems
3. Sometimes avoid problems
4. Often avoid problems
<P09> Happy/cheerful 1. Happy (Not unhappy)
2. Quite Happy (Rarely unhappy)
3. Less Happy (Often unhappy)
4. Not Happy (Always unhappy)
<P10> Am a confident person 1. Very confident
2. Confident
3. Less confident
4. Not confident
<P11> Feel useful/worthwhile 1. Very useful/worthwhile
2. Useful/worthwhile
3. Less useful/worthwhile
4. Not useful/worthwhile
<P12> After considering all aspects of life, do you feel fulfilled? 1. Very fulfilled
2. Quite fulfilled
3. Rather fulfilled
4. Not fulfilled178
TABLE S10 – QUESTIONS TO ASSESS SOCIAL CAPITAL MEASURE IN IFLS–5 SURVEY
Measures IFLS–5 Survey Questions
Personal skill factor how much you agree or disagree with each statement using the following scale
(1. Disagree strongly 2. Disagree a little 3. Neither agree nor disagree 4. Agree a little 5.Agree
Strongly )
Conscientiousness Does a thorough job.
Tends to be lazy (reversed).
Does things efficiently.
Openness to experience Is original, comes with new ideas.
Has an active imagination.
Values artistic, aesthetic, experiences.
Extraversion Is talkative.
Is reserved. (reversed)
Outgoing, sociable.
Agreeableness Has a forgiving nature.
Is considerate and kind to almost everyone.
Is sometimes rude to others (reversed).
Emotion stability Worries a lot.
Get nervous easily.
Is relaxed; handles stress well.
Trust dimension We want to ask you about trust in this village
TR01-I am willing to help people in this village if they need it.
TR02-In this village I have to be alert, or someone is likely to take advantage of me
TR03-Taking into account the diversity of ethnicities in the village, I trust people with the
same ethnicity as mine more.
TR04-I would be willing to leave my children with my neighbours for a few hours if I cannot
bring my children along.
TR05-I would be willing to ask my neighbours to look after my house if I leave for a few days.
Community part. We would like to ask you about some community or government activities and programmes
that may have taken place in this village during the past 12 months (1. Yes 0. No)
Community Meeting, Cooperatives, Voluntary Labour, Improve the Village/Neighbourhood,
Youth Groups Activity, Religious Activities, Village Library, Village Saving and Loans, Health
Fund, PNPM, Political Party, Neighbourhood Security Organisation (Siskamling), Water for
Drinking System/Supply, System for garbage disposal, Women’s Association Activities(PKK),
Community Weighing Post (Posyandu), Community Weighing Post Lansia (Posyandu Lansia)
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TABLE S11 – QUESTIONS TO ASSESS SOCIAL CAPITAL MEASURES IN SUSENAS SURVEY
Variable Question
Social participation Did you participate in any of the following social activi-
ties in the past three months?
1. religious
2. skill
3. sport
4. art
5. saving (arisan)
6. funeral
7. art
8. Other.
Trust [4 = strongly trust; 1 = no trust] 1. In general, do you trust that the head of village do
his/her job properly?
2. In general, do you trust that the village leaders can
do something to solve community member’s problems?
3. In general, do you trust that the religious leader acts
as a moral role model in the village?
4. Do you trust your neighbour in entrusting your house
when you are away?
5. Do you trust your neighbour in entrusting your chil-
dren when you are away?
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